

The Marian Reforms

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The Marian Reforms

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Abstract

The Marian Reforms of 107 BC and the factors that led to an apparent radical break with tradition and likely a violation of Roman Law, and the exploration of the politics surrounding the lasting Reforms particularly with regard to the admission of the proletariat in the army and the reorganization of the military are known and well discussed in scholarship. However, the politics that allowed a *Novus homo*, namely Gaius Marius, to pass *such* reforms in light of direct *or* absence of open opposition by aristocratic factions is more ambiguous. The actual mechanisms and forces that facilitated the change led by *or* accredited to Marius are the main aspects under consideration, as well as, the political and social factors that allowed the longevity of these Reforms initiated by Marius to exist *even* after his decline, disgrace, and death. The manner of the investigation made use of the biographical analysis and textual analysis as the *Life of Marius* by Plutarch provided a wealth of information on the professed character of Marius though the nature of the text *itself* dictates caution in terms of the supposition of veracity. Moreover, close readings of Sallust especially pertaining to his writings of *The Jugurthine War* as the narrative declared by Sallust portrays a unique antagonist to Rome that eventually provided the political necessity for a man, such as Marius, to rise to prominence and yield a sense of practicality for the Reforms proposed.

Furthermore, other ancient sources, though written outside of the temporal considerations to the Reforms, still reflected certain social trends or political events that were either in the process of beginning or continuing in the time of Marius. Other sources served to ground this work in the context of the Reforms and their immediate and essential contribution to the Roman society, military, and state.

Dedication

A Deo

Per Deum

Deo

To my mom, Colleen Mixson, who is my source of inspiration and strength. To my grandmother, Patricia Ash, who has always helped me chase my dreams. To my dad, Kerry Mixson, who always encouraged me. To my brother, Ryan Mixson, who is the man I aspire to be. And to the rest of my family and friends who led me to Roma!

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction: The Need for Reforms.....	6
2. Corruption in Roman Society	19
3. Ancient Roman Economy	30
4. Reforms in Use	42
5. Conclusion	50
Bibliography	52

1. Introduction: The Need for Reforms

The Marian Reforms of 107 BC marked the end of a tradition, if not its formal abolishment that forevermore altered the Roman military and the core of the Ancient Roman state. Gaius Marius would lead the induction of the proletariat into the Roman Army. This act was in direct defiance of the original system of conscription and service established by the sixth King of Rome, Servius Tullius (575-535 BC). The prior system was based upon the citizen owning sufficient capital *or* land to earn the honor of military service for privileges were awarded based on their contribution. This single act established a professional army, removing over four hundred years of citizen-soldiers being the fighting force of Rome. The Reforms and its far-reaching effects of politics on the Roman state can best be understood by placing them in a broader political context *both* internal (to the Roman state) and part of its international *or* inter-kingdom relations. Rome, the Republic, had built itself an empire following the end of the Punic (246-146 BC) and Macedonian (214-148 BC) Wars. These victories brought great wealth to the city, but also stretched its institutions to their limits. Most importantly, the military was not set up to wage massive campaigns for extended periods with great distances from the center of power. Thus, the army lacked the resources necessary for it to continue being active and the primary aspect of any military is its soldiers. Rome was deficient in manpower as the last two centuries of conquest came at a significant toll in men and supplies. This practical necessity came to the forefront in the age of Marius due to the ongoing conflict of the Jugurthine War (112-105 BC). The problem of Jugurtha became a central attribute of the rise of Marius, a *Novus homo* (*new man*); to the height of political power in the rank of Consul as his message declared

that he would end the Jugurthine War and ensure proper *and* total victory for Rome. At that time, the role of the Jugurthine War within these political schemes served as the background, foreground, and *in name* the cause of the political dispute. Rome was enraged and wanted to achieve the victories as it had grown accustomed to successes. When costly interruptions or defeats delayed this, the people became anxious; not only the Romans, *themselves*, but their allies as well. Rome gained its hegemony by the grace of its armies and the mythos of their nigh invincibility *or* inevitability of victory despite any short-term events that alluded to the contrary. Moreover, a war against a minor warlord who was once an ally of Rome should not, by their impression, be one that Rome did *not* win quickly and overwhelmingly. Any challenge to this system threatened the entire manner that the Roman *empire* was established and therefore directly threatened Rome by stripping it of its larger support system. Thus, the threat of Jugurtha to Rome was a mix of potentialities and past affiliations, as well as, a legitimate challenge to the larger structure of the Roman state.

The character and agent of Jugurtha by Roman observation was a story of betrayal besetting Rome and placing them on the defensive against a traitor and a tyrant. The origins of Jugurtha show the basis of the threat that he potentially posed to Rome. Jugurtha was the nephew (through a union of concubinage) of Micipsa, the King of the Numidians, following the succession of his father, King Masinissa, who was a prominent ally to the Romans in the wars against Carthage and Hannibal, the so-called scourge of Rome.¹ Masinissa's alliance with Rome was essential to the Roman influence in the region of North Africa and provided a strong support

¹ Sallust, *The Jugurthine War*, trans. John Selby Watson, (New York and London. Harper & Brothers, 1899), Chapter 5, access 11/26/2018, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0126%3Achapter%3D5>

against the Carthaginian state that had previously held sway. This pact was also built on a personal friendship between Masinissa and Publius Scipio (Scipio Africanus) and this type of political association between elite families and foreign dignitaries is a large part of the inter-Mediterranean politics conducted among the aristocracy.² Further, regarding succession, the connection of families would often continue over generations as Micipsa also had a relationship with the Scipio family. Additionally, due to familial ties, Jugurtha was third-in-line for succession for the Kingdom of Numidia, and this caused considerable concern to Micipsa for Jugurtha in his youth, as attested by Sallust (Roman Historian, 86-35 BC), swiftly distinguished himself in ability and temperament.³ Micipsa had two sons that were in direct line for the crown and realizing that Jugurtha would present a strong contender for the throne, sought a manner to remove his nephew. Micipsa's plans were limited though--directly killing, imprisoning, or leading a scheme against Jugurtha could politically harm Micipsa as Jugurtha was a popular individual among the Numidian people. As a result, Micipsa sent Jugurtha to aid the Romans, their ally, in the *bello Numantino* (Numantine War) in Spain with the hopes that Jugurtha would disgrace himself *or* perish.⁴ In Spain, Jugurtha had an uninterrupted opportunity to learn from the Romans, *themselves*. He learned how *best to fight* them as he fought alongside the legions and had the personal friendship and trust of the Roman General Publius Scipio. This experience of Jugurtha is essential to understand why the Romans would not have succeeded in their future war against him, as he knew the strengths of Roman organization and logistics that enabled the Romans to maintain a campaign or siege. Jugurtha's purview also included the relationship with

² Ibid, Chapter 5.

³ Ibid, Chapter 6.

⁴ Ibid, Chapter 7.

the auxiliary troops, such as the Numidians, alongside the Roman military's hierarchy, that was made up of allied or localized troops to *supplement* the essential citizen-soldiers mainly for their skills or knowledge of the surrounding area. Moreover, he saw how the Numantines were able to slow, and delay, and even directly resist the Roman forces. All the while, Jugurtha was also gaining valuable command experience with Numidian troops and made a name for himself due to his prowess in martial affairs. Remarkably, the Greek-Roman biographer, Plutarch (45-127 AD) claimed that in the early career of Gaius Marius--that Marius was also in Spain under the command of Publius Scipio in the Numantine War.⁵ As such, it is possible that Marius and Jugurtha may have known each other and possibly might have viewed the other as a friend, rival, or *both*. It is probable that Marius and Jugurtha could have seen how the *other* leads and commands in battle, their preferred tactics and abilities, their tendencies, their allies, and potentially even the weaknesses of the other. Beyond the endless speculations possible from this assertion is the undeniable notion that *both* Jugurtha and Marius learned from Scipio the methods to wage war. Scipio, being a renowned General from an illustrious family, inevitably influenced their martial education. Some additional aspects for consideration from Jugurtha's involvement in Spain are that through Scipio and his *own* deeds, Jugurtha was able to befriend many prominent Romans throughout the ranks of the Roman Army. Through these new associations, he seems to have gained support for *his* royal claim. Sallust attests that this sparks the damning sense of ambition within Jugurtha that eventually lead to his clash with Rome.⁶

⁵ Plutarch, *The Parallel Lives*, trans. Bill Thayer, (Loeb Publishing 1920), Updated 11/28/17. Chapter 3. http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Marius*.html.

⁶ Sallust, *The Jugurthine War*, trans. John Selby Watson, (New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1899), Chapter 7-8, access 11/26/2018, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0126%3Achapter%3D5>.

It was in light of this appetite that Jugurtha would begin to take steps toward tyranny; he returned triumphantly from Spain with the blessing of Scipio. Then years later, Jugurtha met with his elderly dying uncle, who addressed Jugurtha, *to adopt him formally*, and besought him to aid his *new* brothers instead of pursuing personal power.⁷ Upon the death of Micipsa, Jugurtha met with his two newly adopted brothers, Adherbal and Hiempsal, to divide the Kingdom and its wealth according to their father's wishes and their own ambitions. Hiempsal's viewed Jugurtha as *the bastard child* unlike himself and his brother, Adherbal, this slight further pushed Jugurtha to act in his own interests.⁸ Eventually, through intrigue and bribery, Jugurtha arranged the murder of Hiempsal, which ignited a civil war between him and Adherbal for the throne of Numidia. Adherbal fled to Rome in exile and implored the Senate to honor the alliance that it had with his father and restore *him* to the throne over the usurper, Jugurtha. Regardless, Jugurtha had many friends in Rome, and *he* bought political influence to aid in *his* plans.⁹ A series of treaties were vowed and broken until Jugurtha openly sieged his *brother*, Adherbal, in the City of Cirta. The Senate sent emissaries to intervene and arbitrate as allies and to a degree as suzerain over the territory. The agreement made dictated that Jugurtha would spare all within the city specifically including his *brother*, Adherbal, should they surrender.¹⁰ The Senate guaranteed the treaty, and Adherbal surrendered the city to Jugurtha. Sallust said, "Jugurtha in primis Adherbalem excruciatum necat, deinde omnis puberes Numidas atque negotiatores promiscue,

⁷ Ibid, Chapter 9-11.

⁸ Ibid, Chapter 11.

⁹ Ibid, Chapter 13.

¹⁰ Ibid, Chapter 25-26.

uti quisque armatus obuius fuerat, interficit.”¹¹ This was considered a blatant act of war and aggression against Rome. By the orders of Jugurtha, Roman citizens were murdered, which the Romans *could not* abide. The totality of the Roman people was outraged; war was declared on Jugurtha *despite* his political factions intervening in the Senate.

The Consul Calpurnius Bestia gathered an army and departed to Numidia. The Romans quickly took a beachhead and pushed deeper into Jugurtha’s territory, seizing towns. This short campaign in 112 BC seemed to be leading to the capitulation of Jugurtha and the quick ending of hostilities. However, Jugurtha delayed the Roman forces by disrupting their logistics with intense guerilla warfare in desert terrain. Simultaneously, he used his vast wealth and influence to send emissaries to the Romans offering gifts (bribes) and subtle hints that this war would drag on with increasing difficulty, but also, that he was willing to make peace. (The notion of bribery and corruption beyond the very potential avarice of any Roman in a position of power which is a more significant social trend that will be examined in relation specifically in this era found in Chapter 2). This obvious delaying tactic, by Jugurtha, was ideal for his purposes as if he could make this war so costly concerning materials--then the Romans may seek a truce as they were engaged simultaneously on other fronts notably in the area of Thrace, and additionally, there were movements of tribes of Gauls in the north.¹² Another benefit to this strategy was that if Jugurtha delayed long enough then Calpurnius would lose his command due to the expiration of

¹¹ Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum*, Chapter 26, <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/sall.2.html>

Translated Sallust said that: *Jugurtha first killed Adherbal through torture, then he killed all the Numidian youths (young adult males) and the merchants (Italians or even Romans) without distinction, that whoever the armed man (army) had met (he or they killed).*

¹² Gareth Sampson, *The Crisis of Rome: The Jugurthine and Northern Wars and the Rise of Marius*, (Pen and Sword Books Ltd, UK, 2010), 203-217.

his mandate to *imperium* (power, but more-so military authority) from the end of his term in office and another would be sent to take his place. Furthermore, delay meant that the time restriction of the war seasons gave a respite from actual engagement of military forces. This tactic, by inference, served to provide a reprieve from active Roman devastation of his territory, minimize loss of his resources, and perhaps yield an opportunity for a more substantial victory in the field. The much more likely reason for this tactic is as Sallust attests that Jugurtha was delaying the war in hopes that his allies in the Roman Senate and the people would disrupt this conflict and call for peace.¹³ Through unorthodox tactics like elaborate use of diplomacy and by delaying, set Jugurtha, *in the Roman view*, as a threat as his character is that of an idealized opponent of the Republic; one ambitious man who made *himself* king through treachery and strength of arms, but is also able to win over *his people* and fight against Rome. He became the quintessential tyrant and brilliant tactician able to counter the Romans like the early historical war against Pyrrhus of Epirus in 280 BC *or* the more recent memory of the war against Hannibal of Carthage in 218 BC. These past two leaders were seen with terror by the Romans due to their success against the Roman state, and it is entirely possible that Jugurtha had that potential as well. This campaign ended in a truce with the demand that Jugurtha come to Rome to answer for his deeds. In Rome, political conflicts amongst the factions were on the tipping point of open chaos once again surrounding Jugurtha. Public opinion was against him, but powerful families and officeholders supported him. Any chance of redemption and peace between Jugurtha and

¹³ Sallust, *The Jugurthine War*, trans. John Selby Watson, (New York and London. Harper & Brothers, 1899), Chapter 29, access 11/26/2018, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0126%3Achapter%3D5>

Rome ended when Jugurtha ordered the assassination of a potential rival, Massiva, the grandson of the former King Masinissa, who was also in Rome.¹⁴

The renewed war of 110 BC marked a staggering defeat that combined with political fracturing back in Rome, which confounded the Roman war effort, and further served to mark Jugurtha as a major threat. The Proprætor Aulus, brother of the Consul Albinus who was recalled to Rome due to political discord, was placed in command *ad interim* and in a near abuse of his authority pulled the army from winter-quarters to fight Jugurtha. This short expedition ended in the Battle of Suthul, where Aulus was defeated and humiliated by Jugurtha.¹⁵ After this defeat, Aulus made a peace treaty with Jugurtha on *unfavorable terms* for the Romans, and their defeated army was liberated but banished from Numidia. The entire Roman population was appalled at this development, and the political repercussions were numerous. The first was that the Senate refused to ratify the treaty and both Aulus and his brother, Albinus, stood denounced by the people and the Senate. The reaction of the people attested by Sallust was one of confusion and trepidation. Sallust stated, “Sed ubi ea Romæ comperta sunt, metus atque maeror civitatem invasere: pars dolere pro gloria imperi, pars insolita rerum bellicarum timere libertati”¹⁶ This passage is critical to understand the ever-evolving view of Jugurtha, to the Romans, as he was *then* not merely a nuisance that needed to be dealt with or a tributary that had stepped out of line. Jugurtha was *now* seen as a menace to Rome and Rome’s interests. The humiliation of the

¹⁴ Ibid, Chapter 35.

¹⁵ Gareth Sampson, *The Crisis of Rome: The Jugurthine and Northern Wars and the Rise of Marius*, (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2010), 203-217.

¹⁶ Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum*, Chapter 39, <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/sall.2.html>

Translated Sallust said that: *But when they learned these things (affairs or matters) at Rome, fear and grief entered into the citizens (population): part (of the people) suffer for the glory of the empire, (another) part unaccustomed of the affairs of wars fear for (their own) liberty.*

Roman Army could do irrefutable damage to the reputation of the empire.¹⁷ The structure of the Ancient Roman hegemony in many ways favored local autonomy and often functioned as a tributary system depending upon a territory's entrance into the influence of Rome. Rome usually expanded by alliance first if strategic, such as early Rome's relations to the Italic people.¹⁸ However, if alliances were not an ideal option then wars of subjugation dictated the creation of the Roman hegemony.¹⁹ Alternatively, Rome would expand by invitation of allies *or* so deemed friends of Rome to aid in particular areas. A fourth trend was actual wars of expansion, such as those against Carthage and Macedon. The exact relation of a territory or ally to Rome depended on an almost infinite number of factors, but a basis of the relationship remained constant that the allies of Rome were to support the conquests of Rome by finances, resources, or manpower.²⁰ This gave the allies of Rome a stake in the future expansion of the state and lessened the damage to the city--should disaster strike. This whole system was dependent on the faith of the allies and territories in Rome, and anything that damaged that trust was detrimental to the entire structure of the empire. Thus, when Jugurtha was harming Roman interests and positions abroad; any defeat even in the borderlands could threaten the Roman powerbase in Italy.

¹⁷ Philip M. Taylor, "The Glory That Was Rome." In *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 40.

¹⁸ Andrew Erskine, *Roman Imperialism*, (Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2010), 12-13.

¹⁹ Evelyn S. Schuckburg, Trans. 1889, Polybius, *Histories*, (London, New York: Macmillan with reprint Bloomington, 1962) Book 1, Chapter 6,
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D6>.

²⁰ Donald L. Wasson, "Roman Citizenship" last modified January 27, 2016,
<https://www.ancient.eu/article/859/roman-citizenship/>.

Jugurtha was a threat *but not* to the City of Rome and all of its grandeur, but a danger to Rome, the empire, and the entire system that had aggrandized that city making it the dominant power in the Mediterranean. The actual hazard of Jugurtha to Rome was limited--he was not in Italy or even in any sovereign Roman territory, and he did not lead an invading force seeking the destruction of Rome. Jugurtha *was not* Hannibal, but there is an affiliation that can be determined as *both men* were talented Generals and enemies of Rome.²¹ One aspect that *both* these leaders shared was their knowledge of the strategies of the Roman military. Jugurtha had practical experience alongside his eventual foe, in contrast Hannibal was known for being able to determine the strategy of his enemy and how to quickly counter it. Given his immense hatred for Rome, it is possible to infer that he studied the Roman military--most probable by learning from his father, Hamilcar, who had fought the Romans in the First Punic War (264-241 BC). Jugurtha was winning the war purely *by the delay* which bears a disturbing parallel to how the Romans fought against Hannibal when he was invading Italy. At that time the Roman dictator, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus "Cunctator" (*the Delayer*), had been tasked with defending Rome against Hannibal. Fabius adopted extremely unconventional tactics that were seen by many Romans as cowardly, for Rome traditionally fought in open engagements and won through force of arms and strategy. Instead, Fabius fought through guerilla tactics even going as far as using stratagems tantamount to *scorched earth* (burning the land and depriving both sides of anything valuable lest it falls to the enemy forces) to shift the war to one of attrition instead of

²¹ Elena Giusti, *Carthage in Virgil's Aeneid: Staging the Enemy under Augustus*, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 16.

campaigns.²² This strategy was not ideal but was effective as the Romans had the territorial advantage of knowing the land and possessing more allies to provide resources, while, Hannibal lacked an efficient means to resupply his forces. The Romans found that their position was reversed as they were *now* the invading force being countered by attrition tactics preventing total domination *or* any means to end the resistance. As such, the Romans were having some of their *own* tactics used against them. Furthermore, the geographical proximity of Numidia to Carthage could also bear a distressing sentiment to the Romans for once *again* they were in a war in North Africa. Moreover, without the help of the Numidians and King Masinissa, the Romans would not have defeated Carthage or Hannibal, the utmost threat to Rome and one that was still feared and despised.²³ The Second Punic War (218-201 BC) broke the power of the Carthaginian Empire and crippled its hold over the Mediterranean, leading Rome to become the new commander of the waves. In North Africa, it was Numidia that became the most powerful kingdom in the region without the overlords of Carthage suppressing them or promoting division and infighting amongst its people. They were able to unite the two main tribes of Numidians, the Masaesulii and the Massyli. Thus, a more centralized kingdom with a focus on dominating the land of North Africa was a valuable ally to the Mediterranean centered Roman control. This connotation of considerable concern was interpreted primarily by Sallust--where he declared that *some of the*

²² Theodore Ayrault Dodge, *Hannibal: A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians and Romans down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., with a detailed account of the Second Punic War*, (Houghton, Mifflin & Co, 1891/Endeavour Media LTD., 2018), Chapter XIII.

²³ Gareth Sampson, *The Crisis of Rome: The Jugurthine and Northern Wars and the Rise of Marius*, (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2010), 831-847.

Romans were afraid *even for their own* liberty.²⁴ The crucial term here is *liberty* as the threat from Carthage and Hannibal had been so great to the Roman psyche--as he was the enemy that got closest to attacking and sieging Rome, *the city*; who had not suffered that indignation since it was sacked in 387 BC. The loss of liberty, in the eyes of the Romans, meant the end of the state, and either their subjugation or the restitution of a monarchy which was inconceivable at this time in the history of Rome as the Republic is still *dominate*, but on the edge of decline.

Gaius Marius would arise towards the end of this war--here Jugurtha had won victories over Rome and had lost many battles, but there was *never* anything definitive to end the conflict. The war had been going for over five years when Marius received the command due to his newly elected position of Consul in 107 BC. The primary propagandistic message that Marius asserted leading to his election was that *he would* end the war, imploring the people to trust in him due to his talent and skill as a soldier and general.²⁵ Marius had already fought against Jugurtha with some success under the command of the prior Consul, Metellus, in 109-108 BC. The Jugurthine War, due to its drain on Roman resources, presented a practical necessity to conscript more forces or levy more troops from Rome's allies and tributaries; though the latter notion of passing

²⁴ Sallust, *The Jugurthine War*, trans. John Selby Watson, (New York and London. Harper & Brothers, 1899), Chapter 39, accessed 11/26/2018, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0126%3Achapter%3D5>.

²⁵ Plutarch, *The Parallel Lives*, trans. Bill Thayer, (Loeb Publishing, 1920), Updated 11/28/17. Chapter 7-9, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Marius*.html.

the cost onto Rome's allies was politically dubious due to the already taxing demand placed on them to support Rome's military in other theaters throughout the Mediterranean. This was exasperated by the fear that if Rome continued to stagnate *in this war* that Rome's allies would view Rome as becoming weak, and begin dissension of their *own* for their independence *or* their sovereignty. Additionally, alteration of tactics and organization would remove the primary advantage of Jugurtha who had first-hand knowledge of how the Roman Army operated. Another call for improvements was due to the dread that was present within the Roman populace since there was extensive knowledge amongst the elite of what a challenge like this could do to the *entire* Roman imperial system, as well as, familiar dismay due to the apparent associations of Jugurtha to *Hannibal*--and Jugurtha's effective ability to actually *resist* Rome. The Jugurthine War directly led to Marius' rise and further displayed the political factions and corruption within the Roman state that lead to the Reforms being passed.

2. Corruption in Roman Society

By the end of the second century, the Roman Republic was an empire; the Mediterranean was in large part dominated by *both*--direct Roman rule and influences of the Roman hegemony. The conquest and supplemental sacking of many cities brought immense wealth to the City of Rome and its allies; however, such wealth and success bred excess and vice. Many Roman elites bemoaned the seeming decay of the Roman Republic with the direct connection to the decline of Roman virtue and the definition of *Romanitas* (nature of being Roman) in a quasi-mythos tantamount to a virtually spartan existence. As the unmistakable memory of early Romans was that though *they* (Romans) lacked in luxuries and grandiose construction, its *people* were strong, pious, and virtuous.²⁶ This goes beyond the glorification of the past in memory to echo--a more considerable sentiment--that wealth and success had made the Romans weak and decadent. This debauchery led to the escalation of conflict within Rome that would have never occurred in the previous ages--as Rome of *that era* was united, often against a foreign enemy. The internal conflict was a *class* conflict that had haunted Rome since the foundation of the Republic, but was only expounded by the growth of the state--while the elites were enriched; the masses were deprived. The availability of spoil purely indicated the disparity in the distribution of wealth, the ownership of the land, the production of monuments, and the construction of lavish houses by the elite only fostered the conflict further.²⁷

²⁶Jerome J. Pollitt, "The Impact of Greek Art on Rome." (Transactions of the American Philological Association, 1978), DOI:10.2307/284245, 158.

²⁷ Brewminate, "Social and Economic Corruption in the Graeco-Roman World," 09/01/18, (Originally *published* by *Theoretical and Applied Economics* XXIII:2, 2016), 239-248, <https://brewminate.com/social-and-economic-corruption-in-the-graeco-roman-world/>.

The assertion of corruption was indicative within the social and political sphere was attested to--in the surviving literature of the first century BC. Such accounts are based around the rise of the Triumvirates and the shattering of the Roman Republic, *again*, into civil war. Though these accounts are formally beyond the temporal consideration of Marius and his Reforms, the possibility that such supposed degradation arose within only a few generations absent from the trends of their ancestors are highly unlikely. The aspects indicative of this time alludes to its potential presence in the prior, if not in the direct apparition, thereby weakening the systems politically *or* within social morality that would prevent, or at least, protest such destructive developments that led to corruption. The notion of corruption of the individual against the state often indicates a shift in the social code of behavior *or* the embodiment of individualistic aspirations *in defiance* of the state instead of the *pursuit* for the state. The Roman Republic had expanded to such an extent and had maintained itself--due, in-part, to its ability to harness personal ambition and competition for honor, power, wealth, and position as the pursuit of the individual was best served through *or* in the conjoining of the state. Contrasted to this, in the later Republic, when the victories were won, and the spoils claimed, the acquirement of desire came to be seen in *defiance of the state* or *taken from the state* instead of for services rendered. When the ambition of the person is best served at the expense of the state, degradation of the state and society becomes natural—as it is spread throughout the public. The old codes of conduct and dictation for the ascension of rank became archaic--if not practiced *or* valued and the actual pursuit of such paths become pointless if one's interests were best served in other manners. Corruption of values often is intertwined with the actual acts of the individual against the laws *or* of the society--including bribery *or* to any extent necessary in the eyes of that person. Many of these acts would be unthinkable to prior generations of Romans as attested by Polyibus,

who writes in regard to Carthage, that it would be inconceivable to the Romans to accept bribes for there could be no greater dishonor.²⁸

The merits of the Romans from their conception were a combination of *virtus* (virtue or courage) and *pietas* (piety in literal translation, but in essence means a proper relationship to the divine and man). These were only two of the extensive range of attributions, but are the cornerstones of what Livy would emphasize to be the *foundation and rise* of Rome.²⁹ The selection of these two facets explains and shows how the Romans saw themselves. They were a people who arose by the strength of arms and martial discipline and through their rigorous ritualism maintained a relationship with the divine, and *the City* was preserved. These were distinct ideals to declare to be the essence of *Romanitas*, and these aspects were reflective of their history and impressive parts of their success. However, such lofty ambition for the maintenance of social morals is also predicative upon their regular observance which means that any failure to truly represent them is a corruption of the entire system. Nearly all failures of the Romans were often attributed to an error in one, or both, of these ideas. Likewise, almost all victories were attributed to a proper balance or the reflection of them. Though as time passed, the people changed and potentially forgot the harsh obligation of rigorous discipline which is apparent in the face of constant necessity from the presence of danger which kept fear in the hearts of man, both of a foe and of the divine. However, when the enemy is far away, the

²⁸ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, (London, New York. Macmillan. Reprint Bloomington, 1962), 6:56, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D6%3Achapter%3D56>.

²⁹ Titus Livius (Livy) *History of Rome*, Book 1 and 2, trans. Benjamin Oliver, Foster, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919), <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0151%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3Dpr>.

obligation was gone. Corruption of these morals was the loss of what made Romans--Roman and the people, society, and the Republic suffered. Livy wrote in the *History of Rome*, “*donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vita nostra nec remedia pati possums perventum est.*”³⁰ Livy wrote this in his preface to *Ab Urbe Condita Libri* (literally books from the city having been founded) or the *History of Rome* with the intention that this entire book would be meant to show the Roman people their past history and the virtues that made them *great*. Livy echoed a very traditionalist view of the first century that carried some aspects of the social tension and the growing concern in the late second century. This line “*donec ad haec tempora*” refers to *the present time* of Livy’s writing--in effect that the corruption of society had infested every part of Rome and had so thoroughly corroded the moral and discipline codes of the people that society, itself, was buckling under the pressure. Moreover, given that Livy was writing after the civil wars had ravaged the Republic, twice, over resulting in the devastation of multiple generations the presence of *such decadence* that had led to an actual break down of society and a fracturing of the state unheard of since the Civil War of 89 BC, led by Marius of the Populares (the people), and Sulla of the Optimates (the elites). Corruption had reached the apex of its presence--where all social ties and trust that held people together fractured into factions where it is irrelevant that the opposition are fellow Romans for *all are foes* of personal ambition. The commencement of civil war is the collapse of society and most definitively signaled the end of political order.

The aspect of the class conflict, as a social influence, upon charges of corruption was naturally a possibility. The connotation of corruption as a charge against political opponents was evident in the conflict of the Optimates and the Populares. The Patricians (senatorial class) and to a degree the Equites (knights, one step below the senatorial class, but *above* the people)

³⁰ Translated: *Until this time, in which we are able neither to come to allow our crimes nor endure the remedy.*

domination of political offices and honors and their intrinsic connection to the public sphere left them open to judgment and condemnation. There is always a likelihood of abuse due to the self-interest of those in positions of power. The Tribunes were the ones meant to protect the Plebs *or* the masses from such potentialities. Therefore, the expected conflict between the Tribunes and the Patricians--over apparent *or* perceived abuses and threats were familiar to an extent. The denunciation of various Patricians, magistrates, or governors near their end of office--by the Tribunes to the masses was also frequent and rarely led to any lasting effects or prosecutions. Not since the age of the Gracchi were the Tribunes such a challenge to the Patricians. The potential power of the Tribunes to sway the people had plateaued. However, in the prelude to the rise of Marius in light of the Jugurthine war; the apparent corruption of the elite taking bribes from an enemy of Rome was too often, and accusations led to judicial actions.³¹ The Equites who occupied the jury in accordance with the Lex Calpurnia (149 BC) renewed by Lex Servilia Glaucia (approximately 100 BC) sided with the Tribunes and the Populares seemingly in defiance of their natural allies, the Patricians. There was a multitude of potential reasons for this development. It is possible those charges--such as against L. Opimium (connected with the assassination of the Gracchi brothers) was politically or socially rivaled or opposed by the individualistic aspirations of the jurors. Just as plausible is that these Patricians were condemned due to their political allegiance or association with the Optimates. And given the court of public opinion--along with the possibility of mob violence in the city; it was, in essence, politically necessary and easier to sacrifice *or* condemn them. Furthermore, in this ostensible alliance of the Equites and the Tribunes, Marius arose as a champion of both the Equites and the Populares. The origin of Marius is potentially the crux *of how* he can tie or at minimum, represent these diverse

³¹ Gary D. Farney, "The Fall of the Priest C. Sulpicius Galba and the First Consulship of Marius," (*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 42, 1997), DOI:10.2307/4238746, 23.

groups. The actual ancestry of Marius is contested, as Plutarch attested that he came from *common* people and by *his* virtue, arose to a position of prominence as a *Novus homo*.³² Beyond the marked literary value of such a claim, it does explain an apparent link to the Populares. Some historians, such as Erik Hildinger challenged this and instead affirmed that he was of the Equestrian class, but not from Rome instead believed to hail from Arpinum,³³ though contested by other scholars, such as Keith Roberts who attributed Marius to be a member of the plebian class.³⁴ If Marius was an Eques, this would present a natural association and potential connections in the Equites class. Thus, the character and agency of Marius were intertwined in this broader political shift--weakening the power and to an extent the public presence of the Patricians. The means of such devastating attacks are politically charged--though potentially true accusations of corruption presented through public litigation. Though this assertion leads to the inquiry whether such political maneuverings were within themselves--indicative of corruption; this is by modern conception of the purpose of law and the courts' impartiality of evidence of corruption. However, in Ancient Rome, this awareness may also have held true except that regardless of the push for a reason--it was done with the outward blessing of the masses indicated by the lack of public challenge or uprising. The instigators of the action were the representors and supposed protectors of the people, the Tribunes. The passing of the Lex Mamilia (110/109 BC) at the prompting of Tribune, C. Mamilius Limetanus, resulted in the

³² Plutarch, *The Parallel Lives*, Life of Marius section, trans. Bill Thayer, (Loeb Publishing, 1920), Updated 11/28/17. Chapter 7-9.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Marius*.html

³³ Erik Hildinger. "Chapter 5: The Jugurthine War," *Swords Against the Senate: The Rise of the Roman Army*. (Rome: Da Capo Press, 2002), 59.

³⁴ Keith Roberts, *The Origins of Business, Money, and Markets*, (Columbia University Press, 2011), 166.

investigation of those Patricians deemed to have suspicious dealings with Jugurtha.³⁵ This investigation was a true inquiry into corruption, yet also simultaneously a reflection of popular discontent about the course of the Jugurthine War and the effort of the Populares to blame key Patricians. In particular, this investigation could be seen as a response to the murder of the Gracchi brothers as declared by the author, Dr. Farney, who demonstrates this possibility by the writings of Cicero in *Brutus*. Cicero wrote about five notable Patricians that were charged and banished or otherwise condemned,

*“nam invidiosa lege [Mamilia quaestio] C. Galbam sacerdotem et quattuor consularis, L. Bestiam C. Catonem Sp. Albinum civemque praestantissimum L. Opimium, Gracchi interfectorem, a populo absolutum, cum is contra populi studium stetisset, Gracchani iudices sustulerunt.”*³⁶

This case was the linchpin that both demonstrates the presence of corruption in the public conception as a problem and simultaneously was crucial to the rise of Marius. As Cicero alluded to these court proceedings as being undertaken by “Gracchani iudices” indicating the Populares and most probably the former followers of the Gracchi were the instigators.³⁷ This tied to Marius--as either by direct alliance and intention *or* correspondence to the presentation of opportunity, as the investigation targeted high ranked Patricians that could oppose him. Marius ran for consul and was elected for 107 BC. In this atmosphere of tension, Rome was divided between factions; Marius would be a prime candidate as a former Tribune, an Eques, and

³⁵ Gary D. Farney, "The Fall of the Priest C. Sulpicius Galba and the First Consulship of Marius," (*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 42, 1997), DOI:10.2307/4238746, 25.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 23/Cicero *Brutus* 128, Translated: "For, by a spiteful law, the Gracchan jurors (Gracchani iudices) brought down the priest C. Galba and four men of consular rank, L. Bestia, C. Cato, Sp. Albinus, and even that most outstanding citizen L. Opimius. Opimius, slayer of Gracchus, had been found guiltless of crime by the people, even though he had stood against the people themselves."

³⁷ Harold B Mattingly, "Acerbissima Lex Servilia." (*Hermes* 111, no. 3, 1983), 309, <http://www.jstor.org/jcu.idm.oclc.org/stable/4476323>.

seemingly a member of the Populares.³⁸ All these factors seemed to give potential credence to a story, attested by Plutarch, that when Marius was discharged from Africa--he had twelve days to arrive in Rome. He had only seven days left to campaign for votes, and somehow he was chosen.³⁹ Regardless of the veracity of this story, it presents the possibility of authenticity--given the state of mind of the people of Rome.

A further consideration is the legalistic aspect of corruption in observance of practices against the codes of society. It is most evident--both by the judicial observance of cases that prompt or correspond to the social necessity for legislation to counter actions that go beyond the purview of proceedings open to the populace. The further necessity of laws combated supposed *or* perceived abuses of advantage and position against either magistracies or even entire social classes. The proposal and passing of the Lex Calpurnia (149 BC) by the Gracchi brothers was a prime example of such anti-corruption legislation. The base of this law was the removal of the senatorial class from certain court cases especially cases of corruption or charges of extortion.⁴⁰ Previously if a Patrician was brought to court on such charges, they would face a jury of peers or a judge of the same class who naturally would have some knowledge of *or* have ties to the accused (more probable scenario). This law dictated that the jury would be filled with members of the Equites class which is of significant interest for the seeming alliance existed in the middle of the second century. The Gracchi, the beloved heroes of the people, would trust the Equites to

³⁸ Gary D. Farney, "The Fall of the Priest C. Sulpicius Galba and the First Consulship of Marius," (*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 42, 1997), DOI:10.2307/4238746, 36.

³⁹ Plutarch, *The Parallel Lives*, Life of Marius section, trans. Bill Thayer, (Loeb Publishing, 1920), Updated 11/28/17. Chapter 7-9, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Marius*.html.

⁴⁰ William Scott Ferguson, "The Lex Calpurnia of 149 B.C." (*The Journal of Roman Studies* 11, 1921), 86-89, <http://www.jstor.org/jcu.idm.oclc.org/stable/295888>.

keep a check over the senatorial class in the name of the masses. This was a substantial strike against the Optimates and it remained as law until the passing of Lex Servilia Caepio (106 BC) that tentatively swung the pendulum to the other faction as this granted that both Senatorial and Equites could serve in the courts, but naturally the Senatorial class would have preeminence over the Equites as befitting the social hierarchy.⁴¹ The passing of this law was shocking as it was only one year after the election of Marius and was still in the background to his rise to power. The outward strength of the Tribunes and Equites alliance had been crushed, but with over forty years out of control--had left this aspect of the rights of the Senatorial class exceedingly weakened. Not long after the passing of this law, a new law reinstated the prior *status quo*: the Lex Servilia Glaucia (approximately 100 BC) granted supremacy in the courts to the Equites.⁴² These laws were meant to combat the potentiality and actuality of corruption within the higher classes and present a *real threat* for misconduct and abuse of position. Nonetheless, they were chiefly meant for use in Rome and to an extension in Italia proper. As such, there was a multitude of other legislation relating to corruption in the provinces especially pertaining to excessive looting or extortion by the magistrates. The Lex Acilian (123-122 BC) was passed precisely for this purpose. It granted the populace, in the provinces, another means of redressing injustice, and potentially seeking restitution in the public courts instead of relying upon the basis

⁴¹George Long, *The Decline of the Romans Republic*, (London: Bell and Daldy, Fleet Street, 1866), 3.

⁴² E. Badian, "Lex Servilia", *The Classical Review*, [Volume 4, Issue 2](#), June 1954, (Published online: 02/13/09), 101. DOI: 10.1017/S009840X00177777, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/classical-review/article/lex-servilia/9DB3A780C9D6873F33DD9F4069CEFC76>.

of client to patrons that many would have established with other elite Romans.⁴³ The necessitation of such legislation is evidence of the existence *or* the primary concern of the presence of corruption within the Roman Republic.

The societal trend of corruption in the face of victory and surplus--haunted the Roman state throughout the second to the first century BC, and arguably would never cease to impair the state even throughout the Empire. In a society that was failing to meet their own standards--both for personal and societal behavior, where moral degradation turned to the actualization of personal ambition over the concept of the common good, Gaius Marius gained power and instituted mass reforms to the Roman Military. These reforms were to a greater extent indicative of this broader systemic problem infesting Rome. Though evident in later eras, whether planned or even considered to be--an effect was the shift of the loyalty of the army from the Republic to a single robust and charismatic individual. It is very possible that such a devastating impact of the reforms could not have occurred without the conditions that preceded it, nor potentially would the necessity of the reforms, to a core element that could not be corrupted or weakened without cataclysmic impact upon the entire Roman hegemony, be present within Rome.

Additionally, as part of corruption was the escalation of class conflict through all means whether legal, in the courts, or through threat of mob violence and by playing off the various factions--Marius was able to be elected Consul by appealing to the Populares, his fellow Equites, and then perhaps not opposing the Optimates in their efforts to retake the courts and protect themselves. He was able to maintain a balance. This climate of conflict and degradation tied instinctively to the significant events, such as the Jugurthine War, feeding back into the chaos of

⁴³Johnson, Coleman-Norton & Bourne, "Acilian Law on the Right of Recovery of Property Officially (123-122 BC)," (*Ancient Roman Statutes*, Austin, 1961), 38-46, https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Anglica/acilia_johnson.html.

the City was the political environment of the Marian Reforms and what allowed such change without the ability of the Senatorial Class to resist effectively--if such attempts would have been enacted.

3. Ancient Roman Economy

Ancient Rome economy's primary foundation was based (like *all* ancient civilizations) in agricultural production. Initially the City of Rome had only substance farming and minor manufacturing of vital products; with the growth of the Roman state into a local hegemon over the Italian Peninsula and its assertion of power further into the Mediterranean gave way to the prospect for trade mainly due to its location to the Tiber River and the strategic position in-between the Etruscans to the north and the Greek colonies to the south (until the inevitable assertion of Roman militant dominance). This significantly expanded the access of Rome to a variety of goods *both* crucial products such as a stable grain supply, but additionally, to luxury goods imported on a more common basis. After the First Punic War in 241 BC, the acquisition of Sicily with its natural fertility provided the Romans a truly steady base for the supply of foodstuffs. Furthermore, it provided essential supplies to the army on campaigns across the Mediterranean.⁴⁴ The future conquests of key ports and locations around the Sea including Greece, Carthage, and Spain bestowed an abundance of natural resources and an overwhelming number of slaves that contributed to the labor force.

In the third and second centuries BC, the influx of wealth from these conquests amplified Rome to new heights of grandeur with new public constructions. Moreover, the plunder *itself* and liquidation of spoil as largess to the people played a vital role in the politics of the Roman Republic as public gifts and benefactions were a necessity for ascension in political rank. The further Rome expanded, the *more* abundant the foreign treasures were, and the *more* urgent the

⁴⁴ Emanuele Vaccaro, "Patterning the Late Antique Economics on Inland Sicily in a Mediterranean Context." *Local Economics? Production and Exchange of Inland Regions In Late Antiquity*, ed. Luke Lavan (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2013), 266.

continuation of this unsustainable stream became the *very foundation* of Roman politics. Though Rome and its people were enriched, the actual concentration of wealth became dominated by the Patrician class and even within the rank *itself*, the number of families that maintained their status were decreasing.⁴⁵ The Senatorial class was on the decline even as the Roman Rome was growing into an empire; it had become more oligarchical in structure. The response to the supremacy of the political power and wealth was civil strife, and a large counteraction was attempted by the Tribunes and the Plebian class on multiple occasions to force the redistribution of wealth, particularly regarding land holdings. This was distinctly evident with the efforts of the Gracchi brothers in the mid-to-late second century BC; their efforts were an effective systematic weakening of the Senatorial class, both indirectly and directly, led to the rise of the Equestrian class alongside the Plebian class. The ties of the Equestrians to the Senatorial class were steeped in the sense of traditional honors, dating to their founding in the age of the monarchy specifically with *mythical* King Romulus institution of the Senate. Then linked by King Servius' establishment of the Equestrian class with its militaristic premise as a *supportive* class to the magistrates.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Equestrians became, in effect, a strong middle-to-upper class with an economic footing in mobile wealth tantamount to a merchant class.⁴⁷ In the role of that occupation, the link to the Senatorial class was essential. Senators mainly supported themselves as landowners and were economically dependent on future production from their estates; due, in

⁴⁵ Michael C. Gambino, "The Military Reforms of Gaius Marius in their Social, Economic, and Political Context" (master's thesis, East Carolina University, 2015), 48-49.

⁴⁶ Olga Tellegen-Couperus, *A Short History of Roman Law*. (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 1993), 34.

⁴⁷ "Eques, Ancient Roman History," Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/eques>.

part, to certain punitive and anti-corruption laws, as well as, social stigma deterred participation in trade.

A central unique law governing maritime commerce was the *Lex Claudia de nave senatorum*, dating to approximately 218 BC. It is what scholars often refer to as *practical evidence* alluding to this social trend--that it was the role of the Senatorial class to engage in politics and they were meant to think of the *city* before *themselves*.⁴⁸ Moreover, the exact restrictions of the law governed the capacity and size of a ship that would be used for transportation of cargo, in bulk, especially budding agricultural products, which was the mainstay of elite estates. Such restrictions were meant to limit the ability of a *single* Patrician from single-handedly moving excess products to the market *or* potentially served as an incentive to turn to a middle-man like an Eques or Plebian. The prospect that the Senatorial class having links to the direct engagement in commerce was *almost* a necessity; however, the extent to which they were able to diversify their economic interests were limited. The landed-elites were dependent on the production of agricultural products, such as wheat which competed with mass imports from across the Mediterranean, as well as, the production of refined luxury goods.⁴⁹ Both of these diverse methods of household economic models required a variety of assets to initiate *and* sustain a fruitful capacity. The production of foodstuffs, while essential for survival, on a large-scale would require significant investment at almost all stages of the agricultural cycle. First, the laborers had to prepare a field depending on the crop; then needed capital to purchase seed in large quantities; then the acquirement of the labor class to tend the fields (which

⁴⁸ Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders. edited by Kurt A. Raaflaub, (University of California Press, 1986), 316.

⁴⁹ Walter Scheidel, The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy. (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 162-163.

were increasingly becoming slave laborers *or* alternatively, through *regular* paid laborers), and with a notable capacity to risk made substance agriculture a costly endeavor. Complications anticipated were due to any number of environmental factors including weather, the danger of warfare *or* banditry threatening the land, natural disaster, pestilence, and the eternally haunting potentiality of crop failure. All of these issues were compounded by the intense labor demand in cultivation particularly in wheat farming which required the constant purchase of additional slaves to maintain productive capacity.⁵⁰ Additionally, for the price of *such investment*--it did not *always* equate to profits for the landowner. Market values were at various times a game of speculation in which the potential to profit off of a *real or perceived* famine was possible, though dangerous, due to civil revolt *or* in the place of price control which occurred at various times by Roman laws. The possibility of profit meant an enforced maximum of its capacity, with the fear of over-saturation of the markets which were naturally applicable to *any type* of trade good. Major concerns of grain production due to the perishable nature of the product were most affected. The financial consideration was most probably a concern faced by many aristocrats particularly those throughout Italy, especially in Sicily with their grand-scale of agricultural estates known as *latifundia*. They were the embodiment of the new degree of wealth available to the select elite and the few members of the middle class that had attained that level of affluence. The procurement of such an estate carried with it a certain degree of stigma as the actual term *latifundium* is a combination of *latus* (meaning wide or spacious) and *fundus* (plantation or farm).⁵¹ The stigma was indicative of the social hierarchy, and even among the elite, such estates

⁵⁰ Paul Erdkamp, *The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study*. (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47-53.

⁵¹ Christopher Francese, *Ancient Rome in So Many Words*. (Conshohocken, PA: K & P Publishing, 2007), 79.

were potentially seen as ostentatious. Also, with the switch from the intensive labor production of base agricultural products to the increasing desire to produce luxury goods that reflected the nature of the affluence of the elite while simultaneously providing a higher potential of base profit with a limited overture. The planting and production of olive oil and wine, are examples of two such styles, became increasingly prevalent through the second and first centuries BC.⁵² The benefit to the estate's wealth was immense as the production of such products mandated a significantly reduced need for manual labor. Workers involved in maintaining the orchards and vineyards had fewer demands on their bodies which reduced the necessity for replacement personnel. This aspect seriously reduced operating cost; however, this style of the estate *did* require a significant *initial* investment as the vineyards would take time for growth, to bear yield sufficient to allow for-profit via exporting to local markets and commerce across the Mediterranean. Moreover, this style of estate management was still susceptible to the same threats as substance agriculture. There was a distinction in these types of agricultural estates-- though it is *both* possible and probable that they were not mutually exclusive. It is more economical to concentrate resources into one *or* the other, and thus the luxury goods production served as a source of profit with minimum expenditure. This wide-reaching societal shift (during these centuries) is, in part, due to the far-reaching conquests of Rome throughout the Mediterranean. As more land abroad was brought into the growing dominion, Sicily's granaries became less central. Though Sicily was known as *the breadbasket* of the Roman Republic; the expansion allowed the pursuit of grain from abroad, namely Spain, Carthage, the Black Sea Region, and Egypt. Spain and Carthage had its fertile lands annexed, while the Black Sea Region and Egypt encapsulated a wider range of resources. These estates were the core of the wealth of

⁵² Lesley Adkins and Roy A. Adkins, *Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome*. (Oxford University Press, 1998), 196.

the elite Senatorial class that was inevitably tied to land holdings. The work of many Equites was to move the products of the Senatorial Class as their role in *mobile* wealth. This association of the class and the dependence of the Senatorial Class on land led to political ties. However, the number of the Plebeians and Proletariat inevitably meant that their role would become more and more central to the Roman government as they were *the core* of the economy outside of slave labor. The mass induction of slave labor caused a crisis of employment within Rome, and throughout Italy, that instigated immense social pressure. Though the Senatorial class had faced decline as self-competition within its ranks from the concentration of wealth; the Equites mostly expanded in number and prevalence both in terms of economic stature and political authority. This shift was, in part, from the natural role of the Equites who were open to economic diversification while without legal or dictating societal code. They then were able to be affirmed as allies of the Plebeians outside the Senatorial elite. The shift of the Equites away from the Senatorial elite toward the Plebeians and the Tribunes is, in part, economical. By asserting more political sway, the Equites opened more potential for class distinction and access to new means of capital gain.

The assertion of social impropriety of the prominent landed-estates comes most definitively from the first century AD in which under Emperor Nero, Pliny the Elder wrote “*verumque confitentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam, iam vero et provincias,*”⁵³ while the temporal nature of this author comes much after the political and societal context of the Marian Reforms. The creation of these estates (*latifundia*) that were bemoaned by Pliny was taking place well before Marius, during his reign and life, and most definitively after, as well. Pliny denounced a difficulty that had come to fruition in his era where the consolidation of such estates

⁵³ Pliny the Elder, *Historia Naturalis*. Book 18, Chapter 7, Translated: “*and truly confessing, the plantations destroyed Italy, and then also in truth the provinces.*”

whether in a rhetorical claim or not seemed to dominate both Italy and to threaten the provinces. As Pliny asserted, the destruction of Italy presents two distinct threats that were hazardous during the Marian Reforms. First, was the societal pressure that the latifundia created for--meant that the purchase of both public *and* private lands happened through legal means or extortion. The nature of the agricultural business excluding base substance denoted that small farmers were unable to compete with the large land holdings of the elite and were often pressured or forced to sell their land to the Senatorial class which, in turn, grew the power of select families while simultaneously depriving *some* Plebeians in a manner of economic independence. This purchase of Plebian farms, while legal, was often the beginning of the second and equally dangerous factor of the larger cycle of debt-slavery that *could be* and *was often* forced onto the lower classes. The small farm owners would often take out loans to use as the capital to run their farms, and should the crop fail, or the market price fell, the landowner would not be able to pay back the debt. It was possible for the holder of the debt to demand *service* or even to *imprison* the debtor until it was repaid or guaranteed by another.⁵⁴ This accumulation of debt goes beyond the traditional manner of the patron and client relationship that governed Ancient Roman politics and society and was more a resemblance of probable exploitation. While the absorption of smaller farms did occur throughout Italy, especially in Sicily, the prevalence of debt creation had a wider and deeper effect than merely the confiscation of property. Until the institution of the Marian Reforms, the means of entrance into the Roman Army was dictated mainly by the land holdings of the individual. The reduction of property available and the incorporation of land from the Plebeians and Proletariat reduced the overall amount of soldiers available to be

⁵⁴ Sandra R. Joshel, *Slavery in the Roman World*. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 53-54.

recruited by the Roman Army; this was compounded by the increasing need of a more permanent military force to address security and campaigns across the Mediterranean absent the traditional seasonal considerations. Furthermore, while under the prior system of military organization, citizens were hard-pressed to fulfill their obligations to the military mainly due to the personal cost. This meant *both* the practical necessities for service and supplying themselves on the campaign, but additionally, that personal debt also accrued at home--such as debt from untilled fields and farms that lay fallow. Livy in his history of Rome recounts the tale in the early Republic of a man that appeared before the people when the city was on the verge of war and bemoaned his fate as he was an older man with an unkempt appearance and he declared that he was a debtor and a military hero. It was said that some people recognized the man as he displayed his battle scars to the public and told of how while he had served, the debt had taken everything from him upon his return and while he had earned glory, he was then ruined and his property forfeit and potentially himself as well.⁵⁵ Thus, the economic disparity created a true sense of civil strife where a veteran returning victoriously from the campaign could face ruin and potential imprisonment or even forced servitude. Though such an allusion was the extreme of possibility, it does illustrate a practical problem faced by the Roman state and society which responded to this travesty with a vehement denouncement and through civil strife. This was particularly a problem early in Rome's history, and formal debt bondage between fellow Romans was outlawed in 326 BC and lessened in severity though this did not prevent nigh similar exploitation of both fellow citizens and foreigners.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Titus Livius (Livy), *The History of Rome*, Book 2. trans. Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D., Ed., (Harvard University Press, 1919), 2:23, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0151%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D23>.

⁵⁶ Thomas Wiedemann, *Greek and Roman Slavery*. (Croom Helm Ltd, 1981), 37-38.

The largest attempt to counter both the economic disparity in the Roman economy and the emerging social crisis was by the Gracchi brothers. Both Tiberius and Gaius, as Tribunes, sought a program to force the redistribution of land particularly targeting the Senatorial class or any landed-elite that had violated the right of possession to public land or *ager publicus*.⁵⁷ As the Latin dictates *ager publicus* is land in possession of the Roman state for use by the Roman citizenry but was *not meant* to be used as private property for the construction of estates or villas, but rather it was tantamount to be public grazing ground *or* as a place of leisure. The acquisition of such land was often part of the peace deal in conjunction with the expansion of the Roman hegemony as the cities or territories may be asked or demanded to forfeit a certain percentage of land or certain areas as the exclusive rights of Roman citizens or under state control. The extent to which the Roman state made use of this land is highly dependent on its location and the situation Rome was addressing. One such avenue was to auction the land to the public to then let it serve as *private property*. Even if this was undertaken, there were still laws regarding the consumption of such property and the extent to which one may grow one's holdings as it was dictated by *Lex Licinia Sextia* (367 BC) that no more than approximately 500 *iugera* of *ager publicus* was permitted.⁵⁸ The Gracchi attempted by reinforcing the archaic law to force those who possessed more than the allotted amount to turn over those portions of their land back into the public system to be redistributed to veterans or the landless populace. This was immensely well received by the *Populares* and was utterly detested by the *Optimates*. The prospect of the

⁵⁷ Andrew William Lintott, *Judicial Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic: A New Edition, with translation and commentary, of the laws from Urbino*. (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 44-46.

⁵⁸ Christopher J. Dart, "The Impact of the Gracchan Land Commission and the Dandis Power or the Triumvirs." (Hermes 139, no. 3, 2011), 342.
<http://www.jstor.org/jcu.idm.oclc.org/stable/23067319>.

plan was ideal as a means to address the social pressure of both the homeless and unemployed as it could grant a resurgence of small farms or at least provide a way for a larger percentage of the people to become self-sufficient. This plan ultimately did little and led to the murder of the Gracchi brothers. The second endeavor was by Gaius Gracchus came closer to success but ended with a crackdown by the Patricians to end the strife and prevent an attempt at sedition. This act of political suppression by the Optimates in 130s BC resounded throughout the political climate surrounding the Marian Reforms. The proposed land reform was still an ideal hope of the Populares, and the crisis of unemployment and housing for veterans haunted the then present. Gaius Marius' proposed Reforms presented a means to address *both* the societal crisis and the military's dilemma of a lack of soldiers. The removal of the requirement of property or equivalency in wealth to serve in the army while simultaneously providing the recruit a salary and his equipment paid at the state's expense yielded a new method of employment for the masses. This provided the youth, both within the cities and rural areas, a potential position of wealth and respect by serving in the army. Additionally, the promises of providing land within Italy and the provinces by the formation of colonies, whether fulfilled or not, would grant temporary solace to the strife in Rome. The creation of this newly mustered and organized force would enforce security throughout the Roman Republic on the frontiers and potentially provide enough soldiers for the suppression of banditry in core provinces. However, though these Reforms completely altered the basis of the army and addressed the dilemma of manpower; it also generated a new massive economic strain on the Roman state. A standing army was an enormous expenditure. Soldiers who had once fought in the idealized concept of the citizen-soldier as *defenders* of Rome and were perhaps rewarded by plunder upon victory now sought payment as a means to dictate their course of action. The conception of loyalty of the army

shifted to the tie of money as soldiers swiftly became loyal to their commander who cared for and paid them, rather than to that compared to the faith and support within Rome (as that many of the new troops--*most probably had never seen Rome*), as well as, the government. This would breed disastrous consequences within the Roman political sphere and would directly correlate to the eventual civil wars and to the predication that all power within the military was available to the new leader upon the condition of a *bribe* when assuming command.

The production of wealth and the flow of the Roman economy were inevitably connected to conquest providing a temporary boon for almost *all* sectors of society. The riches of spoil would provide redress to any notions of concern of debt within the state, and the essentiality of spectacle particularly triumphal processions would distract, if not, alleviate social concerns. The economic factors within Roman society surrounding the Marian Reforms reflected the negative aspects of the unsustainable cyclical system. Absent from the victories of the military and the mass tribute paid, the Roman economy could barely sustain itself on its *own* productive capacity, and the manner of tax collection lacked any formal institution to guarantee or provide an accurate assessment of revenue as taxes were collected through a private intermediary often times through Equites.⁵⁹

All these economic factors underlined the political tension of the Roman state in which the Marian Reforms were passed. Gaius Marius provided a new means for the masses to escape this cycle of debt and oppression with the opportunity to serve in the military at state expense with the potential to earn glory and wealth. This option of military service, open to the masses, was in direct violation of tradition but reflected a practical remedy to many of the dilemmas faced by the Roman state. With a new supply of fresh blood it could, in turn, perpetuate the

⁵⁹ Kyle McLeister, "Publicani in the Principate," (PhD thesis, McMaster University, 2016) 24-25.

flawed cycle of Roman conquest and spectacle to repair the bankrupt economy and fractured society.

4. Reforms in Use

The Marian Reforms of 107 BC were created and passed due to a sense of urgency and realistic necessity that the Romans faced due to the threat of the Jugurthine War in Numidia. This open threat commanded a re-evaluation of prior tactical deliberations and alteration in the heart of the Roman tradition and identity which was intrinsically linked to the militaristic nature of the Roman civilization. These modifications were undertaken with immense speed; however, the nature of their longevity is an additional consideration within the political aspect and social sphere that these Reforms altered. The actual practicality of the Reforms has been discussed regarding prompt tactical advantage and the advancement and maintenance of Roman security, as well as, the preservation of the Roman hegemony throughout the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the long-term benefits with the introduction of the needed manpower simultaneously crippled the Roman state due to the costs of this undertaking. Both the economic and the social pressure exerted from the *current* political element of the military as an entity unto *itself* which is separate from the direct connection or affiliation with one's (citizen) stature. The longevity of the Reforms was owed to the continued political dominance of Gaius Marius, who defied Roman Law and tradition *again* by assuming the highest office of Consul a staggering *seven* times in all. Marius held the consulship first in 107 BC where he instituted the Reforms, then again with repeated re-election from 104-100 BC as he addressed the threat in the north and the seventh time in 86 BC when Marius then was fighting Sulla.⁶⁰ Marius was able to maintain his position and continue reshaping Rome, predominantly because of *another* external threat. The Gauls and Germanic

⁶⁰ *The History of Rome*, (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1837), 226.

https://books.google.it/books?id=UqMoAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA226&dq=Cimbrian+war&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjOm9_gobiAhVRbVAKHZFoBZIQ6AEIMDAC#v=onepage&q=Cimbrian%20war&f=false

tribes from the north that threatened Roman Provence and had the probability of crossing the Alps *again* and invading the Italic Peninsula created a *new* sense of peril to Rome. Not unlike Jugurtha, it was more a threat to the empire in its *entirety* rather than to that of the City of Rome, as the center of authority. The impact of a Gallic threat on the Roman psyche was exponentially more than that of Jugurtha. The ability of Marius, with his newly trained army, to respond to the challenge is a principal cause of the Reforms endurance.

The impression of the Gauls to the Romans is based on a wide range of factors. The first being the geographic relation of these two distinct cultural groups and civilizations--for while the term *Gauls* is used to describe the movements and relations of its populace. The Gauls were not a unified people *or* a political entity, and as such, were fragmented tribes that may have been joined through blood *or* alliance to face any challenge. This political fragmentation is also, in part, the prime difference between the Gauls threat from the north and Jugurtha in the south as Rome was a formidable opponent that could address the threat posed by a singular monarchal *or* a tribal chieftain based political entity compared to the nigh-endless diverse and separate, but linked groups and tribes of the Gauls, *or who they called Gauls*. Like Julius Caesar, the eventual conqueror of Gaul, using the military organization from Marius wrote of Gaul in the *De bello Gallico*: “Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiamqui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur.”⁶¹ Though Caesar is outside the temporal association of the political context; he is emblematic of the inheritance and continuation of the system instituted by Marius while additionally, his writings and deeds allude to a wider scholarly and popular conception of the Gallic people. Furthermore, his

⁶¹ C. Julius Caesar, *De bello Gallico*. ed. T. Rice Holmes, Caes. Gal. 1.1.1. Translated: “All of Gaul was divided into three parts, of which the Belgae inhabit one, another the Aquitani inhabit, and the third being called in their language Celts, (but) in ours Gauls.”
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.02.0002>.

oversimplification allows the Romans to better understand a larger political fragmentation within the guise of asserted cultural groups *or* basing the naming of the tribes based off of the potentially *strongest tribe or people*. The past relations of the Romans and Gauls were one of bloody conflict, and at the same time, it is very probable without that conflict, Rome may not have arisen to assert dominance throughout the Italic Peninsula, let alone become a significant power unto *itself*. The crux event was the sacking of Rome by the Gauls in 387 BC.⁶² The tribe of the Senones crossed the Alps from Gaul into Italy with approximately thirty thousand soldiers and proceeded to wage war and loot the inhabitants.⁶³ The Roman account attributed the Senones as less militaristic conquerors, but rather pillagers with the intention of plundering and then *most likely* planning to withdraw. Perhaps the speculation attributed to the Senones was a similarity to force of nature that came, eventually had to be endured, and was defeated. Rather than, an equal to themselves who bested them and nearly dominated the Latin people as the actual damage caused by the sacking is highly disputed by historians but ancient historians bemoaned it as a tragedy.⁶⁴ The sacking of Rome did irrefutable damage to the Roman consciousness and was evident through all future relations as this event would be constantly mentioned as a dishonor and a tragedy that must *never* be repeated.⁶⁵ This assertion of the will to never endure further humiliation provoked the same response in modernity as antiquity where certain calamities are seen as rallying moments for a civilization. Instead of being the dissolution of Rome, the sacking marked the beginning of mass expansion. Within only a century, Rome

⁶² Thomas S. Burns, *A History of the Ostrogoths*. (Indiana University Press, 1984), 1-3.

⁶³ Harry Mountain, *The Celtic Encyclopedia*, Volume 1, (self-pub, Upublish.com, 1997), 219.

⁶⁴ Arthur M. Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. (University of California Press, 2006), 132.

⁶⁵ Stephen L. Dyson, *The Creation of the Roman Frontier*. (Princeton University Press, 1985), 16.

would expand far into the Mediterranean and wage war with the *then current power* of Carthage in the west and invade Greece in the east. Rome's ascension to power was that their actions were of a defensive nature by shielding themselves *or* by coming to the aid of esteemed friends or allies of Rome. The Romans were building a buffer zone to protect the city as that would be the immediate solution within Italy and once a process of militaristic expansion begins it is hard pressed to be sate unless otherwise defeated from within *or* externally halted. All outward growth was, in part, fueled by the fear that Rome would be under threat.

The next two events and conquerors that inspired the same dread in the Roman people was King Pyrrhus of Epirus and Hannibal of Carthage as *both* invaded Italy, proper, and were a true danger to everything the Romans had built. These men showed the potential fragility of the Roman state as it seemed not even to be able to defend its *own* capital city. The ultimate risk of Jugurtha that was the major justification of the staggering Marian Reforms was, in effect, relatively minor compared to the past considerations. However, as Sallust had asserted, that some Romans indeed feared for their *own* liberty at the prospect of Jugurtha.⁶⁶ There is a possible degree of association of Jugurtha to Hannibal or to Pyrrhus through the individual centrality of these people is a shared link with the potential association of Jugurtha and the crisis in Numidia to the threat of the Gallic people in the north. The Gauls were the first to threaten truly *the core* of the Roman civilization, and any danger afterward would surely face scrutiny or relation to such. The potential of Jugurtha as a threat to Rome and the empire was vastly inferior to the threat to Rome *the City*, though the conception of Rome as the City *or* Rome as the empire, the distinction, in thought, between the two in the Roman outset is not apparent. The Romans in a political sense made a division between the two, however, the correlation of Rome to the

⁶⁶ Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum*, Chapter 39, <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/sall.2.html>.

perception of empire due to the inevitable dependence of the metropolis of Rome on its larger holdings for the simple necessity of sustenance among all other resource imports.⁶⁷ The inspiration of dread caused by the prospect of another Gallic invasion faced by Marius in 104 BC would truly echo the beyond rational fear that the sack of Rome caused. The concern that the feat of Rome *actually* being under threat *again* was almost inconceivable for it had been well *over two centuries* since that event when Marius was sent north to address the movements of the tribes.

The two tribes that were of greatest concern due to their migration into Roman controlled territory were the Cimbri, and the Teutones and the Romans became engaged in the Cimbrian War (113-101 BC).⁶⁸ These tribes were considered to be Germanic in origin, and while the Romans were cautious of the Gauls at best, they were terrified at worst--though, the level of panic only increased as the Germanic people were known as having natural military talent and this reputation was well earned from the Cimbrian War. The movement of the Germanic people was a threat unto its own, but the concern that they wished to settle in the Roman territory or displace other tribes outside of the direct Roman hegemony but on the borderlands, thus, forcing even more migration by disrupting the balance of power was a true dilemma. An additional aspect that was a potential danger was that a tribe of Gauls would make an alliance with the Germanic people to provide them with land to settle in exchange for an increase in military dominance perhaps allowing a tribe whether originally friends of Rome or mortal enemies to rise to prominence in the region. The speculation of the potential threat alludes to the concern that the

⁶⁷ Scott A. J. Johnson, *Why Did Ancient Civilizations Fail?*, (Routledge, New York, 2017), 143.

⁶⁸ *History of the Roman Legions: History of Rome*, (self-pub, 2015), <https://books.google.it/books?id=OLQ2CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1152&dq=Cimbrian+war&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAlpbn8IfiAhVMGpoKHT0UAd4Q6AEIQTAF#v=onepage&q=Cimbrian%20war&f=false>.

Romans were facing especially when early Consuls and generals sent against the tribes accomplished very little, and there were multiple defeats. A staggering defeat was after the battle of Noreia where the Romans were routed and slaughtered with nearly the loss of the entire army presenting a horrendous blow to open the war against the Germanic and Gallic forces.⁶⁹ The war had already begun on the frontier across the Alps, while Marius was *not* in a position of prominence. Though, after his rise to power and the passing of his Reforms, he had been sent to battle Jugurtha. The victory won in Africa, and the popularity that Marius *himself* had garnered in light of this achievement compounded by the newfound loyalty of the army ushered him to be a central figure in Roman politics. In 104 BC, Marius in defiance of tradition was elected *once more* to the Consulship to give him supreme military power to defend the Republic and Rome *itself* from the Cimbri and Teutones. The exact nature of the legal code dictating that someone could not be elected to the consulship except once every decade or that a second term was banned, or taboo is ambiguous but it did act against precedent and when it occurred there was usually an emergency or other special permission was granted.⁷⁰ Scipio was granted an additional consulship to address the crisis of Carthage and likewise Marius was granted multiple years to face the grave threat to the north. Additionally, due to devastating losses where nearly eighty thousand men were annihilated after the battle of Arausio, Marius was tasked with mustering additional forces brought together entirely by his new methods of organization.⁷¹ This military force was taken from across the social classes with absolutely no restriction on wealth or

⁶⁹ Gareth C. Sampson, *The Crisis in Rome: The Jugurthine and Northern Wars and the Rise of Marius*. (Pen & Sword Books, Ltd, UK, 2010), 93.

⁷⁰ T. Corey Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic: Volume 2: 122 to 49 BC*. (Oxford University Press, 2000), 650-651.

⁷¹ Richard A. Gabriel, *The Great Armies of Antiquity*. (Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Publishers, 2002), 266.

social standing, and therefore the entire force was absolutely loyal to Gaius Marius to whom they owed everything. This army was the true test of the ability of both the commander and the Reforms that he had passed for the new military organization was the heart of these legions that had no prior training to factor. This military force lacked any great tradition, but rather could factor the full benefits of new recruits from the pool of manpower. The trust in Marius, as well as, his political dominance due to faction politics and potentiality of liquidating assets to serve as largess to inspire votes kept him in power constantly being re-elected to the consulship. Even as far as electing him *in absentia* (in absence). Though the factor of fear of the Gauls and Germanic people was indeed an influence in the causation of this for only when the Republic and Rome were threatened did the extremes become seen as necessary.⁷² After the army was sufficiently trained and supplied, Marius was ready to face the Cimbri and the Teutones. The great hero of Africa was then set to face the Gauls and Germanic tribes in the north. The clash between Marius and the Germanic people ended with a complete Roman victory and the full routing or otherwise defeat of the opposing forces. By this victory, Marius had earned his place in the annals of Roman history as a great conqueror and defender of the Roman state. Marius was so acclaimed for defeating this ancient enemy that terrified the Roman imagination inciting true terror in the people that Marius was named as “the third founder of Rome,” a true honor to compare Marius to both Romulus and to Brutus the first king and founder of the Republic respectively.⁷³

Furthermore, his Reforms were *then proven* as truly effective and efficient for the purposes of military organization and tactical advantages. Their practicality had been tested in

⁷² Thomas S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians, 100 B.C.-A.D. 400*. (Baltimore, Maryland, The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), 65-66.

⁷³ Plutarch, *The Parallel Lives*, trans. by Bill Thayer, Loeb Publishing 1920, Updated 11/28/2017, Chapter 27.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Marius*.html.

two diverse conflicts and climates and served Rome well. The Marian Reforms by their intrinsic alteration to the foundation of Rome and the nature of such Reforms *themselves* created the nigh impossibility of their removal for once the introduction of the proletariat became viable. It would be difficult *not* to make use of such a valuable resource and cause undue political strife to attempt to ban or remove them. Rome had entered the age of the professional army that would defend and expand Rome to become *the true masters* of the Mediterranean.

5. Conclusion

The Marian Reforms of 107 BC marked a significant transition within the history of Rome. The actual effects of the alterations bolstered the military might of the Roman state through the introduction of the proletariat thus correcting the crisis of manpower. Jugurtha presented a valid and urgent demand to alter the military due to its seeming inability to subdue him and thereby, yielding Gaius Marius--a political target upon which he could rise to power and gain the consulship. The threat of Jugurtha was addressed by the Reforms that altered the core of the military's organization and consequently changing of tactics to better suit the *new army*. The promise of victory allowed the Reforms to pass; due to the current state of Roman society, they could not harness *any* potential opposition to Gaius Marius' prominence. Roman civilization in the late Republic was bemoaned by the Romans *themselves* to be horrendously corrupt with the prior century of success leading to excess within the population. The people who had once been in their myths the glorious conquerors had fallen victim to the problem of success and had become dependent upon its continuity and simultaneously had been corroded with avarice. The Plebian class through the Tribunes with the cooperation of the Equites used the courts to sanction various prominent Optimates, in part, in response to the murder of the Gracchi brothers whose ideals were still inspiring civil strife and also due to the apparent weakness and incompetence of the aristocracy in dealing with the Jugurthine threat. The Tribunes thought that the Optimates were clearly corrupt and were only losing the war because they had been bribed. Regardless of the veracity of these claims, they brought many prominent families that would have opposed Marius for the consulship to trial and the ensuing scandal removed them from running. This

political climate of corruption and strife allowed Marius to defy tradition and pass the Reforms openly.

Furthermore, the actual economy of the Roman state was in part feeding both the necessity of the changes and political strife gripping the city. The consolidation of land by the wealthy and the increasing oligarchic and kleptocratic tendencies of the Roman Republic led to the manpower crisis under King Servius' system of military organization, as well as, the political dissension of the Gracchi and the following political factionalism causing intense division. The entire longevity of the Reforms beyond the status of Gaius Marius' career and lack of reactionism by the Optimates in the response to tradition came from both the weakness of aristocracy to oppose the Reforms after implementation and the evident effective nature of such. The Reforms lasted as undoing them would cause intense confusion and unnecessary political strife for there was not an ideal alternative to keeping the Reforms that eventually took on a sense of tradition *themselves*.

The Marian Reforms would serve as the foundation of the military leading to the rise of illustrious and charismatic figures following Marius such as Sulla, Pompey the Great, and Julius Caesar. Gaius Marius was forever able to change Rome *both* for the better and the worse due to the weakness of the aristocracy which could have kept him in check and the apparent requirement of change for the preservation and prosperity of the Roman state. For Rome to be an Empire, the military needed to expand, and Gaius Marius ushered in a new era of Roman dominance.

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