Ruscitti, Francesco
Institutional profile
I hold a Laurea degree in Economics (summa cum laude) from Sapienza University of Rome (1999).
I then got a Ph.D. in Economics at Purdue University (USA) in 2007.
I have taught a broad range of (undergraduate) courses in Microeconomics, Mathematical Economics, Economics of Information, Financial Economics, and Game Theory. I routinely teach introductory and intermediate Microeconomics and also Game Theory. Moreover, I have given graduate-level lectures on mathematical methods and the theory of financial markets at Tor Vergata University in Rome. My past research focused on the use of mathematical models for the analysis of market economies in a general equilibrium setting. More recently, my research interests have branched out into Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Game Theory.
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Publication Metadata only Dynamic Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions: the Trade-off Between Equity and Long-Run EfficiencyRuscitti, FrancescoI exploit the theory of stochastic orders to formalize preferences over sequences of income distributions that embody suitable principles of equity and efficiency. Intragenerational and intergenerational equity are combined into a new concept of equity that extends the Hammond’s equity principle (for infinite utility streams) to the realm of stochastic processes. The main result of the paper can be interpreted as follows: short-sighted, piecemeal economic policies that enhance equity may come at the expense of the income of generations in the far-off future. The proof of the instrumental lemma could be of interest in its own right because it uncovers the interplay between moment-generating functions and stochastic orders.Publication Metadata only A Note on Optimal Commodity Taxation with Moral Hazard and Separable Preferences(2010) Panaccione, Luca; Ruscitti, FrancescoIn this paper we show that differential commodity taxation is superfluous in an economy with moral hazard and separable preferences.Publication Metadata only On social welfare orders satisfying anonymity and asymptotic density-one Pareto(2021) Dubey, Ram Sewak; Laguzzi, Giorgio; Ruscitti, FrancescoWe study the nature (constructive versus non-constructive) and the issue of real-valued representability of social welfare orders, on the set of infinite utility streams, satisfying the anonymity and asymptotic density-one Pareto axioms. We characterize the existence of representable and constructive social welfare orders (fulfilling the aforementioned axioms) in terms of easily verifiable conditions on the feasible set of one-period utilities, denoted by YCR : a social welfare order satisfying anonymity and asymptotic density-one Pareto is representable and admits explicit description if and only if contains finitely many elements.Publication Open Access Monotone Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium(2016) Ruscitti, Francesco; Dubey, Ram SewakUnder certain conditions on the excess demand function, it is shown that the set of equilibrium prices coincides with the set of maximizers of a potential function. Therefore, monotone comparative statics techniques can be employed to study how equilibrium prices change when there are shocks to the parameters of the model. As a by-product of our analysis, it turns out that the set of equilibrium prices is a convex lattice.Publication Open Access Provision of a discrete public good with infinitely-many commodities(2013) Ruscitti, FrancescoSuppose a group of individuals must decide whether to undertake a public project. The private commodity space, from which are also drawn the inputs for the public good, exhibits the Riesz decomposition property. We give a sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible provision of the public good that Pareto-dominates inaction. The condition is that the `net benefit' from the public project be positive. If this condition is met, by the Riesz decomposition property the cost of the project can be decomposed into a sum of individual contributions or taxes so that the project can be `financed' and every agent retains a positive surplus.Publication Open Access Existence of Competitive Equilibria without Standard Boundary Behavior(2011) Ruscitti, FrancescoWe study the existence of competitive equilibria when the excess demand function fails to satisfy the standard boundary behavior. We introduce alternative boundary conditions and we examine their role in proving the existence of strictly positive solutions to a system of non-linear equations (competitive equilibium prices). In addition, we slightly generalize a well-known theorem on the existence of maximal elements, and we unveil the link between the hypothesis of our theorem and one of the boundary conditions introduced in this work.Publication Open Access The Open Graph Theorem for Correspondences: A New Proof and Some Applications(2012) Impicciatore, Galeazzo; Ruscitti, FrancescoIt is known that a correspondence from a topological space to a Euclidean space, with open and convex upper sections, has an open graph if and only if it is lower hemicontinuous. We refer to this result as the open graph theorem. We provide a new and simple proof of the open graph theorem. We also show that the open graph theorem leads to novel results on the existence of constant selections and fixed points for correspondences with non-compact and non-convex domain. Finally, we present an economic application of our results to a principal-agent model.Publication Metadata only On the representation and construction of equitable social welfare orders(2020) Dubey, Ram Sewak; Laguzzi, Giorgio; Ruscitti, FrancescoThis paper examines the representation and explicit description of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams. It is assumed that the social welfare orders under investigation satisfy upper asymptotic Pareto and anonymity axioms. We prove that there exists no real-valued representation of such social welfare orders. In addition, we establish that the existence of a social welfare order satisfying the anonymity and upper asymptotic Pareto axioms implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set, which is a non-constructive object. Thus, we conclude that the social welfare orders under study do not admit explicit description.