

## The art of preventing violence: the case of the Republic of Macedonia

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*The Art of Preventing Violence*  
*- The Case of the Republic of Macedonia -*

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## *1. Preface*

Having witnessed the carnage and the destruction of World War II and what was to become the "century of fear", Albert Camus pleaded the individuals of the entire world to embrace the motto of a "common humanity". There is plenty of philosophy in this simple phrase. Humankind as an entity, if pushed to believe in and grasp for, has the ability of creating that prosperous society for the common good. Wars and destructive conflicts are not part of humanity, they are not inevitable, and thus we can certainly take action to prevent them. We, however, are often mocked by the games destiny plays on us. Our emotions are weak, our thoughts incoherent and subject to others' demagoguery and dreams. Camus was right when describing the possibility of creating the "common humanity", yet this is directly linked to the rise of the level of consciousness of that same humanity. Unfortunately enough, time needs to elapse before we witness the results of such a process. Until that bright day arrives, we must be able to cope with our own reality of fear and uncertainty, war and destruction, pain and suffering...

Writing about preventive diplomacy and my motherland, the Republic of Macedonia, has proven a rather difficult task for me. On the one hand, I was confronted with the problem of objectivity and righteousness. While thinking of and writing about something I was personally linked to, I also, on a number of occasions, brought into question my previously established beliefs and certainties. I came to view at the situation through another lens, quite different

from the one previously established. At the same time, however, this very activity reopened the wounds that were created some ten years ago, or so. I felt as if I was losing my homeland yet again. I do understand that the level of patriotism, some may even call it nationalism although it has come to take on a negative connotation over the years, is greatly more developed in the Balkans than perhaps anywhere in the world. That has probably made us the curse of Europe, its "powder-keg", and its most troublesome region... I am not trying to deny this, yet want to prove that in all this negativity and darkness, there still exists some light, some ground for prosperity and development, in a very minimal but important way, of that common good of Camus' "common humanity". The lessons drawn from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia will hopefully prevent future repetitions across the globe. The actions of the first successful preventive deployment mission established in Macedonia will hopefully serve the future generation of possible conflicts.

I would like to specify that upon the creation of this Thesis a variety of references from different viewpoints and ideologies were used. It was then that I understood how a certain public opinion, whether it is the Macedonian, Albanian, Serb, western European, or American can be manipulated. It is well known that history is written by the victors, yet the question is whether there was truly a single victorious side in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia taking into consideration all the destruction, pain and suffering, the shame felt and mistakes committed by all participating sides. One thing is certain, however. If

there was not a victorious side, there certainly was a victorious concept. That of preventive diplomacy as applied in the Republic of Macedonia.

Finally, I would like to precise that for the purpose of this Thesis, the name Macedonia will be used in reference to this former Yugoslav republic, even though it bears a different official name of recognition in the international community. I am compelled to do this and not act otherwise, since this is the name I was brought up to use, the name that my people have used over the centuries and cannot simply give up on it.

## ***1. Introduction***

Article 1 of the United States Charter defines, in relevant part, the purposes of the Organization as the effort "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to peace... and adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."<sup>1</sup> Yet, besides all the hope and efforts to implement this preposition to the very political reality, the United Nations, in the almost five decades' course of the Cold War, has always been reactive rather than active towards the emerging threats to international peace and security. This was due to the bipolarity that has come to be created after World War II and the abuse of an international forum, such as

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<sup>1</sup> UN Department of Public Information, *The Charter of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1996) art. 1, para. 1.

that of the United Nations, for the presentation of personal or block interests, not paying much attention to the interests of the entire humanity. All action in international affairs was taken *after* the cessation of hostilities, at a large political, economic and humanitarian cost to the community, which seemed inappropriate and inadequate as far as the prevention of any further conflicts and disputes was concerned. The conceptual idea of the "founding fathers" was taken up only after 1989, marked by a series of events that brought the Cold War and the bipolar, East-West, division of the world to an end. The initial euphoria was replaced with the notion that certain modifications in the UN Charter, the guiding tool of a future, improved international system, were necessary. "It became apparent that the U.N. system, developed primarily with regard to inter-state threats and breaches of the peace, was ill-suited to combat the new threats to the peace of the 1990s: resurgent ethnic and nationalist conflict resulting from tensions which, through long-simmering, had been contained by the bipolarism of the Cold War, and which by and large were intra-state in character."<sup>2</sup>

A new remedy was thus needed. A cure for a world, which has started moving along two diverging paths - one following the trend of globalization, while the other inclined towards that of fragmentation. Against this background, juxtaposing the potential of the Organization against the intractability of the problems facing it, in 1992, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, came

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<sup>2</sup> Stephen T. Ostrowski. "Preventive deployment of troops as preventive measures: Macedonia and beyond." *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, vol. 30, nos.3-4, (1998) pp.794.

up with the landmark document, *An Agenda for Peace*, which reconceptualized the measures available to the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. Boutros-Ghali was conscious that with the end of the adversarial decades of the Cold War "an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'."<sup>3</sup> A Supplement was released three years later, offering further observations on how best and most efficiently to implement these measures utilizing the UN system. *An Agenda for Peace* and its Supplement, have put forward a entirely new approach in the international relations, not just because they have accepted the change in the international arena and recognized the crucial need of the United Nations to adapt its methods to the changing face of conflict, but in particular because they have given an extraordinary emphasis on preventive diplomacy.

That is the very reason why this Senior Thesis will concentrate on preventive diplomacy and its deployment. With its exceptional use in the Republic of Macedonia it has shown to be the remedy for future worldwide conflicts, and should it be implemented in the right manner, following the advises made by a distinct body of scholars, the notion of perpetual wars around

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<sup>3</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1995) pp.39.



the globe might easily vanish. The argument that is to be found in the following pages is that normally, a preventive deployment should be undertaken with the consent of all the parties to the conflict and when it is closely linked to achievable political and humanitarian goals. Furthermore, the primary responsibility for resolving the underlying conflict must remain with the parties themselves. While a military deployment by the international community can and should provide the bases for a secure environment where dialogue can flourish and assistance be provided, if progress toward resolving the root causes of conflict cannot be made or is unachievable, military deployment may not be the best option. The amalgamation of military, political, socioeconomic and humanitarian aspects in the preventive deployment in the Republic of Macedonia has been the reason for its successful outcome. The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia was the "real life laboratory for preventive diplomacy of the United Nations"<sup>4</sup> and as such holds valuable lessons for the future. Prior to the discussion of the successful Macedonian experience and the reasons for it, however, this Thesis will examine the theory and challenges of preventive diplomacy in the past, as well as in the newly generated political reality. Finally, recommendations stemming from the Macedonian experience will be given, drawing from both its successes and minor shortcomings, all

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<sup>4</sup> Ilkka Tiihonen, *Preventive Deployment of the United Nations Forces: The Case of the UNPREDEP in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (New York: Longman, 1997) pp.57.

striving towards the purpose of establishing, in the Charter's words "international peace and security".

## *2. The Prevention of Violent Conflict*

### *2.1. The Theory behind Preventive Diplomacy*

When the second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, first coined the phrase 'preventive diplomacy' he intended to use it in the definition of the United Nations' efforts to keep regional crises, like that of Suez, Lebanon and Congo, from escalating into larger conflicts where the two superpowers could possibly be involved. With the end of the Cold War era, Hammarskjöld's idea was further expanded and acquired new, far more ambitious meaning. In his report, *An Agenda for Peace*, former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali advanced a multileveled definition of preventive diplomacy. According to him, "preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."<sup>5</sup> With this comprehensive definition, Boutros-Ghali intended to espouse various elements and levels of hostility. He referred to the prevention of basic disputes, the avoidance of violence escalation of disputes, as well as the containment of any possible violence. The former Secretary-General's parameters for preventive diplomacy extend over a myriad

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<sup>5</sup> Boutros-Ghali, pp.45.

of elements comprising tools such as taking preventive measures to build confidence, early warning based on information gathering and formal or informal fact-finding, preventive deployment and, if necessary, demilitarized zones.

It has become widely accepted that it is far better to address the root causes of conflicts before they erupt, than to partake in major politico-military initiatives after they have occurred. It is clearly impossible to prevent something if there is no knowledge that it might happen or inadequate understanding of its causes and possible cures. This is the very explanation behind Ghali's insistence on early warning and fact-finding. "Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts ... Given the economic and social roots of many potential conflicts, the information needed by the United Nations now must encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions."<sup>6</sup> The United Nations does not have and is not likely to develop an intelligence network because governments do not relish being spied. The Organization is therefore highly dependent on information provided by Member States' governments and their official declarations, statements and statistics, the world media, academic and institutional sources, regional arrangements and other international and non-governmental organizations to provide the information needed for an effective preventive

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.47.

diplomacy with the purpose of giving an early warning of a possible rise of violence.

Given the prominence of social and economic catalysts in conflicts in today's world, information and analysis encompassing only political factors are bound to be inadequate for preventive purposes. Economic and social factors need to be incorporated as well, in the assessment of the possible potential for conflict in a particular region or country and in the fulfillment of the most effective means of averting it. Social, economic and political factors need to be, in Ghali's words, synthesized in assessing the need for preventive action and deciding the appropriate measures to be taken. This could be accomplished through "the establishment of a special 'watch' or 'early warning' staff in the UN Secretariat to follow information and reports on political, social and economic developments from the various sources available to the United Nations, including the specialized agencies and the functional offices of the United Nations Organization."<sup>7</sup> The information, once ensembled and processed, would be put to practice through the sending of senior UN officials that through their mediation will indicate to the parties involved that the Organization is "actively seized of the matter as a present or potential threat to international security."<sup>8</sup> The UN, as well as specific regional organizations, should work towards the

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<sup>7</sup> James S. Sutterlin, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995) pp.16.

<sup>8</sup> Boutros-Ghali, pp.48.

establishment of expertise and well-trained personnel that can help remove or alleviate sources of potential conflict.

The end of the Cold War clearly increased the willingness of governments to work through the UN and other international channels to address conflicts and other problems. Rather than trying only to mitigate conflicts when they reach a virtually unmanageable scale, deliberate efforts have been made to keep them from erupting in the first place. Preventive deployment has been undertaken in accordance to Ghali's views - in instances of national crises upon the request of the Government, or all the parties concerned; when two countries have felt that UN presence would alleviate or discourage hostilities on both sides of the border; or when a single country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate UN force alongside its border alone. In every single one of these instances, it is extremely necessary for the UN troops to have a clear and present mandate, one which is carefully devised and which does not violate the sovereignty and independence of the state or states concerned. Since the United Nations must bear the consequences of change of times and the political reality, Ghali sees it as utmost necessary to stay obedient to the principles of the Charter - "that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected...and that, in this context, assistance

should be provided with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by that country."<sup>9</sup>

Great credit should be given Boutros Boutros-Ghali's, *An Agenda for Peace*, yet today, on its ten year anniversary, with a dozen of conflicts that the international community has failed to prevent even though the blueprint contained in *An Agenda* has been available, one has come to question the real applicability and even quality of this work. Preventive diplomacy as keeping disputes from arising, as Ghali claimed in the initial part of his definition, may miss the mark. Systemic factors such as socioeconomic, political, psychological and international conditions, although increase the chances that seemingly simple disputes might turn to violent confrontations in the long run, do not necessarily cause the violence. Critics also find the final third of Ghali's definition, the containment of violent conflicts after they have escalated unhelpful. One should not confuse between crisis management or stopping wars, and prevention. Prevention involves the actions undertaken before conflict erupts and not the control of the advanced stages of a violent conflict. Consequently, as the expert on preventive diplomacy, Michael S. Lund, has underlined, the most fruitful approach on this renaissanced term concentrates on Ghali's middle part, which calls for the prevention of low intensity disputes from rising to tense, high-stakes confrontations or the resort to armed force. If conflict prevention means preemptive timing of actions at previolent stages of particular

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.50.

embryonic conflicts, it need not be restricted to a certain technique or method of intervention, but use a variety of diplomatic, political, military, economic, judicial-legal and other tools and policies, which could well encompass mediation, power sharing, problem-solving workshops, peace conferences, peacekeeping, collective security, track-two diplomacy, rule of law, coercive diplomacy, human rights promotion, and many others.<sup>10</sup> All of the above-discussed things considered, pushed Lund to coin an entirely new definition of preventive diplomacy, furthermore so, since the euphoria linked to the end of the Cold War gathered dust on it and thus things could be viewed in a calmer and more rational manner. His definition reveals that

Preventive diplomacy, or conflict prevention, consists of governmental, or nongovernmental actions, policies, and institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially in situations where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effect of economic, social, political, and international change.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) pp.88-93.

<sup>11</sup> Michael S. Lund, "Early warning and preventive diplomacy," *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) pp.384-385.

Viewing preventive diplomacy, or conflict prevention, as an intervention before force or coercion settles disputes, helps to clarify some of the confusion between this term and other current terms such as classical diplomacy and foreign policy, commonly used in relation to the intervention into worldwide conflicts. With the intention of making a clear distinction among various interventions taken at different points in the life-cycle of a conflict, Lund devised the so-called "Conflict Curve" (Figure 1) in which "the course of disputes that become violent conflicts [is] plotted in terms of two dimensions: first, the degree of co-operation or hostility that exists between two or more parties, i.e. the intensity of conflict (vertical axis); and, second, the duration of the conflict over time (horizontal axis)."<sup>12</sup> The smoothly curving bell-shape figure understandingly represents the ideal life history of a conflict. As represented by the several arrows that deviate, certain conflicts might decline, downturn, remain in a perpetual status quo, or simply violently outburst. What is exceptional about Lund's bell, is that he develops a scientific approach to conflicts, firstly by devising several stages of peace or violence varying from durable peace to war, and then protracting them through time, in his attempt to come up with a definition in relation to the duration of the conflict. As it can be seen from Figure 1, preventive diplomacy, or "conflict prevention comes into play during a level of conflict we call 'unstable peace'. As such, conflict prevention occupies the position between 'regular'

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<sup>12</sup> Michael S, Lund, "The meaning and components of 'Preventive Diplomacy'," *Preventive Action in Theory and Practice. The Skopje Papers*, Jeremy Ginifer, et all, eds. (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1999) pp.139.



peacetime diplomacy or national politics - during stable peace - and interventions calculated to minimize or manage crisis and war ... [it would, thus,] be activated in the course of conflicts when the tensions in the relationships between parties are in danger of shifting from the status of stable to that of unstable peace."<sup>13</sup> This kind of action towards conflicts becomes most relevant when, and where, peacetime conditions and relationships have begun to break down, but before crisis management is necessary. Preventive diplomacy, therefore, is very time sensitive and place specific. Its primary aim is to keep obvious, or potential disputes at a specific time from escalating into an all-out conflict, an action that clearly is highly dependent on the 'early warning' tools.

## *2.2. Types of Preventive Deployment*

Depending on the need and exigencies of a situation, a preventive deployment force can be grouped into one of the two major categories: "classical preventive deployment, which espouses the first and the second generation of peacekeeping and is based on the three pillars of consent, impartiality and limited use of force; and preventive peace enforcement, which is authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter and implemented in the event of a deteriorating political environment or impending humanitarian disaster, with or without the consent of the parties

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid. pp.141.

involved, and equipped to use all necessary means towards the accomplishment of its goals.

It is said that the "classical" preventive deployment embodies the first and second generation of peacekeeping because it is always implemented at the initial stages of the conflict continuum. It is based on three pillars, among which the one involving consent perhaps bears the greatest importance. A "classical" preventive deployment must receive consent by the legitimate host government, due to the restrictions presented in Chapter VII, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter that strictly prohibits interference in matters essentially in the domain of domestic jurisdiction.<sup>14</sup> To do otherwise risks dragging the UN into a civil-war situation on the side of one of the disputants, and potentially transforming its resources from instruments of resolution to those of oppression. At this point, the "classic" preventive deployment is faced with the second of its pillars - impartiality. "Its perception remains a vital ingredient for U.N. peacekeeping forces, especially given the concept's strong links to the United Nations' moral and institutional legitimacy and perceived fairness."<sup>15</sup>

Impartiality is the oxygen of peacekeeping; the only way peacekeepers can work is by being trusted by both sides, being clear and transparent in their dealings, and keeping lines of communication open. The moment they lose the trust, the moment they are seen by one side as

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<sup>14</sup> Ostrowski, pp.832.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. pp.835.

the 'enemy', they become part of the problem they were sent to resolve.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, there should be a limited and restricted use of force, essentially as a matter of self-defense, but also as a mean to provide enough muscle for the mission to accomplish its tasks and preserve its effectiveness, yet still refraining from imposing itself upon the conflictual parties.

The second category of preventive diplomacy is the preventive peace enforcement that in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter takes place in the absence of consent for its utilization, but upon a Security Council observation of gross violations of fundamental human rights, humanitarian disaster or internal strife. All action, in these instances, is undertaken in cases where there is a considerable certainty that they pose a threat to the international peace and security, including the dangers posed to the civilian population and transboundary implications. No matter how much this intervention is justified since it encompasses actions undertaken upon humanitarian and natural disasters, it has still been largely criticized by a great body of scholars. "Charges of its selective application in furtherance of the interests of the international elite as well as the potential pretext it may provide for aggression by powerful states have helped add to these suspicions."<sup>17</sup> It is

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<sup>16</sup> Sashi Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?", *Survival*, Winter 1995/96, pp.56.

<sup>17</sup> Ostrowski, pp.838.

deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone.<sup>21</sup> In each situation, the composition and mandate of the UN presence would need to be carefully devised and clear to all. The United Nations forces in cases of deterring external threats, usually, assume the responsibility of monitoring the withdrawal of troops from a disputed area, thus filling in the momentary vacuum in the security apparatus, and providing the 'trusted eye' of a third party to enable the disputants to proceed towards a peaceful, political resolution of an underlying conflict. In recent years, the United Nations has become quite efficient and effective in the deterrence of external threats since it has managed to develop a clear and credible back-up to the UN troops with the increased engagement of major powers or coalition of powers in its operations, ones that make it well clear that "any harm befalling the peacekeeping troops on the 'thin blue line' will engender swift and serious retribution."<sup>22</sup>

Another major action arena of preventive diplomacy is when its troops are positioned within the state's boundaries with a primary mandate to maintain security, undertake confidence-building measures and prevent the outbreak of internal violence. The operations that such a preventive deployment mostly focuses on, whether they would be executed by the military personnel, the civilian police forces, or the military observers include humanitarian operations, supervision or retraining of police forces, development of competent and

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<sup>21</sup> United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia

<sup>22</sup> Ostrowski, pp. 844.

professional leadership, facilitating beneficial community relations, internal election monitoring, etc. All this is done with the purpose of providing both the necessary security and stability for such activities to take place, and the psychological boost of having the international community involved.

#### *2.4. The Determinants of a Successful Preventive Deployment*

If preventive diplomacy fails in its attempt to avoid violence, and consequently the situation deteriorates into crisis, the need for it ceases to exist. Yet, a logical question arises? What are the factors that act as the determinants of a violent or a nonviolent resolution of emerging political disputes, i.e. what are the most effective preventive diplomacy tools? A general overview will comprise of factors, such as third parties involvement supporting firm, unequivocal pressures behind a process of peaceful settlement before any crisis erupts; multitracked intervention strategies, that with the use of adequate policy tools address the potential sources of violence; the extent to which global and regional powers, as well as interested nations and neighbors support, or at least tolerate the undertaken preventive efforts, without undermining them by overt or covert political or military backing of one disputant over another; accommodating moderate political leaders in the conflict arena itself, since it is obvious that failure is likely to occur if they get involved in provocative rhetoric, unilateral preemptive hostile acts, uncompromising policies, or use of coercion and force; and making disputants pursue their differences through common governing

procedures and institutions, operating on the bases of agreed-on, enforceable rules, such as those of legislatures, regularized elections, judicial systems and bureaucracies.<sup>23</sup>

Having listed the many possible tools that are embraced in the conflict prevention methodology, however, is not enough. One must find a way to describe and categorize its sub-types, based on the principal causes, or sources, of potential violent conflict. Michael Lund has, therefore, devised a preventive diplomacy toolbox that comprises all the possible causes of potential conflict and the tools that would alleviate the tension and thus prevent the violent outburst of forces. The first set comprises the so-called development and humanitarian tools, which succeed in preventing conflicts caused by a socio-economic resource scarcity. One reason violent conflicts arise is because nations or groups lack sufficient basic material resources, such as food, shelter, and health needs. Therefore, severe competition is created for these limited resources, competition which results in violence. Furthermore, violent conflicts also appear when there is a lack of equal distribution of these resources in the society, i.e. when a cognizant party enjoys them only. Group violence and armed force can thus only be prevented through humanitarian assistance taken up as an emergency measure to restore the material needs, and the redressing of the inequities in the distribution of resources available. The preventive tools that should be enforced, on the other hand, are "targeted or conditioned economic development

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<sup>23</sup> Lund, "Early warning and preventive diplomacy," pp.392-395.

assistance, cross-communities development projects, gradual income redistribution, and distribution-sensitive humanitarian relief."<sup>24</sup>

The second set of tools are the political development and governance tools, which act as prevention of the outburst of conflict caused due to the lack of enduring governmental institutions and political processes at the national and international levels, as well as a lack of non-governmental valves and a public life to express demands and aggregate preferences. The tasks to be undertaken in such instances are the setting or strengthening of permanent political institutions and procedures, the creation of a non-partisan state, and the creation of a public life and public dialogue not subjected to the state. Lund advises that in these situations the most effective tools to be implemented with a final goal of preventing a possible conflict are "elections and electoral assistance; governmental capacity-building or reform of legislatures, administration, the civil service, and judicial systems; constitution-drafting assistance; the encouragement of executive power-sharing; the allocation of political authority through federalism, autonomy, and decentralization of government functions; political party development; civil society-building; the development of diverse non-political media, etc."<sup>25</sup>

The third set of tools is the diplomatic one, which stems from the lack of negotiation and communication skills among the disputing parties. In these

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<sup>24</sup> Lund, "The meaning and components of 'Preventive Diplomacy'," pp.144.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. pp.145.

instances there is also a lack of good ideas, distrust and an absence of strong motivation to divert from one's own established position. This dead-lock is only to be surmounted by engaging the parties in communication and dialogue through good offices, mediations, peace conferences, arbitration and incentives to negotiate and settle the differences.

The military tools, being the last ones, refer to the direct threat to physical security springing in a situation where there are few or no restraints on the ability of parties to resort to violence or armed force as a way to achieve their demands. The tasks that must be undertaken in these circumstances comprise of the deterrence, suppression and containment of the threats of violence, the deprivation of weaponry, and maintenance of public order, all to be executed through the deployment of a preventive force.<sup>26</sup>

### *3. Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War Era*

A defining characteristic of the post-Cold War era has been the disjuncture between its complex, horrifying events, and the assumption of some foreign policy makers that an easy cure for those disasters can be found. The initial stance advanced by these political elites was that international intervention in civil wars could bring peace and reconstruct governmental structures and civil societies. Unfortunately enough, this claim instantly vanished at the streets of

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid. pp.146.



Mogadishu and Sarajevo. Now, the perspective has changed, seeing the proclamation of early and preventive action in order to stop the humanitarian tragedies of the Balkans, Somalia, or Rwanda kind, tragedies that only in this way can be averted with little cost or risk. The idea that early intervention can prevent civil wars, state collapse, and attendant humanitarian tragedies has proven potent even though it is not new. "The need to monitor, predict and prevent potential violent confrontations has always been an integral aspect of international relations. Two aspects of the contemporary fascination with preventive diplomacy, however, are novel: the amount of attention that foreign policy elites are now devoting to the concept and the expansion of private organizations into what was once viewed as the realm of states."<sup>27</sup>

The global political elites, led by the 'hierarchy' residing in the UN Headquarters in New York have started developing a comprehensive approach to the concept of preventive diplomacy. Being guided by Ghali's *Agenda* as well as the continuous body of work produced by the academic community all over the world, they have acquired a new understanding regarding this matter. They have understood that there is a need for careful planning and comprehension of the underlying matters, elements on basis of which future action would be implemented. While the Security Council must remain the most prominent actor for the preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces, given the Charter's

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<sup>27</sup> Stephen John Stedman, "Alchemy for a new world order," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June95, Vol.74, Issue.3, pp.14.

vesting it with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"<sup>28</sup>, the Secretary-General is generally in a better position to evaluate the various options. He is usually granted the *de facto* command and control over the peacekeeping operations, since he designs, assembles, deploys and manages the mission through his Special Representative, but still has the duty of reporting back to the Security Council. The preventive diplomacy policymaking is therefore executed in the UN Secretariat and its multiple branches, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

The post-Cold War, globalized world, however, has imposed an additional element. Quite plainly, as the former Secretary-General stated, "the United Nations, even with its vast experience and unmatched global network cannot take on all the world's problems by itself. Decentralization and delegation increasingly will be required."<sup>29</sup> Ghali's appeal could and was easily met by a number of regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as individual and *ad hoc* groups of states. The UN 'share of labor' with the regional arrangements has proven to be very successful because they have shown to be closer to particular problems and often possessing a specialized expertise and capacity to devote resources to the solution of a given problem that the UN as a whole cannot. United Nations authorization and co-deployment with a regional organization

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<sup>28</sup> UN Charter, Art.24, para.1

<sup>29</sup> Secretary-General stresses importance of cooperation between the UN and Regional Arrangements in Steven R. Atner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1995) pp.25-26.

could legitimize the latter's efforts and protect against abuses of regional hegemony. As far as the individual and *ad hoc* groups of states, or the so-called 'coalitions of the willing', are concerned, it is necessary to emphasize that their activity has been highly praised in the past few years. They have often shown to provide an interested country with political and military assistance at a critically early stage. By sharing the burden with regional and *ad hoc* groups, while retaining oversight of their activities and implementing the new concepts of preventive deployment in the post-Cold war era, the United Nations perhaps can finally expand its field of activity in the kind of partnership towards global peace and security originally envisioned in the Charter.

#### *4. The Macedonian Case*

##### *4.1 The New Balkan Reality - The Dissolution of Yugoslavia*

At the wake of the Cold War a "strange" nation was created - Yugoslavia. It found its identity in being nonaligned to neither the West, nor the East. During these four decades the West saw Yugoslavia as a *de facto* ally, helping to contain Soviet expansion in Europe. It supported Tito's firm rule, which kept ethnic tensions under control, but it was common wisdom that after he passed from the scene, nationalist pressures might destabilize the country and might even lead to its disintegration and to civil war. These predictions proved correct. Soon after Tito's death in May 1980, nationalist tensions increased. These were reflected in

nationalist tensions between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, Moslems asserting Islamic identity in Bosnia, repeated incidents by Croatian nationalists in that very republic, and calls for independence by Slovenian intellectuals. By the mid-1980s, observers of the Yugoslav scene became highly pessimistic of the chances of the federation holding together.

As the Cold War was winding down, Yugoslavia lost its geopolitical importance it had for the West. As the strategic lens through which Yugoslavia had been viewed during that period was discarded, it came to be perceived as yet another Communist country that needed to be encouraged to democratize and launch itself in the domain of market economy. From its own personal side, in the closing years of the 1980s, when the dissolution of the Soviet Union had almost become a certainty, Yugoslavia lost its *raison d'etre*. Its presence as a buffer state, nonaligned and independent, was no longer necessary, no longer demanded. Suddenly higher goals appeared at stake. The preservation of the country's unity and territorial integrity, which had been a matter of high priority within the Cold War strategic context, was now subordinate to democratization. The international community believed that democratization, the standard medicine believed capable of curing most of the world's ills, would also cure Yugoslavia's afflictions. It was viewed and believed to be a form of preventive action, since, the hope was that, it would bring along the redress of human rights, alleviate ethnic tensions, and keep the country united. These might be the expected outcomes when applied to an ideal case. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia

was not. Ironically enough, democratization, the promotion of economic reforms, and respect for human rights, may have even contributed to the aggravation of the country's problems. Western economic assistance to help alleviate the troublesome economic and social situation, which had been deteriorating since the mid 1970s, became conditional upon reforms, which required returning powers held by the republics to the central government. The change was resisted by Croatia and Slovenia, further stimulating already strong Croat and Slovene aspirations for independence. While these issues were being debated, economic and social conditions continued to worsen, contributing to the malaise that facilitated the propagation of nationalist hatreds. The elections that issued as a result of the West's demand for democratization portrayed this very situation. The first multiparty elections in the Yugoslav republics, witnessed the triumph of those politicians who campaigned on extreme nationalist platforms.

The election results and the increase in nationalistically inspired violence led observers to conclude by mid-1990, that the country was about to break apart. The timing, however, was still unclear. It seems as if the date that triggered the 'beginning of the end' was a referendum held in Slovenia on December 22, 1990, which approved a proposal calling for independence within six months, unless agreement was reached for turning Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of states prior to that date. Yugoslavia observers and experts knew that unless something happened to interrupt this tendency, Slovenia and Croatia would proclaim their independence and a civil war will likely erupt at the end of

the six-months deadline. Since Western policies aimed at alleviating the country's problems were not producing the expected results, they obviously needed to be adjusted. Therefore, instead of pursuing policies aimed at remedying the country's ills as a long-term cure, it suddenly became necessary to address the more immediate danger of war. As it has been claimed, the avoidance of war deeply depends on the political will of the disputants. Unfortunately, former Yugoslav officials, at least those whose actions influenced the most the future of the Federation, showed a distinctive lack of it. That is the very reason why, the international community's attempt to influence them failed to persuade any of the actors to defect from the course that was bound to lead to a violent collision of forces. Had the international community any ability to develop a clear purpose and project credibility the situation might have diverted along a different path. Yet, history is not made with 'ifs' and an academic study should investigate the reality of the very arena of action.

The European Community, as well as the United States administration, in the fall of 1990 launched themselves on a policy that had two components. One was a continuation of a policy adopted in 1989, seeking to alleviate ethnic tensions by encouraging democratization, respect for human rights, and economic reform. This effort was complemented with a strategy of economic deterrence aimed at dissuading the principle Yugoslav actors from taking steps that might ignite war, i.e. dissuading the Croat and Slovene leaderships from proclaiming independence, as well as discouraging the federal government and

the military from enforcing unity. Successful deterrence and dissuasion require both the projection of clear goals and credible leverage. The West, however, instead of clarity signaled ambiguity, leading the various Yugoslav actors to different interpretations of the western attitudes. The main difficulty is to be found in the simultaneous advocacy of both unity and democracy. Within the former Yugoslav reality these concepts showed to be in contradiction one to the other. Attempts to preserve unity were to be accompanied with repression of nationalist and separatist tendencies and violation of human rights. Democratization, on the other hand, encouraged the very expression of nationalist feelings through the formation of parties that espoused such a program in every single one of the Yugoslav republics. Thus, attempts to preserve the unity were antidemocratic, while the promotion of democracy encouraged disintegration. This ambiguity in goals that the West envisaged that Yugoslavia should pursue made it difficult for Yugoslav leaders to predict how the West might react to their moves.

Furthermore, the strategy lacked credibility in both promises and threats. The Yugoslav actors were conscious of the divisions among the EC member states, as well as within the US administration. It is obvious that Western European states were more motivated to prevent war than the United States. Some, like Germany and Italy, were geographically close and thus saw their immediate security and well being likely to be affected by the fighting and the inevitable outpouring of refugees. Consequently, they were more inclined to

accept future change in the Yugoslav arena. In Britain and France, however, attitudes were very different, rotating around the vision of preservation of Yugoslavia. Being presented with such a situation, and at the same time being conscious that a joint action was necessary, the European states developed policies that reflected a compromise between their initial attitudes. Yet, this was done solely on the supranational level. While the European institutions called for "full respect for human rights and the preservation of unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia", with the purpose of creating a "new Yugoslavia on the bases of freedom and democracy"<sup>30</sup>, with strong approval by member states, such as Britain and France, others, like Germany and Italy sent comforting signals to independence-yearning Croatia and Slovenia. The American position was no less ambiguous, although due to different reasons. There was a clear reluctance to act on the Yugoslav arena. There was an assessment that events in Yugoslavia no longer affected vital American interests, accompanied with the doubt of many US officials in America's ability to effectively influence the course of internal developments there, and the view that an active involvement in the Yugoslav crisis would require military involvement, hardly supported by US public opinion. Although reluctant to become engaged in the problem, the United States could not completely detach itself from it, and as a result, its diplomacy continuously altered between passivity and activism that further added to the ambiguity.

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<sup>30</sup> *Europe*, February 6, 1991, pp.4-5.



The third 'flaw' in the West's policies towards Yugoslavia is to be defined as the omission of mediation between the disputing parties. The international community avoided mediation because the Yugoslav actors would have interpreted such an involvement as implicit acceptance of the Croatian and Slovenian desire to be treated as sovereign states, equal in status to that of the federal government. Croat and Slovene leaders, in fact, called for EC mediation openly. In these circumstances, an attempt to mediate between the parties would have exposed the European Community to criticism of violation and interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Getting directly and intensively involved in a political maneuvering in Yugoslavia, was something that both the EC and the United States were reluctant to do, since it would lead them to commitments they were not ready to assume. Instead, they pursued a policy of active support of internal discussion in a series of summits that were initiated among the federal authorities and the six republics' president as of March 1991. At these "Yu-summits" the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, seized the initiative proposing a plan, the so-called "June proposal", that would accommodate the interests and desires of all participants through the creation of an "asymmetric confederation or graded federation"

The compromise proposal called for the creation of a loose federation along the lines of the European Community in four common areas of interest - human rights, economic affairs, foreign affairs, and defense. Yugoslavia would remain with its current administrative borders and

would maintain a common foreign policy, a common parliament, and a common military. There would be a single market and a single currency, as well as a collective head of state. However, in other areas, the republics were to have complete autonomy, including the right to establish independent diplomatic mission. In other words, there would be sovereignty for the republics, as in the confederation supported by Croatia and Slovenia, and there would be a state sovereignty, as in the federation demanded by Serbia.<sup>31</sup>

There was a great enthusiasm around the proposed plan, furthermore so, since it was genuinely welcomed by the European Community and its Commissioners Jacques Santer and Jacques Delors. This soon proved to be an illusion because by June, the newly created Croatian police on one side, and the Yugoslav National Army joined by Serb paramilitary units got involved open clashes, with frequent intrusions on the Bosnian territory. The growing violence that issued could hardly be checked by anything, let alone the 'June Proposal'. Yugoslavia had finally fallen into the vicious circle of war, destruction and disintegration. The Slovene and Croat proclamations of independence from Yugoslavia on June 21, and the ones by Macedonia on September 17, 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina on March 6 1992, were solely the epilogue of the attempt to preserve Tito's creation.

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<sup>31</sup> Alice Ackerman, *Making Peace Prevail. Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000) pp.79-80.

What was to emerge was the sole and most worrisome conflict on European soil since World War II.

#### *4.2. Toward State Independence: The Macedonian Peace Story*

Due to a number of reasons, which are difficult to assume and synthesize, the first state of the Macedonian people was established as late as 1944, on the territory that the Republic of Macedonia occupies today. Macedonia's gaining a state sovereignty in 1944, as a constitutive republic of the former Yugoslavia was of dual importance: the people got a chance to determine themselves both in stato-political and in national terms, for the first time in history and, secondly, the Macedonian issue, generated over the Balkan powers' yearn for a dominion over the Macedonian territory, was temporarily removed from the agenda of the political confrontations. This largely contributed to the stabilization of the political and security situation in the entire Peninsula.

As noted in the previous section, the Yugoslav Federation broke up as a result of many deep and serious reasons. While Slovenia and Croatia set up national guards, as embryos of their new armies, and the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (YPA) got involved in the emerging conflict keeping the side of Serbian politics, the Macedonian government behaved more cautiously. Step-by-step, the Macedonian leadership undertook primarily political moves. The declaration of independence resulted from the independence referendum held on September 8, 1991 in which the Macedonians voted overwhelmingly in favor of statehood. The

new Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia was adopted on November 17, 1991. In January 1992, the Badinter Commission appointed by the European Community confirmed legitimacy of all these political steps and gave a clear recommendation for international recognition of the Macedonian Republic. However, up until the end of July 1992 neither the European Community nor other subjects had decided to recognize it. The main reason was the obstruction of Greece, which due to complicated historical reasons claimed a "copy-right" of using the name "Macedonia".

From an internal political standpoint, it is most important to stress that the Macedonian leadership proceeded more cautiously in its relations with the YPA, than Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina had, thus avoiding violent conflict. In this context, the manner of gaining independence and constituting the sovereign Macedonian state is most important. Its main characteristic was its realization without the use of force (either outside or inside); the gradual completion of statehood; and perhaps most importantly, the avoidance of military dualism, which excluded any possibility of armed conflict. The key moment in this connection was the peaceful and civilized resolution of the problem of withdrawing the YPA and its troops from the territory of Macedonia. Despite the fact that there had been even before some public speculations about the need to firstly create a Macedonian national army, this step was taken only after the constitution of the entire state and political civil structure was completed. In this way, the trap of internal or external pressures was avoided in

a relatively peaceful atmosphere for this region and with an absolute rejection of any military option. Therefore, there was no euphoria or national sentiment accompanying the creation of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM). Rather, it was influenced by the pressure of the tragic events on the former Yugoslav territory and the dominant anti-military disposition of the wider public. It is interesting to mention that a group of Macedonian intellectuals centered on the Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action (MAAK) even pronounced a *Manifesto for Demilitarization of the Macedonian Republic* in September 1991.<sup>32</sup>

In course of 1991/92, the Macedonian state had to undertake very important steps in order to constitute its own military force. In this regard one must have in mind the fact that during the YPA's withdrawal all the armament and military equipment were removed from Macedonia. In this sense, Macedonia had to make an account of its human (especially professional) potential and material resources left after Yugoslavia's dissolution, and at the same time organize and utilize them in the best possible way. This transformation was additionally complicated by the UN embargo on the export of arms and military equipment imposed on all former Yugoslav republics.

#### ***4.3. The Fragile Security***

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<sup>32</sup> Olga Murdjeva-Skaric and Svetomir Skaric, "Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia", paper presented at the XVI IPRA General Conference *Creating Nonviolent Futures*, Brisbane, Australia, 8-12 July 1996, pp.11.

The debacle of socialism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia have marked a new historic phase in the development of the Yugoslav successor states, including the Republic of Macedonia. All of these newly created states have gone through many political and security changes. In fact, the old problems have not been resolved by these major historic events themselves, on the contrary, only a range of new ones has been opened. After the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, the process of consolidation of the independent Macedonian state was conducted in extremely complicated circumstances, such as, a very low level of economic development, emphasized by disintegration of the united Yugoslav market; a strong influence of the Yugoslav armed conflict with a possibility of escalation toward Macedonia; a wide range of problems connected with its international recognition, especially the problems with Greece regarding the name; and a double embargo - the first from the north, imposed by the UN resolutions against FR Yugoslavia and the second, from the south by the will of its neighbor. Nevertheless, in the first years of Macedonia's independence, the possibility of spillover of the Yugoslav armed conflict was considered as the crucial and potentially the most explosive problem. "Three scenarios were put forward: (1) spillover of the Kosovo conflict, perhaps even involving Albania; (2) escalation of internal conflict between ethnic Albanians and Slavic Macedonians, facilitated by growing Albanian nationalism; and (3) invasion by Greece,

Bulgaria and Serbia in yet another attempt to establish their dominance over the breakaway republic."<sup>33</sup>

Although the Macedonian government and the international community since the independence of the republic have made frequent reference to the inter-ethnic relations between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority, and especially to the latter's secessionist and irredentist aspirations, it seemed that at the initial stages a more actual concern was the resident effect that a potential Kosovo conflict would have on the republic's peace and security. It was clear that an armed struggle in Kosovo would provoke a flow of refugees that the Macedonian grave economic and social situation would find it hard to cope with. There were also speculations that many of the refugees would prefer to stay in Macedonia, rather than return to their impoverished mother-"country" once the conflict would be terminated. In addition, one could not exclude the risk of infiltration of some radical Albanian elements that might further radicalize the precarious situation in Macedonia. Moreover, the import of such a large number of Albanian population in Macedonia would disturb the fragile demographic balance in the republic. There were even some considerations that in a worst case scenario, the Yugoslav Army could easily continue its operations on the Macedonian territory since firstly the borders have not yet been demarcated and than because the Macedonian territory had practically remained a demilitarized zone. Finally, the Macedonian public has portrayed itself as being highly

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<sup>33</sup> Ackerman, pp.81.

suspicious toward the Kosovo Albanian community and its political leaders. The impression that one gets, however, is that the radicalization of the situation in Kosovo intensifies the Albanophobia among the Macedonian public.

The Albanian question within Macedonia's borders, on the other hand, has always posed uncertainty and uneasiness. The many centuries history of the Macedonian and the Albanian ethnic groups has undoubtedly created a level of ethnic tolerance, but this does not mean that they have created a sense of togetherness. Macedonians and Albanians have most often lived one next to another as two separate worlds where the elements dividing them have been more emphasized than the elements bringing them together. They are of different ethnic origins, cultures, traditions, languages and religions. The lack of social interactions and mutual understanding of each other's language, culture and history quickly transforms itself into fear and doubt. It is these two sentiments that prevailed in the perpetual relations between the two ethnic groups.

Being presented with such a social reality, the Macedonian authorities quickly came to realize that the prevention of violent conflict was closely related to the willingness of the two groups to pursue dialogue, to remain moderate, and to abstain from nationalist rhetoric that could incite violence. "Even before independence, the Macedonian government opted for a policy of accommodation and political dialogue as far as ethnic Albanians were concerned. In the 1990 elections, it permitted the formation of ethnic Albanian



political parties, all of which had specific ethnic agendas."<sup>34</sup> At their termination, the most voted Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) was even invited and participated the creation the coalition government with the greatest of the Slavic Macedonian parties. The doubt among the Slavic Macedonians, however, still remained. It was a basic doubt in the loyalty of the Albanian citizens to the Macedonian state, one that was, naturally, further more intensified by the complaints and the stipulations of the Albanians, who view the fact that they are so little represented in the administration, the police, the army and education as a symptom of a chronic disease. They consider that both in the social and the cultural respect, they are treated by the Macedonians as "second-class" citizens. "There are frequent claims - and this has been confirmed by their co-nationals from Kosovo - that the feeling of social and cultural superiority over the Albanians is much stronger among the Macedonians than among the Serbs... These animosities [have] appear[ed] from time to time and, as it came out in November 1992 or in February 1995, individual clashes between the radical Albanians and the police [could] very quickly and regardless of the motive lead to escalation and ethnicization of the entire atmosphere."<sup>35</sup>

Just how serious the threat is from Serbia, is an unanswered question, and one that goes beyond mere political and defense considerations. Macedonia's economy was closely linked to Serbia's in the old Yugoslav federation, so much

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<sup>34</sup> Ackerman, pp.88.

<sup>35</sup> Magarditsch Hatschikjan, "Macedonia: Variable balances, fragile structures," *Balkan Forum* vol. 4, no.3 (1996)

that some saw no future for Macedonia without Serbia. However, the war and the brutalities undertaken in Bosnia changed much of this perception. One argument in favor of establishing the *denar* as the Macedonian currency independent from the Yugoslav *dinar* was precisely the wish to abstain from aiding the Serbian war effort. An additional problem in the matter was posed by the 45,000 Serbian minority that lived on the territory of the newly created independent republic and their increased nationalistic propaganda and requests for unity with their motherland. The scenario that Milošević might intervene in Macedonia using the country's Serb minority as a pretext for military action was quite a credible one. Belief in such a scenario was fed by the propaganda tactics of the rump Yugoslavia, which referred that the "300,000 Serbs" in Macedonia were greatly discriminated against. This stance was especially taken up by some ethnic Serbian activists, following the lead of Serbian Radical Party and ultra-right leader Vojislav Šešelj who openly called for the creation of an autonomous Serbian region in northern Macedonia. As a consequence and bearing in mind the troubled past with the northern neighbor, Macedonian Defense Minister, Vlado Popovski, in April 1992 officially stated that Serbia posed the greatest military threat to the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>36</sup> It is upon this statement that the request by the President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, for a preventive deployment mission carried out by the international community as a guarantor of the republic's peace and security, was issued.

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<sup>36</sup> Hugh Poulton, *Who Are the Macedonians?* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995) pp.179.

#### *4.4. The International Involvement in the Republic of Macedonia*

Being confronted with such a reality, the Macedonian officials understood that some measures must be undertaken for the preservation of the peace and security in the country. "In a letter dated 23 November 1992, addressed to the President of the Security Council for the attention of the Members of the Council, the Secretary-General referred to the situation in Macedonia and stated that during a visit to the United Nations headquarters in New York on 11 November 1992, Mr. Kiro Gligorov, President of Macedonia had conveyed to him a request for the development of United Nations observers in Macedonia in view of his concern about the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia."<sup>37</sup> The consequent Resolution 795 of December 11 1992, thus, established the presence of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia, whose immediate mandate was to visit Macedonia's border areas with Albania and FR Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro). In addition, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to immediately deploy military, civil affairs, administrative and police personnel that in cooperation with the Macedonian authorities would work on the strengthening of security and confidence in this country.<sup>38</sup> The "Macedonian Command", as this

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<sup>37</sup> United Nations, Secretary-General. 1992. *Report of the Secretary-General on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*. UN on-line source: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/sgrep/1992>>

<sup>38</sup> United Nations, Security Council. 1992. "Resolution 795, Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3147th Meeting on 11 December 1992." S/RES/795 (1992), 11 Dec. UN on-line source: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/795.htm>>

preventive branch of the UNPROFOR came to be called, came to include monitoring activities of the border areas with Albania and FR Yugoslavia; strengthening the country's stability by providing preventive forces; and reporting to developments that would constitute a threat to the country. The UN preventive deployment mission was thus to provide early warning by monitoring the border areas and report to the Secretary-General, through the Force Commander, any developments which could pose a threat to Macedonia, as well as to deter, by its presence such threats from any source and help prevent clashes which could otherwise occur between external elements and Macedonian forces. The "Macedonian Command" was therefore established as the first and only preventive mission in accordance with Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*. It embraced all the elements that he had called for in his Report to the Security Council. It was enforced at a pre-violent stage of a possible conflict upon a demand by the national authorities that *per se* guaranteed future cooperation and collaboration between the two sides, it contained concepts such as early warning and monitoring of the kind Ghali had discussed in paragraphs 28 to 32 in his Report and it was not envisaged as a solely military deployment, but it also had a civil and administrative component. UNPROFOR in Macedonia thus had all the ingredients of a successful conflict prevention mission since its very embryonic stage.

The "Nordic Battalion" (NORDBAT) comprising a combination of 700 soldiers, 35 military observers, 26 United Nations civilian police and a small staff

contingent from Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, became fully operational by March 16, 1993. It took over from a Canadian company that had been deployed on an interim basis in January of the same year, pending the arrival of the joint battalion. In June 1993, a major novelty occurred. The United States sent a 300-men contingent to Macedonia, marking the first American involvement in a preventive diplomacy mission. The US marines not only augmented the mission's size and strength, but also internationalized the force and demonstrated the UN's seriousness of purpose in Macedonia. As the Secretary-General noted in his report at the time, the "tangible support offered... in the form of United States deployment will further strengthen confidence and stability [in Macedonia] and underscore the message that the international community will not accept any further widening of the tragic conflict in the region."<sup>39</sup>

A second major evolution in the preventive deployment presence in the Republic of Macedonia, occurred in March of the following year, with the Security Council's Resolution 908, which "encourage[d] the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, in cooperation with the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace

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<sup>39</sup> United Nations, Secretary-General. 1993. *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 795 (1993)*, *supra* note 32. UN on-line source: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/screp>>

and stability in that Republic."<sup>40</sup> The inauguration of the "good offices" gave a new dimension to the 'Macedonian Command' of the UNPROFOR mission. The inclusion of a civil affairs office as a part of the original mission provided for an additional social, rather than purely military outlook of the preventive deployment. Only with the passage of Resolution 908 was the mission finally equipped with the necessary authorization to address this "complete network of external and internal factors... contribut[ing] to the economic and political uncertainty and rising social tension,"<sup>41</sup> and thus to carry out the multi-faceted and synergistic preventive diplomacy envisaged by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*.

In the Spring of 1995, the Macedonian authorities requested the separation of the United Nations forces on its territory from UNPROFOR for it viewed that the latter's primary concern was in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, primarily Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a consequence, pursuant to Security Council resolution 983 (1995), UNPROFOR was reorganized into three separate forces with the Macedonian portion redesignated United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) and reporting to the Zagreb Headquarters. The resolution, however, did not change the nature of the UN presence in the republic, nor its basic mandate. It was still to monitor the country's borders with

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<sup>40</sup> United Nations, Security Council. 1994. "Resolution 908, Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3356th Meeting on 31 March 1994." S/RES/908 (1994), 31 Mar. UN on-line source: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/9416107e.htm>>

<sup>41</sup> United Nations, Secretary-General. 1994. *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 947 (1994)*. UN on-line source: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scprep>>

Albania and FR Yugoslavia, to strengthen by its presence the country's security and stability, and to report on developments that could threaten the country. With a mandate to patrol and report only, UNPREDEP was not expected to respond with force to an outside attack or otherwise defend the Macedonian border. The Macedonian authorities were quite satisfied with this fact, since it silenced the critiques that the international presence in the country threatened its sovereignty and independence. The mission was simply considered to be a deterrent sufficient to discourage potential aggressors. Yet, besides having as a priority the external threat element, UNPREDEP over time started becoming highly more involved in the internal stability of the republic. It assumed the responsibility to work with other agencies and the Macedonian government to provide humanitarian assistance and to promote reconciliation among ethnic and political groups within Macedonia. Thereafter, the mission focused more on other tasks like assistance in strengthening mutual dialogue among political parties and helping in monitoring human rights, as well as inter-ethnic relations in the country. A scholar at the Balkan Peace Study Center in Skopje, Biljana Vankovska-Cvetanovska points out that "UNPREDEP was subsequently focused on three main pillars of its mandate: political action and good offices (political dimension), troop deployment (military dimension), and the human (socio-economic) dimension. The mission [was] recognized as a significant instrument

for facilitating dialogue, restraint and practical compromise between different segments of society."<sup>42</sup>

When the government of Macedonia requested the continuation of UNPREDEP, following the termination of the United Nations missions in Bosnia and Croatia, the need was explained primarily in terms of external security concerns, namely the need for the mutual recognition and normalization of relations with FR Yugoslavia and the commencement of negotiations on the demarcation of the border between the two States, the need for stability and sustainability around the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, including its arms control and confidence-building measures, and the need for Macedonia to attain sufficient national indigenous defense capabilities. The Secretary-General and the Security Council, fortunately enough shared the view that the continuation of UNPREDEP's mission was an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. Therefore, with the enactment of Security Council Resolution 1046 effective on 1 February 1996, UNPREDEP became an independent mission reporting directly to the New York Headquarters, while maintaining its basic mandate, strength and composition. Although the internal situation was not resolved, it is generally agreed that this experiment in preventive diplomacy has been successful and that UNPREDEP has made a significant contribution to stability in the region

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<sup>42</sup> Biljana Cvetkovska-Vankovska, "Between Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: The Macedonian Perspective of the Kosovo Crisis", paper presented at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington D.C., February 18, 1999.



and to the security in Macedonia.<sup>43</sup> The establishment of UNPREDEP as an independent mission considerably upgraded its capacity for political action under the terms of the Security Council Resolution 908. "The civilian component of the mission utilized the good offices mandate vested in [the] Special Representative to bring together the various communities in an effort to promote mutual understanding, help strengthen respect for human rights and ease political and inter-ethnic tensions within the country. The civilian component of the mission was also active in initiating contacts among various segments of the population in order to address a number of underlying socio-economic problems which, if neglected, or overlooked, had the potential to exacerbate political tensions. This activity was of special importance, given the precarious social and economic situation of the country."<sup>44</sup>

It must be underlined, however, that the UNPREDEP has not acted alone in the execution of its mission on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Various components of the United Nations system were engaged in different forms of assistance to the Republic of Macedonia. Several of them established permanent offices in the capital, Skopje, while others, as part of an imminent exit strategy, were actively encouraged by UNPREDEP to take over responsibility in their respective areas of activity pending the arrival of a resident coordinator of

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<sup>43</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*. (Santa Barbara, Cal.: ABC-CLIO, 1999) pp.150.

<sup>44</sup> United Nations, Secretary-General. 1997. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, 12 May 1997*. S/1997/365 (1997). UN on-line source: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scprep/S1997365>>

the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The UN organizations, agencies and programs that provided assistance to the republic in these initial stages, were immediately defined as indispensable, because they assumed the generating role in all that was to be done in the area of social integration, particularly in the inter-ethnic context. Likewise, the social impact of transition would not, but directly affect the social peace and stability in a country recovering from the breakdown of a planned economy, and one that was considered to be the poorest among the former Yugoslav republics. The efforts undertaken in the human dimension sphere, complemented by other more classical techniques of preventive diplomacy, notably in the military and the political spheres, proved to be the precise preventive remedies for the ill that was expected, but avoided. The human dimension proved to be an important confidence-building measure between the people and the authorities of the host country on the one hand, and the preventive deployment mission on the other. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Henryk Sokalski when trying to define the UNPREDEP mission stated that

[t]he action in question places a preventive operation in the forefront of a process of development and positive change, rather than giving it the role of a passive observer... [I]t constitutes part of the preparations for the necessary successor agreements to be set in place once the preventive peace-keeping force leaves the host country. It is only natural that most of such activities would, in the longer term be

more effectively undertaken by UNDP and other organizations and agencies of the United Nations system. An effective preventive mission, when it leaves, should offer a strategic framework for national and international action and, unquestionably, the strategy proposed should in no way discriminate against its potential users.<sup>45</sup>

Remaining truthful to *An Agenda for Peace* and the new policy-making of the reinvigorated United Nations, a number of organizations, agencies and programs of the UN system were dispatched to the Republic of Macedonia with a purpose of transmitting all the knowledge and experience they possess for the benefit of the host country. In a close cooperation with the Macedonian government a number of innovative projects have been initiated, which have assisted the country in "institution-building, promoting a participatory government, reintegrating vulnerable social groups, training social welfare workers, stimulating employment generating activities, strengthening narcotic drug control, and enhancing criminal justice and crime prevention."<sup>46</sup>

In this way, for example, the International Monetary Fund, and its resident mission in Macedonia actively supported the program of macroeconomic stabilization. In cooperation with the Macedonian Ministries of Finance and Economy, they also focused on advancing structural reforms, carried out extensive programs of technical assistance, particularly in the areas of

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<sup>45</sup> Henryk J. Sokalski, "Preventive diplomacy: The need for a comprehensive approach", *Balkan Forum*, No.1, March 1997, pp.48-49

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* pp.50

fiscal policy administration, tax and expenditure reform, banking supervision, monetary policy reform and the compilation of macroeconomic statistics. The Office of the United Nations for Human Rights was engaged with the host government in projects that would raise the human rights consciousness in the republic. These projects included the incorporation of the human rights education in the school curricula, the development of human rights documentation resources, the strengthening of the office of Ombudsman, and the encouragement for participation of the academic community, non-governmental organizations and groups in the civil society. The activities of the United Nations systems were, thus, widespread and extending in a myriad of spheres. The IMF and the UNCHR, even though being most active in the Macedonian environment, were certainly not the only ones. An active presence and involvement could also be seen from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and many more, each acting within their own dominion, but still giving a new perspective of preventive diplomacy.

It is necessary to note, however, that UNPREDEP has not been provided with any funds or human resources that undoubtedly would have made this mission even more successful. All the results achieved have been dependent on the commitment of its staff, both civilian and military, representing over fifty nations, as well as the trust in the work on the part of some donors. They have

succeeded in creating and developing a small, but quite effective laboratory of preventive deployment in the human resources sphere, thus complementing the initial mandate of UNPREDEP.

Besides being aided by the branches of its own system and the host government, the United Nations Preventive Deployment mission benefited from the activities of third actors such as a number of other international organizations, as well as non-governmental ones. The priority among all of them, undoubtedly, should be given to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its spillover mission in Skopje. The OSCE mission was established in September 1992 following an exploratory mission, and since then has worked to facilitate and encourage dialogue between community groups and the Macedonian government with the purpose of stabilizing the ethnic tensions in the country. UNPREDEP and the OSCE closely coordinated their activities and the two organizations frequently met at a variety of levels to share information and to streamline coordination. As a part of the good offices mandate, in the summer of 1994 the civilian component of the 'Macedonian Command' of UNPROFOR assisted the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Union in carrying out a census to determine the ethnic composition of the population. Troops have also provided assistance to the OSCE upon the organization and monitoring of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1994 and 1998.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Wilhelm Höynck, "OSCE Missions in the Field as an Instrument of Preventive Diplomacy - Their Origin and Development," in Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the OSCE (1997)*, pp. 64-65.

The stabilization of the security in the Republic of Macedonia and the issued process of confidence-building and institutional reform largely supported by the international community were suddenly put into question by the developments in the immediate environment. The events that occurred in Kosovo in the summer of 1998 highlighted the danger of renewed violence in the area and the serious repercussions such violence could have upon the external and internal security of Macedonia. It had become clear that unless hostilities in Kosovo were stopped, tension could spill across the borders and destabilize the entire region. With the willingness of staying compliant with the trends sponsored and undertaken by the international community, the Republic of Macedonia decided to authorize the deployment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Extraction Force on its territory that was to monitor the escalating situation in Kosovo. As a result, the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia became increasingly strained. The probabilities of realization of the worst-case scenario have suddenly rocketed. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on January 29, 1999, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia "presented his Government's arguments for an extension of the mandate of UNPREDEP for an additional six months, with its existing composition and structure. In his letter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointed, in particular, to his Government's concern over the danger of a spillover of the conflict in Kosovo into the host country [Macedonia], the increase of tensions on the Albanian-Yugoslav border... and the lack of progress in the

demarcation of the country's border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."<sup>48</sup> However, an unexpected situation occurred. On February 25, by a vote of thirteen in favor, to one against (China) and one abstention (the Russian Federation), the Security Council failed to adopt the eight-nation draft resolution that would have extended UNPREDEP's mandate for the requested period. "Speaking after the vote, the Chinese delegate said that his Government had always maintained that UN peacekeeping operations, including preventive deployment missions should not be open-ended."<sup>49</sup> According to the Chinese mission to the New York Headquarters, the situation in Macedonia had apparently stabilized in the years of the preventive deployment and its relations with the neighboring countries had improved. There was not, however, made a reference to the Macedonian diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China - Taiwan, which ran contrary to the PR China's inflexible 'One China' policy. In this way, even though the remaining member States of the Security Council expressed their regret at China's veto, the UNPREDEP mission in the Republic of Macedonia was terminated. The greatest fears developed only later. In less than a month, pushed by the Serbian repression in Kosovo, NATO forces started bombarding strategic Serbian sites. What issued was a humanitarian catastrophe

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<sup>48</sup> United Nations, Secretary-General, 1999. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1186 (1998). UN on-line source: <[http:// www.un.org/Docs/screp](http://www.un.org/Docs/screp)>

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Preventive Deployment Force*, [http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm)

seeing more than 300,000 refugees entering Macedonia's territory, destabilizing the fragile Macedonian inter-ethnic balance and thus engendering a possible crisis. It is a question whether the situation would have developed in this direction should the international presence still be in Macedonia. Yet, history is not made with 'ifs'? One is only doomed to learn its lessons and in that way, understand the past to be able to draw a better future. Nevertheless, one thing is certain. The destabilization that befell Macedonia in March 1999 was definitely of its own making. It was not triggered by internal circumstances such as ruthless, nationalist politicians, repressive laws on ethnic minorities, or the revoking of a long-established ethnic coexistence, dialogue, and power sharing, but a work of external forces. Unfortunately enough, at the moment of escalation, of the international preventive actors that had been engaged in Macedonia, only the OSCE with its Skopje spillover mission was still active. In the three months of increased tension, Macedonia held on to peace. It could not, however, avoid its date with the tough Balkan destiny. Its time came in March 2001, the fear of spillover befell it. And the reality would have certainly been different should the preventive deployment mission under the United Nations banner stayed in the country. But that is a different story....



## *5. Conclusion*

Throughout many centuries the destiny of Macedonia and her peoples was the object of many diplomatic actions and negotiations among the powerful actors of the international arena. Solutions were usually adopted on behalf of the people concerned, without carrying about their real needs. At the threshold of the 20th century, the Great Powers heavily influenced Balkan affairs, creating deep scars on the historical being of every Balkan people. From a Macedonian perspective, European diplomacy showed its worst and ugliest face. The main goal of all international activities was achieving one's own state's benefit and disadvantaging the adversaries. Diplomacy, by definition, represents an activity with mostly non-hostile nature. However, unjust and even immoral interference and manipulations among infant Balkan nationalisms have left many open quarrels, unrealized dreams of Greater states and a state of unfinished peace.

Almost a century later Macedonia still represents rather an object than subject of Balkan and wider international relations. It is still a country whose destiny depends on the constellation of international relations and on decisions of the major international players. Nevertheless, the situation at the threshold of 21st century is radically changed. The international community today, has successfully prevented conflicts within and around Macedonia with the intention of preserving a general peace in the Balkans. In this sense, deployment of a conflict prevention force in this country has proved the thesis that it is a part of the concept of modern diplomacy, no matter how semantically narrow the word

*diplomacy* might be perceived. The Macedonian hope for the future is deeply linked with this new kind of diplomacy, where the interests of the peoples concerned and peace would have primacy.

Preventive diplomacy should be given the supreme importance within the international environment created after the end of the Cold War. It is a matter of greatest concern for every member of the international community. One is tempted to postulate the moral imperative that the primary concern of *diplomacy*, in fact, should be to work to avert outbreaks of open conflict, both between and within states. Preventive diplomacy can be seen as a concrete expression of fresh thinking and new ideas, which has begun to prevail within the international community. Nevertheless, it is still too early for an ultimate optimism. There are still many dilemmas and questions to be answered. In this regard, one must keep in mind that the international arena is still in the hands of nation-states, and that the international governmental organizations are still too weak in terms of being able to play a role of their own. There is an opinion that these organizations are hardly relevant as actors in international relations. They do fulfill, however, a number of functions that provide them with important roles as arenas for cooperation and conflict, as "face-savers" for the great powers, and legitimizers of unpopular domestic policies.<sup>50</sup> This contradiction between the role of the great players play in world politics in general and the international organizations in

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<sup>50</sup> Hans Mouritzen, "Twining Plants of International Cooperation: Reflections on the Peculiarities of 'Security' IGOs" in Jaap de Wilde and Hakan Wiberg (eds.), *Organized Anarchy in Europe. The Role of States and Intergovernmental Organizations*, (London&New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996) pp.65-85.

particular could have been seen at several occasions during the UNPREDEP's implementation in Macedonia.

The UNPREDEP, as the first and only UN peacekeeping mission with a mandate of preventive diplomacy, inevitably must be taken as a starting point in the evaluation of the preventive diplomacy concept. The Macedonian case has offered many arguments of the thesis that preventive diplomacy must be comprehended as an evolving and not as a static concept. Since the mission's establishment in 1992/93 it has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, especially in practical terms and under the influence of the events in the field. It is true that the Macedonian case could serve as a *litmus* test for future performance of similar preventive missions. Nevertheless, even now it can be said that the UN will have to advocate a *case-by-case* approach, yet bear thing in mind. Preventive deployment missions, following the gained experience upon the employment in Macedonia, should be closely connected to clear political goals or other recognizable progress towards resolving the underlying causes of the conflict. A UN deployment in such circumstances should seek to create the necessary security and stability by which to enable the parties themselves to take steps towards constructively solving their problem. Good offices and humanitarian aspects of a preventive mandate may significantly facilitate this process, just like in the Macedonian case. Peace, however, in respect of the sovereignty and independence of every single country, must not be imposed from the outside.

Early warning, clear and present mandate, the development of a humanitarian dimension, and the respect for the sovereignty of the country concerned, are the prime ingredients of a successful preventive diplomacy mission. The international community, however, is faced with other problems. The first one that will be necessary to resolve is the differentiation between preventive deployment operations in inter- and intra-state conflicts. Both kinds of operations are to be based on the principles of state sovereignty, consent, non-intervention, and impartiality. The conclusion that can be drawn from the Macedonian case is that it is quite possible that preventive deployment be performed only by the request of the country concerned. Furthermore, the mission might be effective and successful even when the UN troops are deployed on one side of the border only. The second case presupposes the usage of a wider repertoire of traditional and non-traditional preventive techniques. This means that the mandate, structure and organization of such an operation have to be very flexible and delicate. While UNPREDEP's mission was in theory primarily concentrated on external threat and played more of a statist role, it still received consent of the host state for actions undertaken in the internal sphere that made the mission relatively uncontroversial.<sup>51</sup> It is beyond doubt, therefore, that the success of the Macedonian mission was highly dependent on the willingness of the parties to achieve progress towards the preservation of peace and security. It

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<sup>51</sup> Jeremy Ginifer and Espen Barth Eide, "Ethnicity as a Source of Conflict", *Balkan Forum*, No. 2, June 1997, pp.196.


is upon these players that the task remains. UN forces cannot remain stationed forever in a purely preventive context, particularly given the financial constraints that the Organization is faced with today and the skepticism of its member States that oftentimes accompanies the preventive engagement. If preventive deployment is to remain or even become the sole established means of addressing potential conflicts, its missions will have to "remain relatively short-term oriented, or be designed to transition into more civilian-based operation in political and security fronts."<sup>52</sup> One important specification should be made. The international community will nevertheless need to ascertain that the moment of withdrawal of its preventive troops will be the most appropriate for all the players involved. In addition to this, a decision will have to be made, by all parties, of whether a follow up force will need to replace the military component of the mission and the level to which the international community will be involved in the socio-economic dimension following the troops' withdrawal. As much as the UNPREDEP mission, and all the accompanying organizations, agencies and programs of the UN system, was successful during their engagement in the Republic of Macedonia, there is the belief that its conclusion could have been managed in an alternative manner. There is a feeling that the Security Council, upon China's insistence, precipitated in the withdrawal and thus compromised the entire success of the mission. Such impulsive steps should

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<sup>52</sup> Ostowski, pp.877.

undoubtedly be avoided in the future. The 2001 conflict in Macedonia might have been avoided should the UNPREDEP still be in the republic.

Figure 1 – Life History of a Conflict



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