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Allocation Of Residual Income Rights Under Internal Governance Empirical Results from the Hungarian Trucking Industry
Windsperger, Josef ; Jell-Ojobor, Maria
Windsperger, Josef
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Abstract
The paper offers a property rights and monitoring cost explanation for the allocation of residual income rights between the carriers and truck drivers under internal governance. First, by applying property rights theory, we argue that the structure of residual income rights depends on the importance of noncontractible (intangible) assets of the truck driver to generate a residual surplus. The more important the truck driver’s intangible knowledge
assets, the more residual income rights should be transferred to him. In addition, we controlled for the monitoring costs as an additional explanatory variable of the allocation of residual income rights. According to agency theory, the higher the variable proportion of the driver’s income, the higher the monitoring costs.These hypotheses were tested by using data from the Hungarian trucking industry. The empirical results are supportive of the hypotheses.
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Date
2003
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Keywords
Governance Structure, Contract Design, Ownership Structure, Intangible Assets, Residual Income Rights, Monitoring Costs
Citation
Windsperger, Joseph, and Maria Jell. “Allocation Of Residual Income Rights Under Internal Governance Empirical Results from the Hungarian Trucking Industry.” Competitio 3 (1). 2004