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John Cabot University

Department of Political Science and International Affairs

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

The Fourth Instrument of Statecraft:
Biopolitics in the Post-Modern Security Environment

Olivia Caroline Slaughter

First Reader
Dr. Alberto Micali

Second Reader
Dr. Michael Driessen

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Abstract

The global security environment has drastically transformed for interstate conflict in post-modernity. Where interstate power operations were once solely reliant on the economic, military, and diplomatic instruments, a new instrument of statecraft has risen which relies on information. This information includes psychological, sociological, historical, cultural values, scientific qualities, and knowledge. Information can dictate power operations when it is collected, analyzed, and disseminated. State actors, non-state actors, and global citizens can manipulate global power realities by controlling information. Information as a statecraft may not always be operationally separable from the other instruments of power. In chapter one, the post-modern security paradigm will be introduced. The literary analysis in chapter two is a compilation of a series of theorists who have, in some way, described this fourth instrument of statecraft in their works. Chapter three details the historical beginnings of this instrument of power, including the trending methods of coercion, effects of neoliberal international institutions, and the Information Age. Chapter four is a case study of post-modern U.S. intelligence and defense operations and strategies which align with Foucault's theory of biopolitics and Deleuze's control societies paradigm. My findings of this research are that the statecraft of information is elusive; however, it is analytically separable from the other three major operations of interstate power. Further, this instrument will only continue to manifest in its importance as societies continue to modernize in the age of information.

Keywords: *Biopolitics, biopower, coercion, Information Age, information and communication technology, information warfare, intelligence, paradigms of power, security environment, subjectivize.*

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my readers, Dr. Alberto Micali and Dr. Michael Driessen, who have been exceptionally patient with me in my four years at John Cabot University.

And to my mother who will read the dedication and skim-read the rest.

1: An Introduction

“Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power.”

Michel Foucault (1975, p. 52)

There has been no direct kinetic war between the Great Powers since the Second World War (Fettweis, 2010). The lack of direct kinetic war between the Great Powers, and decline in interstate conflict in general, is not representative of some transcontinental, Utopian peace; it is instead a testament to the transformation of the global security environment. The Great Powers and other states alike have advanced their militaries’ and defense institutions’ capabilities to encompass a new frontier of coercive operations against other foreign powers. This frontier is based on information and is the product of military technological and operative innovations, new neoliberal international discourse, and the entrance of the Information Age¹.

The differences between the most economically influential and politically powerful states and those which have little power in determining global affairs vary immensely. Foucault’s theory of power paradigms suggest that power struggles are conducted differently based on the economic, political, social, technological, and disciplinary realities which the authorities and subjects exist in. Scientific innovations, proliferation of technology, and entrance of liberal ideals provide the authorities of a state alternatives to violent methods of subsiding power over their subjects. When authorities utilize superior technology for surveillance and intelligence operations, the subjects cannot know whether they are being monitored. Technological

¹ The Information Age is a term used to describe the period of technological, political, and economic change in the late 20th century following the economic paradigm created by the Industrial Revolution. The Information Age is observed under various names including Postmodernity, the Information Revolution, the Control Revolution, and the Internet Age.

innovation allows for immediate discipline in the case of an unauthorized action. Where previously, the authority's power was implemented through a hierarchical, centralized command, now the distance between the subject and the authority is shortened. Subjectivization was once violent, but now the uncertainty of being watched disciplines the subject to act in line with societal standards. Additionally, the subjects are presented a historical and cultural discourse and social norms which they adhere to in a way which is 'natural'. This includes the normalcy of continuous surveillance. Subjects now regulated themselves, subjectivizing themselves under an authority; this is biopolitics. Foucault's theories can be taken from intrastate power relations and applied to interstate conflict. This paradigm of power befits the post-modern global security environment as states, nonstate actors, and globalized societies increasingly rely of information technologies for everything from computerized finance banking databases, to everyday communication between citizens, all the way to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Post-modernity is characterized by a sharp decline in interstate violent conflict; however, this is not a signal to the international community that world peace is nigh. The struggle for interstate power has become almost non-visible and non-kinetic, especially for those states with significantly modernized². The United States' intelligence and defense operations are a prime example of a state's forces which have fully embraced, and perhaps led, this development in conflict related affairs. Given the increasing complexity of threats in the global security environment, an array of security dilemmas, often interwoven, have risen. The U.S. Department of Defense has developed an adaptive framework of strategy and operation in order to mitigate and confront these threats and changes to the security environment.

² Modernization theory, originally proposed by Max Weber, suggests that societal wealth, liberal freedoms, and the power of state are codependent. Technological innovation, urbanization, industrialization, and rationalization are further attributed to modernization.

The elusive fourth instrument of statecraft is strategically non-visible, but it is analytical observable. In this thesis, I seek to illustrate the biopolitical reality of the post-modern security environment and to determine if Foucault was correct regarding his theory on the future of power-relation paradigms. The post-modern reality of coercive interstate control apparatuses and power operations are illustrated using the U.S.'s intelligence and defense operations and strategies from the post-WWII period to the present-day. A distinct phenomenon involving communication networks, technological proliferation, cultural values, scientific innovation, psychology, sociology, and knowledge is observable. This phenomenon is the fourth instrument of statecraft: information.

2: A Literary Analysis of the Fourth Instrument of Statecraft

“To fight and conquer in all our battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.”

Sun Tzu (Griffin, 1971, p. 9)

Introduction

Traditional realist and liberal theories of interstate conflict, cooperation, and competition have attributed power relations to various instruments of statecraft: the diplomatic, the economic, and the military (Nau, 2019; Waltz, 2010). However, there exists a fourth instrument of statecraft in the international security environment with ever-growing importance, yet it is precisely this instrument which is often disregarded in strategy studies debates. Many scholars, theorists, and political practitioners of power and strategic studies have varying definitions and names for this fourth instrument; however, after analyzing their theories and work, a common phenomenon is illustrated (Foucault, 2003, 1975; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Holt & Van de Velde, 1960; Nye, 2004). This sphere of power is psychological, communicative, informative, and social. States and non-state actors utilize communication networks, technological proliferation, scientific innovation, cultural values, and knowledge to subjectivize target populations and decisionmakers. In subjectivizing these targets, the operating state or non-state actor promotes its interest indirectly by guiding its targets with an ‘invisible hand³’. This invisible hand works by constructing the target’s worldview in favor of the operator’s interest and is conducted through information collection, analysis, and dissemination. The target is unaware that their knowledge and value systems propagate the authoritative power of the operator. Regardless of the scholar’s

³ See Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (1991), originally published in 1776.

terminology, an observable phenomenon has entered the dialogue on international power relations and this phenomenon must be studied as its importance will only increase with the emergence of the Information Age.

Robert T. Holt and Robert W. Van de Velde published a valuable contribution to international strategic studies in 1960 titled *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy*. In this work, the authors give a name to a previously ambiguous concept - psychological operations - and present multiple analytical frameworks for studying its use. Holt and Van de Velde describe psychological operations as the fourth “major instrument of statecraft”, alongside “the diplomatic, military, [and] economic” (1960, p. 4). The authors note that these four instruments are heavily interconnected as foreign policy strategies are intended to achieve desired behavior and responses from other states within and through all capabilities necessary of a state, thus the four instruments of statecraft are *operationally* indistinguishable. A state has an objective which may be accomplished through combined diplomatic, military, economic, or information-based strategies; however, these strategies will have a primary focus and, thus, are *analytically* distinguishable as “it is more useful to think of operation ... as *primarily* economic, *primarily* psychological, etc.” (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 16). Psychological operations are used to influence decisionmakers of states by changing their apparent world, unlike diplomatic, military, and economic operations which manipulate the material world. The material world is “the world as it is”, while the apparent world is “the world as it appears and has meaning” (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 13). The authors use an example of witnesses to a car crash to exemplify the complexity of apparent worlds.

Two cars of certain make and model, say, approached each other at certain speeds at a certain time on a certain day and collided in a certain manner at a certain spot with certain resultant damage. This is the material world – the world as it is, or was. But both drivers,

even assuming complete honesty on the part of each, may have very different versions of what happened. Furthermore, the drivers' accounts may be quite different from those of two witnesses who happened to be standing at the side of the road at the time. What is more, even the accounts of these identically placed, disinterested witnesses may vary markedly in at least some important respects. This simple example shows two things. First, that the material world and almost anyone's apparent world are often not the same and, second, that even in small, familiar situations actually witnessed, apparent worlds may be quite different from person to person. (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 13-14)

The difference in individuals' apparent worlds becomes greater when differences in culture, education, geography, and other life experiences are greater. With these factors accounted for, a state can reach an objective by strategically manipulating the apparent world of a target. The authors write that "changes in either [the apparent world or material world] can affect behavioral responses" of target decisionmakers by effecting how objects and events are "perceived and interpreted" (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 13, 14). Psychological operations thus work to affect the manner in which target decisionmakers understand relevant situations.

Holt and Van de Velde (1960) create a framework for analysis, stating that there are four main ways to influence decisionmakers in psychological operations. Two are 'external', or foreign to the target decisionmaker, and two are 'internal', or domestic to the target decisionmaker. First, in 'external' psychological operations, the target decisionmaker can either have their perception and interpretation of the external (international) situation manipulated directly, or indirectly by having the apparent world of people outside of the decisionmaker's borders manipulated in a manner which will influence the decisionmaker's behavior. Second, in 'internal' psychological operations, the decisionmaker can either directly have their perception and interpretation of their domestic situation altered which will affect their behavior to the

objectives of the operating state, or the operating state can target the apparent world of the decisionmaker's populace which will affect the behavior of the decisionmaker indirectly (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 24).

The authors use examples of several post-war military and foreign policy institutions to illustrate the integration of psychological operations into the foreign policy strategies of the United States. These agencies include the United States Information Agency (USIA) the International Information Administration of the Department of State, the Mutual Security Agency, the Technical Cooperation Administration information program, and the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. The 1953 mission statement of USIA, for example, was "...to submit evidence to the peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace" (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 9). Evidently, the use of information as an operable tool of power relations through communications networks and technology was a phenomenon observable to these authors. They write that this phenomenon of statecraft intends "to influence the behavior of foreign states, not by manipulating objectives in the material world, but by affecting the manner in which the world is perceived and interpreted" (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 24).

The authors, however, narrow their perception of this instrument of statecraft by focusing on techniques such as propaganda, rumors, and person-to-person communication. These techniques, while certainly of importance to this communicative, psychological, and informative instrument of statecraft, are limiting in that they imply the operating state must always directly instigate a target to influence their behavior. The scope of this instrument of statecraft, if utilized fully, can allow the operating state to be 'hands off' with the target and still maintain positive influence over their behavior. Further, massive expansions of a global and networked civil

society, due to the proliferation and innovation of technologies, has imperatively transformed the global security environment since the authors published their work in the 1960's. Electronic mail was publicized for the first time in 1972; in 1974, the Internet was created and the first personal computers were released (Cerf & Stefik, 1997). From the 1960's to the 1980's, remote sensing used in strategic operations transitioned from airplanes to satellites, and from traditional black and white aerial photography to electro-magnetic remote imaging. The first mobile phone was released in 1984 by Motorola, and in 1999 the first camera phone debuted in Japan (Barensky & Lardier, 2018). These changes in technology have altered the capabilities of states in the pursuit of power and should be markedly considered when discussing post-modern international strategic studies.

In 1990, renowned power strategist Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in *Bound to Lead*. According to Nye, soft power is the third dimension of international power next to military and economic power. Power for Nye, like Holt and Van de Velde, is "the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants" (Nye, 2004, p. 4). Soft power is the ability to do so without material threats or incentives; instead, it is to "attract and co-opt [the target] to want what you want" (Nye, 2004, p. 4). This dimension of power is used to influence the behavior of populations and decisionmakers to achieve a desired outcome without direct instruction from the operator. Soft power works by attracting other states and societies to the objectives of the operator, thus "soft power is attractive power an intangible attraction that persuades us to go along with others' purposes without explicit threats or exchange" (Nye, 2004, p. 6). Nye's concept thus expands past the direct relationship which Holt and Van de Velde considered necessary in techniques of this instrument of statecraft. Nye uses the example of Nigeria in the 1990's, "where American programs provided more than half the content on television in 1997" (2004, p. 41). The heavy presence of American culture in Nigerian daily life

led to the Americanization of Nigerian society, without the direct 'hand' of the U.S. government in constructing narratives for Nigerians to consume from their televisions.

Nye further emphasizes the importance of winning hearts and minds in the globalizing world due to the information and technological revolution. He writes, "the information and globalization of the economy are transforming and shrinking the world" (Nye, 2004, p. 30). This transformation can be utilized to benefit the United States' soft power strategies by increasing the global network of influence of the U.S.; however, it can also be utilized by adversary states and global actors to the detriment of U.S. power operations. The politics of soft power in the international system will become more sensitive to the legitimacy of information as information and communications technology (ICT) proliferate across the globe and more actors vie for 'attractive power'. Nye writes, "politics then becomes a competition for attractiveness, legitimacy, and credibility. The ability to share information – and to be believed – becomes an important source of attraction and power" (2004, p. 31).

The separation Nye makes between soft power capabilities and those of material hard power, such as military power, inherently distinguishes soft power operations as those which cannot be militarized or used as strategic coercion against adversaries. Nye (2004) later coins the term 'Smart Power' which is a grand foreign policy strategy that combines economic, military, and soft power capabilities. However, smart power is a strategy or plan of action in the pursuit of influence over foreign decision-makers, it is not recognized as a dimension of statecraft nor is it the realization of the coercive capabilities of information-based control.

Michel Foucault was a renowned French philosopher and theorist of the 20th century who focused on social control theories. Through several published works, as well as public lectures at College de France from 1970 until his death in 1984, Foucault explored his theories of social

control, power and war relations, and security (2003, p. IX). In the analysis of Foucault, three paradigms of power relations are developed: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower. In Foucault's book, *Discipline and Punish* (1975), he develops a theory for the progression of power and means of control by states over their citizens. He begins with pre-Industrial *sovereign societies* which feature visible acts of violence in order to control subjects and deter disobedience of the authority. He uses the example of public executions where authority demonstrated both publicly and violently its control over the physical body of citizens. In this paradigm, power is centralized absolutely (Foucault, 1975). This is sovereign power, the first historically in Foucault's paradigms of power. The historical paradigms are not in strict succession, they can overlap within a single society as well as coexist across societies simultaneously.

After the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment, capitalism and liberalism transformed Western states socially, politically, and economically. These developments impacted power operations and eventually led to the transformation of sovereign societies into what Foucault calls *disciplinary societies* (1975). Capitalism can be defined as the commodification of production wherein property, industry, and businesses are privately owned by organizations or individuals with the intent to maximize surplus values after purchasing labor power from the work force. Foucault believes that the prosperity of man and the accumulation of capital cannot be separated. Further, he writes, "the apparatus of production, the division of labor, and the elaboration of disciplinary techniques sustain an ensemble of very close relations" (Foucault, 1975, p. 221). According to Foucault, capitalism has played a tremendous role in the development of our societies. Capital accumulation and taxation of citizens by the state has led to the formation of modern public institutions and a progressive transformation of legislature (Foucault, 1975; Weber, 2007). Foucault writes that these new liberal institutions and new capitalist industries were then instrumentalized by the authority as disciplinary mechanisms.

Where sovereign societies used public violence, disciplinary societies instrumentalized the design of a new capitalist and liberal society to function in a series of disciplinary mechanisms so that an individual could only move from one mode of discipline into another. From the schoolyard where children were watched by teachers to factories where workmen were monitored by foreman, an individual was always under the watchful eye of the authority through a hierarchical structure of power (Foucault, 1975).

Many of Foucault's lectures were recorded via audio tapes and posthumously translated and published. Two of these works have become foundational in political philosophy studies of the biopower paradigm: *Society Must Be Defended* (2003) which is based on his 7 January – 17 March 1976 lecture series and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1975) which is based on his 10 January – 4 April 1979 lecture series. Recorded in these works was Foucault's notion of 'biopolitics' (Foucault, 1975). While mentioned or alluded to in his other works, these lecture series were focused on the historical beginnings of biopolitics, defining the use of the concept, and exploring the consequences of biopolitics on war and power relations.

According to Foucault, biopolitics exists within the discourse of a permanent, perpetual war between the powerful and the powerless; the authority of the state and their subjects. For Foucault, war is not necessarily violent. He reverses a traditional concept of politics embodied by a quote from the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, which originally read: "war is a continuation of politics by other means" (Foucault, 2003, p. 47-48). Conversely, Foucault's reversal states that "politics is the continuation of war by other means" (2003, p. 48). He states that when a state used its army to subdue internal rivals, and thus monopolized its use of violence with its territory, this was only the initial subjugation of the state's subjects. Once the internal use of the army ended, the authority of the state still needed to continue subjugation of their subjects, the social body, through political means such as laws, institutions, and order (Foucault,

2003). This is the continuation of war through non-violent, non-militarized means. Foucault's 'war'⁴ is apparent in all mechanisms of discipline, control, and power. In a translation of his 21 January 1976 lecture, Foucault stated:

In the smallest of its cog, peace is waging a secret war We have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefield runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently.... There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone's adversary.” (Foucault, 2003, p. 50-51).

Foucault continues that this war is fought using truth and knowledge - known as the 'discourse' (Foucault, 2003, p. 53). The use of discourse in power relations is the notion that Foucault calls biopolitics, also known as governmentality or *raison d'Etat*. Foucault states that this discourse is a politicized history. History is first “a series of brute facts” which are “physico-biological facts” similar to Holt and Van de Velde's notion of the material world (Foucault, 2003, p. 54). These historical facts of the discourse are then obscured with “a bundle of psychological and moral elements” like “courage, fear, scorn, hatred” (Foucault 2003, p. 54). Historical accounts of battles from the recent or ancient past will always illustrate one side as the hero or 'in the right' morally, contrasted by the other as the enemy or 'in the wrong', forcing historical accounts into a binary narrative. The use of discourse is apparent in all the state's disciplinary, control, and power mechanisms such as juridical proceedings and the administration of law that create a governmental rationality by determining the interpretation of rights, actions, and words. The rationality the state creates using discourse is the 'invisible hand' which shapes the behavior of

⁴ Foucault differentiated between 'the perpetual war' and war in the traditional sense: “We cannot confuse power relations with relations of war... I am simply taking the extreme to the extent that war can be regarded as the point of maximum tension, or as force-relations laid bare.” (2003, p. 46)

subjects and subjugates them under the authority of the state. Discourse is based on objective historical facts, yet narrativized in such a way that it benefits the authority conceptualizing the discourse for an audience. Foucault foresaw the militarization of communication, social, and psychological mechanisms when he wrote: “This discourse of perpetual war it is a discourse in which truth functions exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an exclusively partisan victory” (2003, p. 57). At the time of Foucault’s death in 1984, the technological innovations and expansive global civil societal networks which exist today were just beginning to develop. His concepts associated with his work on biopolitics continue to increase in relevancy as mechanisms of information collection, analysis, and circulation expand and emerge.

In 1992, Gilles Deleuze⁵ published a short article titled *Postscript on the Societies of Control* building on Foucault’s theory. In this work, Deleuze focuses on the evolution of the social body’s relationship to authority as modes of production change. Deleuze’s theory of control societies is an addition to Foucault’s theories of sovereign societies and disciplinary societies, following the latter paradigm as a post-modern, post-industrialist extension in which biopolitics and technology are central in power relations.

This paradigm’s control apparatuses lack the distinct borders between mechanisms utilized in disciplinary societies, making control societies more applicable to the present interconnected state of international security environment and power operations. In *Societies of control*, control apparatuses are personalized and perpetual. These apparatuses ‘modulate’⁶, transforming like “a gas”, by continuously collecting individuals’ data and appropriately disciplining individual subjects instead of addressing individuals as a mass (Deleuze, 1992, p. 4) Deleuze emphasizes that individuals under control “have become *dividuals*” due to the transition

⁵ Deleuze is a widely influential philosopher of Neo-Spinozism and post-structuralism.

⁶ Deleuze describes this control as a *modulation*, where disciplinary societies were *molds* (1992, p. 4).

into the Information Age (1992, p. 5). Subjects of control are now capable of being monitored and addressed directly through a centralized system without the former hierarchy of authority utilized by disciplinary societies. Deleuze illustrates this using the industrialist factory and the information-centric corporation. In the factory, all workmen were paid set wages while the corporate employee is given a “salary according to merit” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5). This modulating payment system is done by collecting information on employees’ behavior, assessing it, and appropriately administering payment. In the same way, control is administered to subjects in post-modernity. The subjects of control societies can no longer hide anonymously in the social body, they are now ‘dividuals’ who can be automatically processed using “codes” of the modulating apparatuses (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5). The inclusion of technology in power paradigms is imperative in understanding post-modern power operations and relations. Increased access to the internet is expanding global communications networks, connecting individuals and ideas across sovereign borders in an unprecedented way. The potential for a state’s biopolitical operations to target the individuals of a foreign society will only increase as technology proliferates across the globe.

Deleuze’s theory is built in the context of the state and addresses domestic control systems, not the power relations of the international power structure. Political theorists, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, published *Empire* in 2000 to apply Foucault and Deleuze’s theories on power relations and social control to the international system and develop a unique theory of control and power in the world order. Hardt and Negri begin by emphasizing that Empire is a realization of Enlightenment modernization, the search for rational knowledge of society and the application of this knowledge to better humanity. The Enlightenment brought liberal ideals to the world, which would lead to the organization of humanity via transnational regulatory institutions

above the national state (the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and so forth) (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 13).

This organization would then lead to the formation of a Supreme Ethical Ideal in the spirit of neoliberalism, a decentralized supranational power, and a concentration of coercion in the hands of “God on Earth” that overpowers the naturally anarchical world order which previously existed between sovereign states (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 7). Hardt and Negri further emphasize that Empire is post-colonial and post-imperialist. Where colonialism used violence to benefit a select few, authoritative power in Empire is now inscribed through biopolitical means. Adherence to this power structure is maintained through the spread of neoliberal ideals such as those described in the United Nation’s Charter including “collective security and peace, economic and social development, and international law and human rights” (Nau, 2019, p. 250). In Empire, the use of coercion is justified as necessity to produce social peace and maintain ethical truths (*jus bellum justum*, or “Just Wars”). The legitimacy of military coercion is maintained so long as its use is ethically grounded in neoliberal ideals such as the common good, and so long as it is effective in achieving order and peace. Those actors which are determined to be a threat to neoliberal ideals become the Enemy of the supranational entity. The Enemy is “reduced to an object of routine police repression” and seen as “an absolute threat to ethical order” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 13). The Enemy now loses its humanity, but this is argued to be necessary as the Enemy can now only be those who threaten global peace and order; thus, it is legitimate to dehumanize the Enemy and obliterate the Enemy in war.

Hardt and Negri assert that there is some “single supranational figure of political power” which rules over the national states like Thomas Hobbes’ principle notion in his 1651 work, *Leviathan* (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 9). Hobbes famously writes on the state of nature as a time of “continual fear and danger of violent death” and that, in this time, “the life of man is solitary,

poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (2007, p. 88). To escape this anarchic period of existential crisis, man gave up some freedoms to the state as a trade for stability and security. Hobbes theorized that the state of nature which threatened the lives and peace of man, led man to consent to social contracts that subjectivized them to an authority who provided stability and protection. This is the case Hardt and Negri make for Empire. The neoliberal ideals brought following the Enlightenment and realized following the Second World War led to an organization of the formerly anarchic international system into a global order. The new international authority that is Empire does not exist in a single state or institution, but rather through all international institutions and transnational capitalist mechanisms. There is a duality in the power of such a centralized authority. The authority administers protection over the sovereign and simultaneously redesigns “the production of norms” and contracts between sovereign states (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 9). Thus, enters the biopolitics of Empire.

Hardt and Negri explore the development, maintenance, and principles of biopolitics. The authors emphasize the importance of the social field in biopower, distinguishing the control over the ‘brains’ and the ‘bodies’ of subjects. The subjects' brains are indirectly controlled using power mechanisms in communication systems, ideas, imagery, and so forth. The bodies of subjects are controlled through welfare systems, education systems, and “other monitored activities” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 23). The apparatuses of power are normalized into the civil lives of subjects through social institutions, and control is further extended through “flexible and fluctuating networks” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 23). Through social networks, the invisible hand further guides the behavior of subjects and subsumes culture, thus penetrating society deeply.

Further, the authors develop a Marxist approach to the new power dimensions of control societies based on changes in modes of production. Where mass factory workers were the objects of the Industrial Age, “intellectual, immaterial, and communicative” laborers are the objects of

the Information Age (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 29). This transition in labor power is subsumed by capitalists so that they may continue their consolidation of power over the working masses and, thus, the capitalists must operate control through knowledge, communication, and language. The authors assert that power in post-modernity must come inherently through biopolitical means, including in the production of value systems, dictating of names and meanings, and producing discourse.

Transnational organizations, like the U.N., World Bank, or I.M.F., produce the new ‘World Order’ through such biopolitical means. The legitimization of these international organizations is their “symbolology of the imperial order”, a world order based on peace, a Supreme Ethical Ideal, and legitimate use of force (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 31). The authority of neoliberal transnational organizations, thus, comes from their ability to dictate meanings to concepts like ‘world peace’ and their ability to interpret when it is appropriate to act upon violations of this peace. Hardt and Negri, in short, argue that this transcendental, transnational *Empire* is evidence that the international system “has ‘outgrown’ the nation-state system, including the dominance of the single hegemonic state” (Kiely, 2005, p. 80).

Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* is ambitious in theorizing a new world order. While the authors revise Marxist ideas for the new technological advances, the theory behind *Empire* lacks credible evidence thereafter. The anticipation of a supranational, transcendental authority based on a multitude of actors who share a Supreme Ethical Ideal has yet to be reflected in the international system in the two decades following the book’s publication. The legitimate power of the U.N. and other transnational organizations has not subsumed the sovereignty of all national states.

In the 21st century, many events have undermined the legitimacy of the U.N.'s cooperative ambitions and have led to a decline in international cooperation through international institutions. In 2003, the U.S. and coalition allies entered Iraq “without U.N. or N.A.T.O. authorization” (Nau, 2019, p. 207). In 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian semi-autonomous region of Crimea and left the Conventional Forces in Europe (C.F.E.), a cooperative doctrine for transparency in military and scientific affairs between European states. In 2004, the U.N. created the Group of Governmental Experts (G.G.E.) to set international limits for cyberwarfare. In 2017, the group disbanded over disputes between Western states and Russia and China (Nau, 2019). These events follow a growing pattern of declining international transparency, cooperation, and institutions since the turn of the millennium. This would suggest the authors' idea of a singular international authority was not made into reality. The sovereign national interests of many Great Powers in particular would appear to rival the importance of a supranational authority.

Further, on 11 September 2001, the international security environment and international power relations changed forever. The U.S. launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT) following the attacks on American soil, leading to a tremendous expansion of U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic presence across the globe. The authors tremendously underestimated the enduring dominance of the United States in the international order in the two decades following the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. would develop its own Supreme Ethical Ideals of freedom and democracy for which it would use to develop Just War campaigns against the Enemy; the terrorists and those who support them. Where Hardt and Negri anticipated a supranational Empire governed by the multitude, there appeared Great Powers struggle and the GWOT which threatened the legitimacy of many neoliberal institutions. Despite this, much of what Hardt and

Negri theorize can still be utilized in illustrating the militarization of biopolitics and the international power system which exists in post-modernity.

When the power-relation concepts developed in *Empire*, Foucault's lectures, and Deleuze's article is considered in an interdisciplinary way a biopolitical international power relations reality may be visualized. The growing importance of psychology, communication, social power, information, and value systems in international power struggles will only continue as the world moves into post-modernity. States will only continue to develop the power of their invisible hands as communication systems expand, innovation continues in information technologies, and international institutions and policies are determined. Considering the power relations concepts aforementioned, with respect to the framework created in *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy*, this new instrument of statecraft can be visualized with the United States intelligence and defense operations as an example of the change in power relations. This case study will also demonstrate the militarization of biopower, where biopolitical statecraft and the statecraft of war intersect. It is important to remember Foucault's reversal of von Clausewitz, that "politics is the continuation of war by other means" (2003, p. 48). So, essentially, all instruments of statecraft are a form of war. This notion will be expanded on further in the following two chapters.

3: The Emergence of Biopower in International Relations

“Reality is not only everything which is, but everything which is becoming. It’s a process. It proceeds in contradictions. If it is not perceived in its contradictory nature it is not perceived at all.”

Bertolt Brecht (Mirzoeff, 2011, p. 26)

Introduction

This chapter expands on the foundational concept on which this thesis is based: that power can be leveraged and contested in the international system through control apparatuses and power operations distinct from the economic, diplomatic, and military power instruments. Further, that this power is information and knowledge-based, and that it can be observed to produce a system of international power relations comparable to Deleuze’s paradigm of ‘control’ (1992). This paradigm is exemplified in three main ways that will be explored in this chapter. The first is the ever-present rise of non-kinetic operations and mechanisms in interstate competition, as opposed to a previous paradigm of violent and direct military contest. Second, the emergence and proliferation of neoliberal international institutions which inherently subjugate all member-states to the ‘laws’ and values of the organization. These organizations can be further dissected to show which states and alliances control the international narratives of specific fields of policy, as will be explained later in this chapter. The third example which exemplifies that Deleuze’s ‘control societies’ paradigm is present in the post-modern international power system and, consequently, that Foucault’s notion of biopolitics is present in this system is, in short, the emergence of information technology. The rapid revolution in technology has given way to the rapid expansion of information-based labor systems, surveillance systems, communication systems, and more in our post-modern world.

It is worth noting that this international power system is not under the authority of a single actor, entity, or state. Instead, there exists an interconnected and global rhizomatic scheme of social, political, economic, and material forces which effect the dominant discourses across the globe. Power in this system is reliant on the process of biopolitical subjectivization in which power operations create a discourse by dictating names and meanings, categorizing subjects within the system into hierarchies, and producing paradigms of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ which are understood as the status quo within the system. All actors possess some power to influence others through information collection, analysis, and dissemination. However, this interconnected power structure does have winners, or more dominant actors, who have relative advantages in the strength of their power operations as well as losers, or the primarily subjectivized actors, who significantly lack autonomy from these power operations and who operate within the ‘rules’ of the discourse. As Elden and Crompton state, “it is a battle and not a question of domination” (2007, p. 2).

The power structure of the global order which I reference is not one based on sheer military and economic power capabilities, which I call material coercion. Material coercion certainly has an impact on a state’s ‘power’, as defined by Joseph Nye, though this is not the power to which I refer (2007). Instead, I refer to the actor’s relative power to dictate discourse – their biopower. The entrance into this order of biopolitical control apparatuses and power operations occurred at a complex juncture in the political history of our world. This global order emerged following the Second World War when the tremendous transformation of the world’s social, political, and economic fields coincided with many states transitioning from Industrial to Information societies. Determining what led to the adoption of a biopolitical instrument of statecraft should not imply that a change in a single field of political reality – such as change in national ideology or transition into a capitalist society - is responsible, nor a single pivotal

innovation, policy, event, or other individual aspect. The emergence of biopower operations was made possible by all these transformations, events, and innovations. Further, the growing relevance of biopolitics in the global order is still ongoing as states, non-state actors, and civil societies continue to innovate and proliferate new mechanisms of control, such as the emergence of new information technologies or the expansion of globalized network societies.

This chapter provides a historical context to biopolitics in the international power relations system. An understanding of the emergence of a global order based on biopower is necessary for a later analysis of the use of biopolitical operations in post-modernity. This power dimension, as stated in the previous chapter, is analytically separable from economic, military, and diplomatic coercion; however, it is often operationally indistinguishable. This means that the emergence of international biopolitics coincided with the emergence of new trends in economic, military, and diplomatic power.

Indirect Coercion

The use of the nuclear bomb on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima by the United States had an immense impact on the implications of war between states. The totally destructive nature of the nuclear bomb was understood by societies and world leaders across the globe. Over the next several decades, the other Great Powers – the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China - worked to develop their own nuclear bombs to deter the threat of other nuclear capable states on the guise of mutual destruction if such a war were permitted (Calleo, 1999, p. 11). Nuclear war between such states has the potential to destroy the environment and the civil societies of the world, and the threat of retaliation and subsequent destruction is a strong deterrent against initiating a nuclear attack with another nuclear capable state. Further, non-nuclear violent conflict between states who mutually possess nuclear weapons

bears the risk of escalation into a nuclear war. For these reasons, states with nuclear capabilities are deterred from the use of violent coercion with their nuclear capable counterparts. The nuclear weapon is symbolic of other advancements in military technology which have proliferated across states, drastically altering the potential of interstate war to destroy global societies.

This axiom has not led to the end of the struggle for power between these states. New power operations were developed to subjectivize other nuclear-capable states that relied on indirect coercion. Indirect coercion is not *indirect* in that the coercion is an unintentional byproduct of another action. Instead, I refer to the transition from the use of force in the form of direct and violent military action as a mechanism to subordinate other states and actors into a new reliance on non-kinetic communicative, social, and psychological operations which subjectivize states and coerce them to do something they would not do otherwise. Holt and Van de Velde write that “the distinctive characteristic of psychological operations is that they attempt to influence the *will* to conduct policy as distinguished from the *capacity* to conduct policy” (1960, p.7).

The proliferation of indirect coercion is further evident in material coercion operations in states’ military and economic strategies. The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union is an example of this development. Mutual destruction deterred the Great Power rivals from entering a nuclear war and incentivized the development of indirect coercion. Both states developed strategies of covert military operations, such as war by proxy military forces, and expanded the use of economic coercion, such as sanctions, to leverage power without entering direct military conflict with each other (Drezner, 2003, p. 643). The indirect coercion mechanisms that were developed were not reserved for nuclear capable state competition and would be utilized by states in leveraging power against all states, entities, and actors regardless

of nuclear capability. It is within this same environment that indirect coercion in the form of biopolitical control apparatuses and power operations developed.

If direct coercion is to force a state to subordinate to the commands of another through the use or threat of violent, then biopower uses indirect coercion to manufacture consent of subjectivized states. Those states with greater strength in dictating discourse, categorizing subjects, and producing 'truth' and 'knowledge' wage an indirect war to subjectivize other states into subordination. In collaboration with the emergence of international organizations and the 'Information Age', the proliferation of nuclear weapons incentivized states to develop indirect coercive operations. The struggle to leverage power through indirect, non-kinetic mechanisms has led to the growing importance of biopolitics in the international system.

Neoliberal International Institutions

Following the Second World War, several international organizations were created including the United Nations in 1945, the European Coal & Steel Community in 1951, North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, and Warsaw Pact in 1955 (Nau, 2015, p.134). These organizations offer protections and benefits to their member states while also introducing mechanisms of control and power operations. This paradigm is similar to Foucault's idea of the Enlightenment period in disciplinary societies. The liberal institutions and juridical protections introduced in this time, such as public schools and other public services, benefitted the life of the citizen while also working as a mechanism of discipline and control for the authority of the state. In short, the rights gained by the subject may inadvertently benefit the elites of the power structure. In the international system, an example of this would be the United Nations.

The U.N. was created to maintain peace between member states and solve the crisis of sovereign states. Sovereign states have existed in Europe since the 16th century and are defined

by Max Weber as a political entity which “(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory” (Weber, 2007, p. 127). The crisis of the sovereign states should be referred to as ‘the crises of sovereign states’ as there are two major threats concerning the sovereignty of a state. The first is the crisis of the challenge to a state’s monopoly on violence and to their legitimate rule over a territory. This arises in the form of international, territorial war as well as domestically in such ways as criminal organizations and violent rebellions. As U.N. membership consists solely of actors it considers states, the former is of primary concern in the charter of the organization. Crisis of this sort is existential as the existence of the state, by Weber’s definition, is threatened. In the context of the end of the Second World War, this threat to sovereign states was of great importance to the world leaders and civil societies across the globe. The United Nations addresses this concern in Article 2 of chapter 1 in its charter with the fourth subsection stating: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (U.N., 2019). This obliges member states to not enter territorial wars nor threaten the independent existence of other member states. The United Nations, thus, protects member states from existential threats from other member states; however, this is not the only inherent threat to sovereign states.

The second crisis of sovereign states is the states’ right to sovereign political decision and action. Unlike the previous crisis, this is not an existential threat but a threat to the state’s freedom to use their power domestically and internationally. This is the state’s freedom to pursue their own social, political, and institutional development, and to be loyal to their own national interests, without interference from other states. This crisis is inherent as a sovereign state and will only be exasperated by globalization. A state with true sovereign right would be able to freely make all political actions feasible; however, true sovereign right could not exist as

sovereign states do not exist in a vacuum, they exist in the context of a complex international system. Foucault writes of this: “the state only exists as states, in the plural” (2004, p. 5). States counter this crisis by investing and increasing their relative powers such as military or economic power, thereby mitigating others’ power over their state’s political actions through coercion and deterrence.

As Hardt and Negri note, by joining the United Nations, states agree to effectively transfer their sovereign right to the organization. After the devastating world wars, the purpose for many states joining the United Nations was the protection from existential crisis, as proclaimed in the charter. The U.N. member states transfer their right of sovereignty to the organization upon joining due to the obligations they must commit to, which inherently diminishes their freedom to choose political actions which are prohibited, lest they will be punished accordingly by the U.N. and other member states. While many cases exist of states violating the charter without punishment, the purpose of this writing is not to assess the effectiveness of the United Nations, but to explain how the U.N., as well as other international organizations, institutionalized biopolitics in the international system.

In transferring their sovereign right to the United Nations, member states agree to the narratives of the organization. These discourses are dictated by the organization’s categorization and segregation through their naming and meanings of their produced ‘truths’ and ‘knowledge’. Examples of the U.N.’s discourse is evident in chapter one of the charter, titled *Purposes and Principles*. In Article 1, subsection 1, the organization asserts the purpose of the U.N. is “the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression” and that “conformity with the principles of justice” is mandatory among member states (U.N., 2019). Such claims may seem beneficial to solving the crisis of sovereign states; however, it is necessary to speculate who, or what, defines “the principles of justice” or a “threat to the peace”

of the international system. Terms like peace, justice, freedom, and equality appear throughout the chapter, and such terms present a narrative of what is ‘right’ and what terms are to be associated with the United Nations. This narrative creates a sense of the Self, and implicitly creates the Other. The Other is reduced to whatever threatens the principles of peace of the U.N., yet the decision of who or what is a threat is in the hands of the discourse elites. It is important to note that the structure of the U.N. is headed by the Security Council with five permanent (P5) members – the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom – who alone possess veto power for resolutions, while other member states are only allowed to agree or abstain and non-member observer states may only speak at meetings. Thus, the interpretation of terms like justice and peace are centralized between these five states of the organization, a visible example of the categorization of subjects into a hierarchy. Other member states, who have transferred their sovereign right to the United Nations, have also transferred their right to decide what is the Other in the international system. In the case of the U.N., it is evident who the more dominant actors and who the primarily subjectivized actors in the power operations are. While the United Nations is not the only international organization which perpetuates discourse, ‘truth’, or ‘knowledge’ for its member states, nor are international organizations the only entities which possess power over the narratives of others, the creation of these organizations is a visible example of the institutionalization of biopolitical narratives in the global order.

The Information Age

Coinciding with the 20th century was a shift into post-modern economies and a new reliance on information and communication technologies (ICT). Innovations in ICT and the economy have always had transformative effects on societies. As noted by Foucault, Deleuze, and Hardt and Negri, there exist three political and economic modernization paradigms. Foucault called the first *societies of sovereign*. This paradigm had an economy based on “agriculture and

the extraction of raw materials”, in which power processes were violent, public, and performative (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 280). The second, Foucault’s *societies of discipline*, occurred following the Industrial Revolution where the economy was based on manufacturing and disciplinary mechanisms were used to segregate the subjects. The third and current paradigm, Deleuze’s *societies of control*, is based on the *informationalization* of societies where labor is based on a “intellectual, immaterial, and communicative” economic labor force (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 29). It is important to note that not all states’ societies transition at the same time. Many ‘developing’ states’ economies are still primarily based on raw material and industrial manufacturing while ‘developed’ states’ economies rely on services and information. According to data published by the World Bank in 2019, “agriculture, forestry, and fishing” industries were 25.8% of the total G.D.P. in ‘Low-Income’ states while such industries were only 1.3% of the total G.D.P. of ‘High-Income’ states. States may be somewhere in-between the definitions of the paradigms, as these are transitional processes and industries like agriculture will never be without importance. Different paradigms of economic development existing in the international system today define the power relationship between states. For example, Chad is considered a Low-Income state with almost half of its G.D.P. relying on agriculture, forestry, and fishing production (World Bank, 2019). With such a drastic reliance on the production of raw materials, Chad is subordinate to industrial economies and those industrial economies subordinate to information economies.

The present discourse on developing states is that “if they continue on the path” of the developed, dominant states, they will eventually achieve “an analogous position” in the international system (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 282). This might be the case if their position was based on material power, in this case economic power; however, it’s not necessary the ‘sovereign’ paradigm of the developing world’s economies that reduces their autonomy, but their

subjective position in the global order. When England industrialized, it did so without the presence of the biopolitical global order, and, thus, did not have a regime of dominant actors, states, and entities manufacturing its subordination. As developing states and regions of the world enter the global market, they are doing so in the presence of an already established global order. The dominant actors of the global order will continue to keep developing states in a disposition of power economically regardless of the modernization of the developing states. This is not to say a developing state cannot alleviate itself from subjectivity, but that to do so the state would have to remove itself from the discourse of the dominant actors, states, and entities as well as isolate itself from the global order. This may be impossible in the current international system, not only due to globalization, but also due to the retaliation of the dominant actors. The ramifications of isolating oneself from dominant discourses may lead to an actor being labeled ‘irrational’ or ‘backward’, or even being sanctioned and isolated from the international community entirely.

It is important to note that regardless of the economic paradigm of the state, ICT have proliferated and transformed economies, societies, and politics. For example, raw material production was transformed by new inventions during the Industrial Revolution. States that remained reliant on agriculture and raw material production industrialized their means of production, while refraining from transitioning into industrial and manufacturing societies. The informationalization of the world has further transformed raw material production by integrating information and communication technologies, such as the use of satellite imagery to “assess, monitor and plan the use of their natural resources” (FAO, 2017, p. 4). In such ways, regardless of the economic paradigm, all states have been affected by the innovation of ICT.

The proliferation of such technologies has facilitated the use of biopower by dominant actors. In Deleuze’s *societies of control*, technology has given the authority the ability to monitor

their subjects in all matters of life. In the international system, the dominant actors and discourse elites can utilize inventions of the Information Age, such as mobile phones, satellites, and the internet, as control apparatuses to form surveillance networks of subjectivized states. In this way, the subjectivized state can be constantly monitored and, thus, enter a continuous and perpetual state of control. An example of this would be the Stuxnet cyberweapon used against Iranian nuclear centrifuges in 2012. The cyberworm, as this weapon is called, was a product of U.S. and Israeli military collaboration (Zetter, 2015). The weapon accessed a closed-system computer, meaning a computer without internet capability, that was highly secretive and guarded by multiple safeguards. Despite this, Stuxnet was able to access the Iranian nuclear centrifuges' system through an infected computer technician's laptop and sabotage the system (Zetter, 2015). Stuxnet serves as reminder that in the Information Age, regardless of how well guarded a state is, a more dominant actor with superior technological capabilities will be able to monitor and control their activities and administer discipline accordingly. Iran was not allowed to let its centrifuges pass a specific energy level, when this less dominant state attempted to secretly violate the rules of the discourse then the more dominant state was immediately able to respond. In this way, subjectivized states may be monitored, unknowingly, for activity which threatens the power structure that maintains the strength of the dominant states and, thus, violates the status quo set by the discourse of the global order.

Technological innovations and the proliferation of ICT across the globe are narrativized as instruments of democracy, liberalism, and modernization. While ICT may very well benefit societies and states, there is a duality in their effect. As information and communication technologies proliferate across societies and actors around the globe, the control apparatuses of the more dominant actors develop, further embedding themselves in the social, economic, and political structures of subjectivized actors. For those states already transitioned into Information

societies, their technological advantage over those developing will be utilized in preventing subjectivized states from progressing in the power structure of the global order. The U.S. is typically considered to have the most technologically advanced military capabilities in the world. For its allies and rivals alike to catch-up, whether through imitation or innovation, an extensively demanding and expensive process of advancement would have to occur. Further, this process would be time intensive and the U.S.'s technological innovations wouldn't slow down or stop to allow others the time to catch-up.

Conclusion

Biopower exists in the international power relations system. This global order is made visible through the institutionalization of neoliberal organizations, yet also possesses a rhizomatic scheme – affected by the economic, political, and social fields of the actors, states, and entities within it. Biopower has become a dominant factor in determining a state's relative strength in the global order since the mid-20th century. The importance of an actor's biopower has been exasperated by the decline of direct interstate military conflict and the emergence, proliferation, and innovation of information technologies. More dominant actors of the global order become discourse elites when they are capable of dictating the naming and meanings of concepts, categorizing and segregating subjectivized actors into a hierarchical system, and producing the 'truth' and 'knowledge' which are accepted by the subjects as the status quo. In a more practical sense, discourse and hierarchies are cemented into reality in neoliberal institutions and policies. 'Winners' and 'losers' have already been determined, so long as the international system remains in the current narrative. The expansion of ICTs, presence of unequal economic paradigms, and inequality of technological capabilities are utilized in post-modern international competition. The reality of interstate coercion and power subjectification in general has drastically changed from only a century ago. Where coercion once was visible and violent war

between rival states, today it appears more just, liberal, and peaceful only because it is non-kinetic and disguised by a narrative.

The historical beginnings of the international biopower paradigm are important in understanding how actors, like the United States, have adapted their intelligence and defense operations. All the historic aspects previously mentioned in this chapter are necessary in understanding how this new instrument of statecraft is utilized in post-modern international relations, there's still room left for questions to be answered about the nature of information power operations in the security environment. For this reason, the following chapter will focus on methods of information warfare using the United States' intelligence and defense communities as a case study.

4: Case Study: U.S. Intelligence and Defense Operations

“There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone’s adversary.”

Michel Foucault (2003, p. 50-51).

Introduction

Intelligence and defense operations are incredibly complex today. Policy and strategy-making processes are divided by numerous governmental agencies, then subdivided geographically and operationally, and further divided by the hundreds of internal personnel teams and groups. A fully comprehensive knowledge of these processes and groups which form the complete image of a state’s foreign policy and defense operations is reasonably impossible for personnel on the inside as well as analytical experts on the outside. Included in the complexity of studying information-based statecraft is the degree of confidentiality and secrecy which is mandatory for the success of these operations. These axioms withstanding, it is the intent of this chapter to provide a framework and analysis of the basic processes of informational warfare and, specifically, biopolitical operations from an American perspective. This framework will define concepts, identify variables, and build a functional foundation of reference to analyze what biopolitical operations have been utilized by the United States in foreign policy and military strategy in post-modernity.

First, it is necessary to emphasize that all international cooperation, competition, and conflict is the intent of one actor to influence the behavior of another actor. The globalizing effects of the Information Age have increased capabilities for states to interact with foreign populations and groups, and increased agency for non-state actors to develop international influence. Further, the influential power of individuals themselves has increased with the proliferation of internet accessible devices such as smart phones or computers. Globalization in

the Information Age has contributed to a web of information and knowledge sharing which can be used for benign or malicious purposes by any actor or individual. Regardless of the intent, agency for obtaining, analyzing, or disseminating information has never been so readily available.

Interstate relations in international politics can be defined as “the actions, reactions, and interactions among political entities called national states” (Snyder et al, 1962, p. 199). Snyder et al’s definition of international politics may be used as a basis for defining the global political sphere of transient information. The original definition can be expanded to include all actions, reactions, and interactions among all political entities, including non-state actors, globalized civil societies, and national states. Non-state actors and national states can, however, be analytically separated from civil societies by categorizing the former as organizations. Organizations can be defined as a group of people who share a mission and a formal structure with roles, relationships, and related activities. Globalized civil societies may react and interact with states and non-state actors; however, so long as these societies lack structures and shared objectives, they are not organizations. Civil societies may form mass social movements which share a common mission and may eventually develop structural roles, then becoming organizations and analytically separable from the mass of the civil society. Thus, all international cooperation, competition, and conflict are the actions, reactions, and interactions between states, non-state actors, and globalized civil societies, while it is only organizational actors which develop structure and strategy of activities to take action to reach objectives and mission goals. Simply put, national states and non-state actors are the only actors which have defined objectives in international relations, while both the organizational actors as well as the masses of society can influence global politics. Further, the lack of an organizational structure in the masses of societies means

that individuals can potentially be utilized within an actor's strategy as a means to end, yet these individuals lack the organizational capacity to strategically defend themselves en masse.

Actions taken by an actor to influence the behavior of other actors are taken within a preconceived plan – a strategy. These strategies are attempts “to achieve certain aims, and to prevent or minimize the achievement of the incompatible or menacing aims of other” actors (Snyder et al, 1962, p. 199). The ‘certain aims’ which Snyder et al reference are also known as the objective of the strategy. This is the outcome of the plan of action desired by the decisionmaker(s) of the organizational actor. Prior to developing a plan of action (a strategy) and designating an aim (an objective), the decisionmaker must perceive the “existing state of affairs” also known as the situation (Holt & Van De Velde, 1960, p. 18). The situation is the present-conditions which the strategy, if conducted accordingly, will change into the objective future state of affairs.

There are two terms of utmost importance in the analysis of information-based statecraft: the situation and the strategy. Primacy in situational awareness, including superiority across an array of collection and analysis methods, allows the U.S. to administer control over other actors simply by observing them. Like the panopticon, an adversary may never know when the U.S. is watching them. Further, strategies exist within U.S. defense doctrine that highlight the importance of information, psychology, sociology, knowledge, and technology in post-modern coercion. This chapter will explore how the United States has developed its intelligence and defense operations in order to influence the behavior of other actors and highlight the inherent biopolitical nature of these coercive techniques.

The Situation & The Strategy

The situation must be understood with a significant degree of accuracy in order to prescribe a plan of action that will accomplish the objective. This is known as situational awareness and is conducted through sufficient information collection and analysis. Information which is of political value is known as intel. Gathering as much valuable information as possible on the situation in question is vital in developing and implementing a strategy that will obtain the desired objective. There are many factors in any given situation, including geographic, political, sociological, historic, and psychological which must be configured as data. Given the wide variety of data necessary for analysis, the U.S. government recognizes many different groups and subgroups of intel. These groups include Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) such as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) or Photo Intelligence (PHOTINT), Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MA SINT) which is often used to detect weapons and chemical capabilities, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) such as Communications Intelligence (COMINT) which intercepts communications between two parties such as those in cyberspace, Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) which collects intelligence from public data, the media, and academic records, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) which is the collection of intelligence from human sources. This intelligence can also be sociological, economic, political, and psychological data from databases. The diverse spectrum of intelligence reflects the growing, multifaceted worldwide field of conflict. No longer is war reserved for the physical battlefield; where actors once waged war across the land, sea, and sky, a new domain has entered – the domain of information.

The value of intelligence collection has been realized by the United States since before WWII; however, it's the boom in resources and development of intelligence operations, policies, and agencies since the war that is a defining feature of the post-modern security environment. In 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was founded as the harbinger of American intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. Today, the United States' intelligence

community consists of almost twenty intelligence organizations including the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and various intelligence offices within other departments like the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Further, there are intelligence agencies and groups within all branches of the U.S. military, including the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Army, the Navy, and the Coast Guard. These ‘three letter agencies’, referred as such due to their acronyms, have become a feature in the development of U.S. defense operations.

The diverse reach of the U.S. intelligence community secures the U.S.’s power over the ‘space’ from which it collects its intel, such as electronic communication networks, e.g. cyberspace. This space then becomes a territory within which sovereignty is maintained through dominant intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; all of these methods work to control information. One may first ask how something like electronic communication networks could become a territory. In geography, a territory is often defined as a region that is “ruled, organized, coordinated, controlled and influenced by a constellation of power that presided over a social system” (Berthoin Antal, et al, 2014, p. 2). As authorities in power soon came to dominate and control communication networks within social systems, these networks became territorialized spaces which could be vied for by opposing powers or used as spaces for resistance against power. For example, when societies were illiterate, the power to define and distribute knowledge was in the hands of the literate ruling classes. Later, when printing presses were first proliferating across societies, the owners of the machines or the authorities themselves could easily control the narratives of events available for the public to read. These acts of power are like Foucault’s *societies of sovereign* and *societies of discipline* paradigms in that they are visible and address the subjects en masse.

Post-modern U.S. intelligence operations are closer to Deleuze's *societies of control*. The intelligence officers who sit at monitors listening, collecting, and testing data across the variety of intelligence spaces act as surveillance. Where Deleuze describes digital technologies like cameras, the U.S. further utilizes an innumerable array of technology from nuclear, to seismic, to the content of newspapers, or changing satellite images showing an adversary's newly constructed compound. If a radar signature suggests an unauthorized entry of an aircraft, the intelligence collected can be used to discipline accordingly. Just as authorities can use ICT, such as smart phones, to monitor digital communications networks, authorities can also use other branches of science to collect information in the form of facts, data, statistics, mathematical quantities, and so forth as a means to monitor their subjects. Seismic activity readings can be analyzed to tell a story of what is happening in an area which cannot be observed in a camera. This means the space which the U.S.'s MA SINT instruments can reach encloses their subjects like the peripheries of a camera's lens. All seismic activity within reach of these instruments is observable. As Deleuze writes of "the man of control": he is "undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network" (1992, p. 6). The adversary or any actor in general which crosses into the radars of the U.S.'s intelligence community is now an individual perpetually under the control. Some instruments access everything in their space without a blind spot in their peripheries, thus othering the continuous control of modulation. Depending on the target and the information desired, the state can combine a series of mediums to monitor the target's activities and manifest a clear image of the situation.

This idea of a continuous control module is not unrealized by U.S. defense experts. In June 2000, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff released the Joint Vision for 2020 which centered on publicizing policy and strategic changes and aims for the U.S. Defense community in the 21st century. This describes several pivots for American defense strategies. One section described a

move to significantly operationally integrate U.S. forces in intel, operations, and organization for the purpose of effective operation and responsiveness. Another focal point mentioned is technological innovation and modernization, and “of greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education, leaders, and people that effectively take advantage of the technology” (JCS, 2000, p. 3). Two pivots mentioned in the doctrine are of utmost importance to the 21st century defense strategy. The first is the introduction of full spectrum dominance, and the second is the foundation of this defense strategy – information superiority (JCS, 2000, p. 2).

Full spectrum dominance is about presence and the projection of power across a wide variety of spaces. These spaces include the aforementioned information territories (open-source, chemical, geospatial, etc.), as well as continued dominance in operations on land, in the sea, and in the air. Dominance in operation and collection means freedom to conduct operations against any adversary and “control any situation across the full range of military operations” (FCS, 2000, p. 6). Full spectrum dominance also encompasses controlling perceptions of U.S. forces abroad, from civilians in conflict zones to enemy militants and even controlling the perspective on relations with ally forces. The objective of full spectrum dominance, like the national interest of any state, is freedom of action. The U.S. defense strategy ultimately seeks to minimize the control which other actors may have over U.S. actions, as well as maximize the control of U.S. in its global interests. To accomplish these objectives, the U.S. must exhibit control across all potential battlefields which means primacy in situational awareness and command strategies.

In order to achieve full spectrum dominance, information superiority is fundamental. Information superiority is defined in text as “the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same” (JCS, 2000, p. 8). Collection and processing (analysis) have historically been considered

in information warfare strategies. Military victories have been decided by the opponent with superior information. During the American Civil War, for example, soldiers floated above the battlefields on balloons equipped with telegraphs to relay information in real-time to generals down below (Mirzoeff, 2015). The doctrine cites an “information revolution”, not unlike the Information Age paradigm, as the greatest development in the security environment for the 21st century (JCS, 2000, p. 8). The Joint Vision doctrine states that the increase in commercial production of military technology will increase availability of information capabilities, such as “commercial satellites, digital communications, and the public internet” (JCS, 2000, p. 4). Spaces territorialized by the control and modulation of one actor in war can be contested in the same way which they were initially dominated. Counterintelligence, for example, is the act of preventing an adversary from collecting information on oneself. The increase in adversary technological capability in collection and analysis inherently threaten the U.S.’s authority in their territorialized spaces. The fog, or twilight, of war which Clausewitz once cited as a universal military concern might soon be replaced with a *hypervisual* battlespace. Superior capabilities in accessing and processing information will lead to a favorable advantage in conflict; however, collection and analysis are not the only components of information superiority. Superior information dissemination capabilities are equally necessary for information warfare.

Like the proliferation of the printing press, the advent of the internet and further spread of digital, smart technologies allows more individuals access to knowledge and information that was previously unimaginable. Individuals’ daily lives once primarily consisted of events in physical proximity to them, until technological innovation gave individuals the opportunity to access information through sprawling communication networks. This has led to two, almost paradoxical, truths. First, that the material world of the individual and the apparent world grew further distant. Verifying information and developing one’s own opinion of a material event were

more difficult as the individual was no longer physically witnessing the event. Second, the more available platforms for information and knowledge gathering would continue to diversify the sources available to the individual in developing their apparent world. Individuals and actors alike will have unprecedented access to information which can be assessed and verified, even for those with significantly less relative technological advancement.

These two axioms have been interpreted differently by different decisionmakers and actors. Further, in making a strategy, an operator must understand the conditions of their target and will prioritize one axiom over another in their strategy. Those that choose to primarily value the first axiom may prioritize use of deception in their information strategy, relying on the distance between the target and the environment that the information pertains to. Some deception strategies include propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Technological innovation has made it possible for actors to utilize *hyperdeception* techniques, e.g. deepfakes⁷, which cannot readily be distinguished especially for the less technological advanced actors and civil societies.

If an actor prioritizes the second axiom, that information can now more widely be verified, they may prefer the tactic of enlightenment. Enlightenment utilized in a plan of action is the dissemination of accurate information in a tactful and thoroughly planned manner. Where deception is used to promote non-veridical perceptions in the target, enlightenment offers a skewed perception which is in line with reality. This is what Holt and Van de Velde call a ‘Campaign of Truth’ (1960). The operator of the strategy can design the worldview of the target when their information is perceived as reliable and trustworthy; however, not all facts speak for themselves, and some facts may mean different things to different people. Information can only

⁷ “The free access to large-scale public databases, together with the fast progress of deep learning techniques, in particular Generative Adversarial Networks, have led to the generation of very realistic fake content with its corresponding implications towards society in this era of fake news.” (Fierrez et al, 2020, p. 1)

be introduced after a thorough awareness of the situation is understood. This includes personal histories, psychologies, cultural values, and ethnic histories, but can include every multitude of a given target's reality.

The earliest use of the enlightenment strategy by the United States comes from the post-war information organizations. A law passed by Congress in 1948 dubbed the "Information and Educational Act" was made to "enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States to other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries" (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 8). This was the first of many foreign information dissemination programs by the U.S. Almost immediately came the United States Information Agency (USIA), whose mission was to "'explain' the United States and 'sell America'" like "that of public relations man and advertising agency for the nation" (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 10). The U.S. erected broadcasting towers throughout Europe at the beginning of the Cold War and began supporting programs like the *Voice of America* and *Radio Free Europe* with the goal "of 'drilling' holes in the Iron Curtain through which 'Truth' could be 'poured'" (Holt & Van de Velde, 1960, p. 206). Radios, public address systems (PA), loud-speakers, leaflet bombs, and tanks equipped with PA systems were utilized prior to the advent of the today's technology (Paddock, 2002). These tactics addressed the masses of a given area, while contemporary enlightenment tactics have become increasingly individualistic thanks to scientific innovations in ICT and the proliferation of smart technologies.

Enlightenment is intended to inform the target audience to an actual change in the material reality, but a carefully planned strategy is made to change the target's apparent world in a way which is beneficial to the operator. Enlightenment is in some ways deceptive, as there is a strategic presentation of true data which manipulates the audience. This can include the

publication of once-classified intelligence, which inherently presents a narrative when the operator strategically censors certain information and publishes other parts.

One example is the U.S.'s geospatial intelligence network. The U.S.'s satellite imagery is remarkable in its detail and the quality is unavailable to other actors or private organizations which may be interested, as it is illegal for non-federal groups to purchase imagery with more than .5-meter ground resolution (Ungerleider, 2011). Many individuals and organizations depend on the U.S.'s published geospatial intelligence; however, for the sake of the U.S.'s national security interests, battlefield maneuvers, army installations, government facilities, and personnel locations are censored. Communications theorist, Lisa Parks, calls this the "shutter control rule" wherein published intelligence is obscured to produce a narrative of a situation for an audience (2013, p. 197). Whether the narrative presented was intentionally misleading or necessary for national security is dependent on the circumstance and the audience. An infamous example is the declassified satellite photo set presented to the U.N. by former-U.S. general Colin Powell, which are often held responsible for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Mirzoeff, 2011). While the rhetoric used to describe the image proved to be false, the use of real data to 'enlighten' a target audience into a belief system was a success as the information dissemination strategy reached its objective – to gain domestic and foreign support for U.S. military action which was already decided to occur (Mirzoeff, 2011).

Information dissemination strategies are inherently affected by innovation in information and communication technologies. The proliferation of smart technologies and the increasing access to cyberspace for the global populations has changed dissemination strategies remarkably. The Department of Defense's dictionary of military terms defines cyberspace as "the notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks" (DOD, 2001). Warfare in the cybersphere can utilize cyber worms like Stuxnet, as noted in chapter 3,

which targets technical data, or can be conducted through enlightenment which targets cognitive information to effect psychological processes and perceptions thus changing the ‘apparent world’ of the target.

Enlightenment can also be conducted by protecting target populations and decisionmakers from deceptive operations like disinformation campaigns. Like enlightenment, deception seeks to change the apparent world of targets. Recently, a major adversary of the U.S. in the information environment has been Russia. Disinformation campaigns, known in Russian military terminology as *maskirovka*, or ‘denial and deception’ operations, are waged by professional internet trolls across all areas of the public internet (Jaitner, 2015, p. 93). These trolls strategically relay a discourse which is non-veridical to the narrative desirable for U.S. national security interests. Open-source information, which is not classified, can be presented to an audience that has been the target of an adversary’s deceptive operations. The enlightenment tactic must look natural, or else it may risk feeding into the discourse of conspiracies produced by the trolls. Competitive narratives, which compete definitions of ‘truths’ like what *really* happened in x event or why officials *really* produced y policy, represent two or more authorities vying to control the narrative and apparent worlds of a group of subjects. This would eventually lead these subjects to subjectivizing themselves beneath the authority whose rhetoric they believe, thus living by the ‘rules’ of that presented discourse.

Conclusion

When an actor envisions a desirable future state of affairs, they must first develop a clear understand of the present state of affairs – the situation. The rapid advancement in intelligence organizations and technology by the U.S. defense community has allowed the state to dominate in situational awareness. This awareness acts as a widespread surveillance system over

adversaries, allies, and neutrals alike across a broad range of disciplines. Whether collecting the cellphone data of everyday individuals, foreign and domestic, or analyzing the changes in air quality over adversary territories, the diverse variety of spaces territorialized by the U.S. intelligence community leaves other actors uncertain if they are being observed. For many, this uncertainty will keep them from acting against the rules of neoliberal discourse. For other actors, they innovate their own intelligence technology as a means to look back at the eye of authority, or innovate counterintelligence technology to obscure the subjectivizing gaze of the U.S.

The U.S. defense community has continued to revise its information operations and strategies due to the proliferation of ICT, rise of the private military technology industry, globalization of societies, and increasing cyberattack threats. The strategies of improving information collection and analysis has prioritized innovation and reorganization of U.S. forces to continue primacy in intelligence operations. Beyond situational awareness, the U.S. Department of Defense has developed new strategies for the future of information-based coercion in the security environment. As the Age of Information continues to shrink the world, the emerging global actors will continue to rely on ‘truth’ as weapon. The conduct of information warfare has becoming increasing more individualistic, continuously modulating, and ever-present in surveillance. A tactful combination of intelligence and defense operations and strategies is necessary to maintain a primacy in the post-modern security environment. The reality of this type of coercion suggests a Foucauldian power relations dynamic between the power, in this case the United States, and the target.

5: Conclusion

Information has long been a domain of war, residing alongside the battles on land, in the sea, and in the air. The global transformations following the Second World War have significantly changed the reality of security environments. The most significant change has been the rise of a new instrument of power which is of equal status to the diplomatic, the economic, and military spheres. This is the fourth instrument of statecraft: information.

Michel Foucault's theory of biopolitics and Gilles Deleuze's *societies of control* paradigm can be used to better understand the mechanics of the power-relation between the state operating an information-based strategy and their intended target. These theories, along with Joseph Nye's *soft power* and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire*, are significant in understanding what biopower as a power operation practically look like. From neoliberal international organizations and the inherent narratives produced by their discourse, to the entrance of cyberspace as a domain of war, the use of biopower is made observable in our post-modern security environment. The reality of international power relations based on biopolitics is a reality which is inherently less violent. As communication networks continue to globalize, science continues to innovate technology, information technology continues to proliferate through societies, and neoliberal principles continue to dictate international political standards; the realm of biopolitics will encompass the globe and actors will increase dependency on the statecraft of information in the global struggle for power.

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