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Crisis Dependency: Populist Leadership and the Expansion of Executive Authority in Western Democracies
Slaney, Zachary
Slaney, Zachary
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Abstract
Western democracies are increasingly facing overlapping crises such as economic instability, migration pressures, pandemics, and political polarization. This can create opportunities for executives to expand their authority, by constantly claiming these issues as existential threats that need immediate action. While democratic institutions are designed to check executive power, using sustained crisis framing can cause gradual shifts that weaken these checks. With the rise of populist leaders, this thesis examines how some populist leaders have transformed crisis from a temporary disruption into a permanent governing strategy. This strategy can slowly weaken democratic oversight and centralizes executive control. In order to understand the dynamic between crisis framing and executive expansion, this research introduces the concept of crisis dependency. Crisis dependency is defined as the reliance on constant crisis framing to expand executive authority, work around institutional constraints, and shift public expectations toward executive-centered governance. Unlike traditional emergency powers that formally suspend law, crisis dependency operates within existing legal frameworks through ongoing rhetoric and subtle institutional change. The research question created from this is: Under what conditions does sustained crisis framing by populist leaders lead to the expansion of executive authority in established Western democracies? Comparative analysis of the United States (2017-2021), Hungary (2010-present), and Italy (2022-present) reveals that sustained crisis framing consistently leads to increase in executive authority, weakening of institutional oversight, and increased public acceptance of emergency governance measures. Through these case studies four mechanisms that drive this process were developed: crisis construction, institutional circumvention, public expectation shifts, and normalization of exceptional measures. The case studies reveal that crisis dependency develops in varying degrees. Hungary demonstrates full entrenchment through normalized rule by decree, the United States shows emerging crisis dependency constrained by constitutional resistance, and Italy exhibits moderate development limited by coalition politics and EU oversight. In every case, repeated crisis narratives enabled executives to justify unilateral action, pressure 2 oversight institutions, and reshape democratic expectations. From the research, three recommendations are advised to strengthen democratic resilience against crisis dependency: 1. Strengthen Legislative Oversight: Implement automatic sunset clauses requiring legislative renewal of emergency measures. 2. Protect Institutional Independence: Accelerate rather than delay judicial review of emergency measures. 3. Prevent Normalization of Emergency Powers: Define emergency powers more narrowly in law and require regular public reporting on emergency measures. This research demonstrates that populist leaders use constant crisis framing to erode democratic checks and balances. This occurs gradually through normalizing emergency politics rather than dramatic constitutional change. Crisis dependency reveals how sustained emergency framing can become a strategic governing tool that alters institutional behavior while maintaining democratic appearances. The analysis shows that protecting democracy requires ensuring executive action in times of crises remains exceptional rather than routine.
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Master of Arts in International Affairs -- John Cabot University, Spring 2026.
Date
2026
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Populism, Political leadership, Western countries
Citation
Slaney, Zachary. "Crisis Dependency: Populist Leadership and the Expansion of Executive Authority in Western Democracies". Master's Thesis, John Cabot University, Rome, Italy. 2026.
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International